[MD] SOM is what?

[John Carl]

David,

You asked:

Why do you think SOM is a social pattern?



J:  I don't.  I think our society operates according to a philosophy that
has SOM as it's metaphysical basis.  Is there any argument about that?

dmb:


> Why do you think the giant MUST work according to SOM rules? Where is this
> found as a fact? Does anyone think so other than you? It seems to me that
> you're simply talking about something else entirely. Whatever it is, it's
> not SOM.
>
>
J:  Well to be sure, I wasn't so much asserting as asking.  But my reason
for doing so is that it seems SOM is uniquely suited to social patterns -
it sees everything in terms of subjects and objects, and that is exactly
what a well-ordered society must do if it wants to protect people's objects
and keep it's subjects in line.

dmb:


> The term is philosophical and refers to a family of philosophical views. I
> really don't see any reason why we should think of it as a social pattern
> that rules social patterns.
>


J:  I don't think SOM is a social pattern but I do think it rules society.
As Prof James points out "throughout history".  To my mind this raises the
question, why?
Inevitability or chance?

Thanks for your thoughts,

John


"Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been
> treated...."
>
> "The first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by experience
> will save us is an artificial conception of the relations between knower
> and known. Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object
> have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities; and thereupon the
> presence of the latter to the former, or the 'apprehension' by the former
> of the latter, has assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of
> theories had to be invented to overcome. All the while, in the very bosom
> of the finite experience, every conjunction required to make the relation
> intelligible, is given in full." -- William James
>
>
>



>
>
>
> > On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 10:55 AM, david <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > In a different thread...
> > >
> > > John said to Arlo:
> > > SOM is a social pattern.
> > >
> > > ...successful intellectual patterns are those that are chosen by a
> > > majority of a group.  An intellectual pattern that resides in the head
> of
> > > one person, dies quickly and is forgotton, so there has to be a
> society for
> > > intellect to happen as much as there have to be biological beings in
> order
> > > to make up a society. When a society has evolved out of a chosen (at
> some
> > > earlier time) set of metaphysical premises, it gets labeled by the
> premises
> > > it follows - thus our social system is SOM because that's its king.
> > >
> > > ...SOM is a Western European evolved construct, with so much intellect
> > > woven into it's social patterns which has given it power over objects.
> > > ...You have to bow down to the powerful subjects with objective power -
> > > they rule.
> > >
> > >
> > > dmb says:
> > > I think that doesn't make much sense, John.
> > > The following article does a pretty good job of explaining
> subject-object
> > > metaphysics and its role in Modern Western philosophy - and it does so
> > > without even mentioning Pirsig or pragmatism. It's freshly pressed and
> > > mercifully short. I hope you read it and I sincerely hope it helps.
> > >
> > > ----------------------------------
> > > Kant’s idea that one can never see what the world is really like
> > > “underneath” the phenomenological world we are in, whilst a great
> > > departure, is still minimally in the tradition of the Empiricists
> before
> > > him: it still had a veil of perception model. His world was still a bit
> > > like the world of Hume, were we had a subject receiving bits of
> information
> > > – it’s just that Kant gave us a way in his Transcendental Subject of
> > > preserving objectivity, causality and so on across this series. He
> gave an
> > > account of how experience can be structured objectively and reliably.
> > > This system still has certain minimal metaphysical commitments: there
> is a
> > > subject, there are things in themselves (which we might call objects),
> and
> > > there is the symptomal phenomenal which we have direct contact with.
> There
> > > is still what we call a subject-object distinction. An “out there” that
> > > becomes an “in here”. A world that enters a mind.
> > > This model is explicitly rejected by early 20th Century continental
> > > philosophers in the Husserl-Heidegger-Sartre lineage. For these
> figures,
> > > there is no God or external world pumping the mind with information
> through
> > > the senses; the world is just the world, and we should infer things
> about
> > > it using the phenomenological method. We should make no global
> assumptions
> > > about where it “comes from,” but just treat it as it is: as we are in
> it.
> > > Of course scientific ideas about the brain and so on are perfectly
> > > consistently with this (though the account varies considerably among
> > > Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre).
> > > Further to this line of reasoning, we might even get rid of the
> > > transcendental subject and just say the world is already as part of its
> > > being, structured and meaningful (the Hiedeggerian insight). It isn’t
> in a
> > > mind being processed for us: concepts, beliefs, knowledge, rules,
> goals,
> > > and so on – features of conscious reflection are not the prima faschie
> way
> > > in which the world is.
> > > To motivate this starling conclusion, let’s take a few examples and
> begin
> > > from the Husserlian point-of-view, that is, phenomenologically.
> > > When I arrive in a room, and reflect, finding myself in it, do I have
> > > memories of turning the door handle to get in? Do I remember walking
> here,
> > > that is, putting one foot in front of another? No. Yet these things are
> > > historically necessary to connect the memories I do have – memories of
> > > being in a place before this room and now being here.
> > > Let’s be more immediate: When I’m typing quickly on a keyboard, am I
> > > representing the keys in my mind, forming beliefs about them and
> acting on
> > > these beliefs? Is, in other words, my engagement with the keyboard
> mediated
> > > through my consciousness, through mental representations of what’s
> going
> > > on? No. However, were a key to break – or become stuck – suddenly I
> would
> > > engage with the key in this fashion: I would create models of what’s
> going
> > > on (“it’s broken,” “it’s sticky,” etc.) I would respond to these models
> > > based on conscious reasoning.
> > > What is the state of the world before these kinds of problems are
> > > introduced: before the door handle sticks, or they keyboard breaks? It
> is a
> > > kind of flow – a “being in the zone” – in which there is no self as
> such.
> > > The world is just moving seamlessly my body and the world are
> responding to
> > > one another in an unmediated way – I’m not “loading the world” into
> > > consciousness. When things break in fact, I really have no memory of
> being
> > > in this flow and have to form retrospective beliefs about what was
> > > happening.
> > > This pre-reflective moment has a characteristic which we might call
> > > transparency. Things in the world do not show up as things, as objects
> > > about which to form models/beliefs, etc. They are transparent.
> > > The classic example of the first, is a hammer. A hammer,
> > > phenomenologically speaking (of course!) – does not show up to us as
> merely
> > > a piece of wood and metal. One can relate to it as a piece of wood and
> > > metal, but that’s not the immediate nature of its being. Compare here a
> > > piece of wood laying about on a floor, with the very same piece of wood
> > > placed in a doorway – it becomes transformed from something much more
> like
> > > a material or substance (“wood”) into a piece of equipment (“something
> > > used”). These two modes of being which Heidegger calls present-to-hand
> and
> > > ready-to-hand are quite useful in clarifying the “phenomenology of
> > > scientific realism” – that is, precisely what is going on when a
> realist
> > > goes about making claims about atoms. He sees very well that there’s a
> door
> > > in front of him but nevertheless insists that it’s just wood, or worse,
> > > strings of hydrocarbons. This is because the realist is always
> inclined,
> > > upon reflection, to opt to relate to things as substances
> (present-to-hand).
> > > -Michael Burgess
> > >
> > > ----------------------------------------------
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
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