[MD] Sociability Re-examined

Jan Anders Andersson jananderses at telia.com
Thu Oct 2 02:41:38 PDT 2014


Craig and Arlo


> [Craig, previously]
> Perhaps we should look for examples of social immorality:
> 
> I promise to meet you, but don't meet up.
> We agree to meet, but I don't meet up.
> I intend to meet you (but don't promise to) & I realize you recognize my intention, but don't meet up.
> You expect me to meet you and I realize this, but I don't meet up.
> I intend to meet you, but don't meet up.
> 
> Which of these are humans but not animals capable of?
> Which of these are 3rd level & which are merely 2nd level?
> 
> [Arlo had replied]
> For Tomasello, and others following the socio-cultural tradition, all of these are social.
> 
> [Craig]
> Yes, but what about my questions?
> 
> [Arlo]
> Well, this directly answers your second question, all of these are 3rd level (social) activities. As to the first, I think I answered that as well, although I apologize if that was unclear.
> 
> [Arlo previously]
> They all derive from semiotically-mediated activity. Even the ones that are not outright 'verbal' above require some manner of language to enable the activity. 
> 
> [Arlo continues]
> All of these evidence enough necessary semiotic mediation as to make them exclusively human activities. As for something I might point to as an example of primitive social (mediated, purposeful, semiotic, agenic activity) displayed by a non-human species would be something like a primate directing the attention of another primate to a stick, and that primate picks up and hands the stick to the first primate. In this case, although it is semiotically-mediated, the mediation is primitive enough so as not to require sophisticated language use. In your examples, 'intent' that is able to formulate 'in the future' requires a necessary complex enough code as to render 'in the future' intelligible. So although the primates in this example must share attention (biological), and must extend that into a mediated exchange of intentional activity (social), it is something that pales in comparison to the social activity enabled by complex semiosis. 

Jan-Anders

The difference between animals and humans is that humans are able to make deals. Any concept, any word, have a meaning and consequence that has to be confirmed by all parts for it to be useful. The concept of Yellow for example is meaningful only if there is a common acceptance for it. The meaning of MOQ is actually processed here.
Laws and justice are based on such common acceptance or dealt with at the court. Animals are unable to make such agreements. Therefore there mustn’t be anything like ”Animal rights”. It is us humans that has to be agree about being careful to the biological patterns.

Jan-Anders


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