[MD] Sociopathy (wasRe: Step Two)

ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR ajb102 at psu.edu
Wed Sep 3 11:02:41 PDT 2014


[JA]
RMP says it began with level 1 the inorganic a while ago. Was the social level then? No. Is the social level present now? Yes.

[DMB]
It's true that the MOQ's levels are presented as an evolutionary hierarchy so that each level is a distinct stage or phase of evolutionary development - but it does not promise and cannot offer the kind of magnifying glass you seek.

[Arlo]
What JA is presenting (to reference back to Paul Turner's "Two Contexts" paper) is the 'ontological' framework of Pirsig's MOQ. But what seems to be missing is an understanding of the 'epistemological' foundations. That is, I think JA is misconstruing a high-quality intellectual pattern (evolution) with an external, objective 'reality'. To be sure, 'evolution' is highly explanatory, and provides us with a lens that provides very useful answers to many questions. But what appears missing is an understanding (or acceptance) that epistemologically 'time' and 'evolution' do not precede 'experience'. That is, saying that the inorganic level predated the biological, which came 'after' (aka "time"), is not a description of an external 'reality' but a highly-useful way of understanding experience. Perhaps a better 'lens' than 'time is an arrow' will come along one day, and we'll have to reconsider how we understand 'evolution'. In this way, Pirsig's MOQ is not a 'description of an external reality' but a 'way of ordering and understanding experience'. 

[DMB]
It seems that many of the questions about the transitions between levels are simply scientific questions and we can look at their data and see how it fits in - or not. Arlo's recent attempts are a good example of that.

[Arlo]
Precisely. Arguments over the nature of 'social patterns' go wrong when they start to imply a fixed, objective, nature that is True. The argument is really about which 'lens' holds better explanatory value; both in preserving coherence within the MOQ, and taking this into a pragmatic, interdisciplinary theory that is supported by empirical studies. That is, (1) does it make sense within the MOQ's structure, and (2) does it makes sense when applied to our experience. 

If I argue that the fundamental nature of social patterns is 'reading', I would have to explain (1) how this preserves coherence with the MOQ (how does 'reading' emerge directly from biological patterns), and (2) how does this transition into a coherence with our experience in the world (where do we observe, or how can we study, this claim? is it supported by archaeology? psychology? anthropology? physiology? biology? etc.?).

This is why I've argued that 'shared attention' is the best lens I've come across for understanding bio-to-socio evolution. It preserves internal coherence within the MOQ's structure, and it is supported by empirical (and broad interdisciplinary) studies. That is, it has both 'internal' and 'external' coherence. 

Is it the ONLY lens? No. Do other lenses have any value? Sure. Will a better lens come along? Very likely. But this is just restating what Pirsig wrote:

"But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something better comes along. One can then examine intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings in an art gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the "real" painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value. There are many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can perceive some to have more quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the result of our history and current patterns of values." (Pirsig, LILA)

[DMB]
I think there are some very interesting studies in primate morality that show us where our own social level morality comes from. You can see the seeds of it in the behavior of our closest primate cousins and even a little bit in rats. But these are empirical questions that can only rightly be answered by research out in the fields and labs.

[Arlo]
Of course, I agree. This is why I distance myself from the notion that the social level must exclude ANY and ALL non-human patterns of activity, even at the lowest, most primitive or rudimentary end of the social-level spectrum. It's certainly untenable with regard to external coherence, and ultimately its problematic for internal coherence as well. 



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