[MD] Julian Baggini: This is what the clash of civilisations is really about

[Ron Kulp]

John,
Aristotle says something similar in book alpha of metaphysics, that we seek to render the unintelligible intelligible. We impose limit on experience in order to better understand it. 
I think that is different than a will for
Absolutes. 
I think that's where some disagree
With Royce.
Ron

> On May 25, 2015, at 5:00 PM, John Carl <ridgecoyote at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> dmb, all,
> 
> 
> 
>> On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 11:27 AM, david <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Baggini wrote:
>> 
>> "The clash of civilisations is happening not between Islam and the West,
>> as we are often led to believe, but between pragmatic relativism and
>> dogmatic certainty."
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> dmb says:
>> 
>> We don't need Truth to be Objective, Fixed, Absolute, or Eternal and we
>> can't have that kind of truth anyway. But we do need truth to be vigorous
>> enough and strong enough to kill lies, bullshit, fanaticism, propaganda,
>> honest mistakes and good old fashioned stupidity. We need excellence in
>> thought and speech and ideas that actually work when they're put into
>> practice.
> 
> "The contrast is not one between intellectualism and pragmatism. It is the
> contrast between two well-known attitudes of will, — the will that is loyal
> to truth as an universal ideal, and the will that is concerned with its own
> passing caprices.
> 
> And yet, despite all this, the modern assault upon mere intellectualism is
> well founded. The truth of our assertions is indeed definable only by
> taking account of the meaning of our own individual attitudes of will, and
> the truth, whatever else it is, is at least instrumental in helping us
> towards the goal of all human volition. The only question is whether the
> will I really means to aim at doing something that has a final and eternal
> meaning.
> 
> All logic is the logic of the will. There is no pure intellect. Thought is
> a mode of action, a mode of action distinguished from other modes mainly by
> its internal clearness of self-consciousness, by its relatively free
> control of its own procedure, and by the universality, the impersonal
> fairness and obviousness of its aims and of its motives. An idea in the
> consciousness of a thinker is simply a present consciousness of some
> expression of purpose, — a plan of action. A judgment is an act of a
> reflective and self-conscious character, an act whereby one accepts or
> rejects an idea as a sufficient expression of the very purpose that is each
> time in question. Our whole objective world is meanwhile defined for each
> of us in terms of our ideas. General assertions about the meaning of our
> ideas are reflective acts whereby we acknowledge and accept certain ruling
> principles of action.
> 
> And in respect of all these aspects of doctrine I find myself at one with
> recent voluntarism, whether the latter takes the form of instrumentalism,
> or insists upon some more individualistic theory of truth. But for my part,
> in spite, or in fact because of this my voluntarism, I cannot rest in any
> mere relativism. Individualism is right in saying, "I will to credit this
> or that opinion." But individualism is wrong in supposing that I can ever
> be content with my own will in as far as it is merely an individual will.
> The will to my mind is to all of us nothing but a thirst for complete and
> conscious self-possession, for fullness of life. And in terms of this its
> central motive, the will defines the truth that it endlessly seeks as a
> truth that possesses completeness, totality, self-possession, and there
> fore absoluteness."
> 
> J Royce -  William James and other Essays on the Philosophy of Life
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