[MD] Julian Baggini: This is what the clash of civilisations is really about

[Dan Glover]

John,

On Mon, Sep 7, 2015 at 2:08 PM, John Carl <ridgecoyote at gmail.com> wrote:
> Happy Labor Day, Dan,
>
> On 9/6/15, Dan Glover <daneglover at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Dan:
>> Or with large swaths of the United States. Donald Trump for President?
>
> Jc:  He reminds me of two other politicians, both hugely successful -
> Reagan and Putin.  Reagan was laughed at by the intellectuals and  his
> own party elite  but had the last laugh and Putin with his
> bigger-than-life self-promotion all the time.   In a way, I hope it
> happens.  I think the leader should reflect the character of the
> people and think Trump captures where America is at today.  Yuck, I
> know, but there it is.

Dan:
I'd say Trump appeals to a certain demographic in the United States,
namely old, white, angry males. Luckily, those fanatics are in the
minority.

>JC:
> I actually have a brilliant campaign strategy for the Donald.  He
> should turn the search for the right veep, into a reality tv show -
> American Apprentice, and let people vote just like on American Idol.
> It's a win/win.  He runs an effective election campaign and actually
> makes money off of it.  People would eat that shit up.
>
> Dan:
>
>> County clerks withholding marriage licenses because of their religious
>> convictions? Really? The christian fundamentalists are no different
>> than radical islam.
>
> Jc:  Exactly.  Unfortunately, intellectuals don't have any effective
> means of dealing with either.  Intellectuals are too smart to get
> their hands dirty by talking about religious things, so religious
> things are allowed to grow and fester in the dark, uncriticized.
> That's a mistake  I believe and  Bagginni's article  confirms my
> belief.

Dan:
I'd say the court dealt with it... wouldn't you?

>
> Dan:
>
>>They all demand obedience to THEIR notion of god
>> and anyone who dares to differ is damned to hell for all eternity. So
>> yeah... if you really want to start a religious discussion, start with
>> that.
>
>
> Jc:  Religion is the means of absolutizing social patterns.  It's an
> effective means of keeping them stable and growing them.  what would
> arabs be without Islam?  Africans don't have a unifying religion and
> so their social patterns cannot compete against modernity - Islam is
> taking over Africa.  Now when we speak normally of our western
> advanced society, we mainly refer to Science, but science was never
> intended as a means of social conformity.  Science is founded upon
> criticism and analytic thinking.  People who think you can have a
> society based upon scientific values are, as we all know, SOMists and
> wrong.  Yet that is the kind of thinking that has been growing in
> authority over the last century.  It devolves into a kind of pragmatic
> self-ism, which is why I think the discussion of Personalism is an
> important one to have.

Dan:
I am not at all familiar with Personalism.

>
>>
>>> Jc:  I guess it depends upon what you mean by truth.  A novel is an
>>> expression of a person's story. Perhaps what you mean by truth is
>>> "factual".
>>
>> Dan:
>> No, not really. Again, by definition, a novel is a fictitious story.
>> We all need to recognize definitions to the terms we use, otherwise
>> all we're doing is sowing confusion.
>>
>
> Jc:  Some terms need to be negotiated.  For instance, we understand
> that the word "reality" has definitional problems in the language we
> use.  Thus "fictitious" falls under the same category, since  fiction
> means "unreal".

Dan:
I wouldn't say unreal. Rather, I would say fiction does not conform to
our agreement with experience. A novel is every bit as real as a
non-fiction book.

JC:
> In an MoQ discussion, Truth is not a matter of
> Reality.  Truth is a matter of 4th level value - what is
> intellectually good.  Thus a novel that is intellectually good, is
> true, in the highest sense of the MoQ.

Dan:
This seems to confuse the issue more than enlighten.

>JC:
> The following example of Ron's, is both truth and fiction:
>
> ORPHEUS with his lute made trees
> And the mountain tops that freeze
>    Bow themselves when he did sing:
> To his music plants and flowers
> Ever sprung; as sun and showers
>    There had made a lasting spring.
>
> Every thing that heard him play,
> Even the billows of the sea,
>    Hung their heads and then lay by.
> In sweet music is such art,
>    Killing care and grief of heart
>    Fall asleep, or hearing, die.
>
>
>
>> JC:
>>> That's "a" definition, I guess.  But I don't subscribe to that
>>> particular aspect of SOM.  No, by "truth", I mean the value of the 4th
>>> level, which is ultimately indefinable as a discreet concept, but rather a
>>> sort of urge toward, conceptualization itself.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Well, again, we don't get to pick and choose how we define our terms.
>> That's what a dictionary is for. Now, if you want to define 'truth' in
>> terms of the MOQ:
>>
>> "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with
>> experience, and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality
>> satisfies these." {Lila]
>>
>
> Jc: He's using the scientific definition of truth to affirm the MoQ,
> there.   He's not absolutizing the scientific methor, nor it's
> definitons by doing so.  The enterprise of the MoQ is to create a new
> mapping for truth.
>
> Dan:
>
>> "... one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the
>> highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge
>> that if the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be
>> taken provisionally; as useful until something better comes along."
>> [Lila]
>>
>
> Jc:  Amen!  And with that flexibility, we can use the term "truth" in
> a new and practical way that doesn't get too hung up on Objective
> categories.  The "problem of truth" disappears and the solution of
> truth becomes practically available for use.  Right in line with
> classical pragmatists.

Dan:
As long as we don't confuse the truth with anything goes.

>
>
>> Dan:
>> Truth, according to the MOQ, is not some sort of urge or even the
>> value of the 4th level. As you can see, there are parameters defining
>> truth in specific terms. Truth is not a sort of anything goes, which
>> is what you seem to infer.
>>
>
>
> Jc:  It's certainly not anything, that goes.  what works, is what goes
> and for that we need past and future experience as well as immediate.
>  But that's along a different topic...
>
>
>>>JC:
>>> Thus a novel can be, and often is, A truth.  It helps us conceptualize in
>>> our own lives, then that is what truth is all about.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Again, no. A novel is a fictional story. If we find it somehow relates
>> to our own lives, that doesn't make it true. It simply adds appeal.
>>
>>
>
> Jc:  if something is true for me, but not for you, then the truth is
> that some things are true for some people, but not for others.  if
> this statement is true, then logically speaking, it's not true.

Dan:
Remember the squirrel anecdote in Lila?

"It seems as though the squirrel is using the term "around" in a way
that is relative to itself but the man is using it in a way that is
relative to an absolute point in space outside of the squirrel and
himself. But if we drop the squirrel's relative point of view and we
take the absolute fixed point of view, what are we letting ourselves
in for? From a fixed point in space every human being on this planet
goes around every other human being to the east or west of him once a
day. The whole East River does a half-cartwheel over the Hudson each
morning and another one under it each evening. Is this what we want to
mean by "around"? If so, how useful is it? And if the squirrel's
relative point of view is false, how useless is it?

"What emerges is that the word "around," which seems like one of the
most clear and absolute and fixed terms in the universe suddenly turns
out to be relative and subjective. What is "around" depends on who you
are and what you're thinking about at the time you use it. The more
you tug at it the more things start to unravel. One such philosophic
tugger was Albert Einstein, who concluded that all time and space are
relative to the observer."

Dan comments:
According to this, your logic fails.

>JC:
>  What we mean by truth is what works out to be true for all of us.
> sometimes that takes time to work out so truth is a process.  It
> doesn't work solely on appeal, because appeal is so various.  But it
> doesn't work without appeal,  because nothing does.  Caring is as
> fundamental as Quality.

Dan:
This all seems to stem from your belief that a novel is true. On the
other hand, I have dictionary definitions backing up my assertion that
a novel is fictitious. That definition has nothing to do with being
true for one person or for everyone. And if we refuse to define terms
in ways that comport to the dictionary, then we allow a sort of
anything goes into the discussion.

>
>>
>> Dan:
>> We don't get to pick and choose the truth. My point was that there was
>> a reason why ZMM was called a novel.
>
> Jc:  Of course, it was injected into a SOM world that demands these
> categories and it's easier to go along than fight over every term.
> But honestly Dan, I've found ZAMM in more categories at the bookstore
> than I can name, from Travel to Religion to Mechanics.  The one place
> I never seem to find it is in the Novel section.  Usually it's in
> philosophy, to tell the truth.

Dan:
I don't know about your copy of ZMM, but mine states clearly on the
cover that it is a novel. Where you might find the book in a bookstore
has no bearing on that fact.

>
>
>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Past and future are convenient fictions. To accomplish anything, one
>> must be present, not ensconced in tomorrow and yesterday.
>>
>
> Jc:  The present is a convenient fiction.  It certainly doesn't exist
> in actual experience!  Nothing is less concrete than immediate
> experience.  "whoosh!"  there it goes.  There it went, leaving only
> the scant memory of its passing, .0023 microseconds ago.  Where is it?

Dan:
The present is experience. Everything else is but a memory.

>JC:
> Where was it, is more like it.  And where will it be tomorrow, or in
> the next minute.  When I do anything, from eating to breathing to
> cooking or exercising, I am doing in the hope of an expected or
> desired outcome.  All my immediate experience is then, is expectation
> and memory.

Dan:
If you go through life with those preconceived notions, you are
effectively removing all the magic... all the surprises... all the
newness of the day. And sure, most people do just that. Which I find
rather disheartening. But to each their own, as we say.

>
>>
>> Dan:
>> In the MOQ, experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality.
>
> Jc:  Hmmm... I guess I'm going to challenge you on that one.
> Experience is of static patterns.  Perhaps it could be said that
> experience is the static fallout of DQ.    I believe Pirsig said
> "immediate experience"  in which he was following along with James in
> dialogue.  But experience as a whole is roughly equivalent to
> "reality" but without the Cartesian baggage.

Dan:

Robert Pirsig:
In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a
preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no
pre-existing subject or object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become
synonymous. Change is probably the first concept emerging from this
Dynamic experience. Time is a primitive intellectual index of this
change. Substance was postulated by Aristotle as that which does not
change. Scientific “matter” is derived from the concept of substance.
Subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and
nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes
later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism,
which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so
pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ time is
dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction
from experience.”

DG:

Yes, this does help, thank you. What bothers me slightly—I am sure I
am not seeing it in the proper light yet—is how experience can be
synonymous with Dynamic Quality? Isn’t experience that which we
define?

RMP:

Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone. Consciousness can
be described as a process of defining Dynamic Quality. But once the
definitions emerge, they are static patterns and no longer apply to
Dynamic Quality. So one can say correctly that Dynamic Quality is both
infinitely definable and undefinable because definition never exhausts
it.

Dan comments:
So basically, I was saying the same thing you are now. And sure, we
could qualify the term experience with direct if we so choose. On the
other hand, if we begin to get a grasp upon the MOQ, that becomes
redundant.

>
>> Dan:
>> "This classification of patterns is not very original, but the
>> Metaphysics of Quality allows an assertion about them that is unusual.
>> It says they are not continuous. They are discrete. They have very
>> little to do with one another. Although each higher level is built on
>> a lower one it is not an extension of that lower level. Quite the
>> contrary. The higher level can often be seen to be in opposition to
>> the lower level, dominating it, controlling it where possible for its
>> own purposes." [Lila]
>>
>> Dan comments:
>> Now, if we want to discuss the MOQ, it behooves us to use the terms as
>> laid out in Lila. Otherwise, what are we talking about?
>
> Jc:   I admit I'm arguing with the author a bit.  I take his system as
> a whole, but disagree with the terms he uses here "dominate" and
> "control".  Often the relationship can be seen to be plainly creative
> and harmonious and should be more.  I think Pirsig held a grudge
> against society, and who can blame him?  If I'd been institutionalized
> and tortured, I'd certainly hold a grudge that would color my
> perceptions of the system that did that to me.   But especially in the
> area of the 1st and the 2nd levels, there is this tremendously rich
> interplay that is "oppositional".  And while intellect is critical of
> certain social patterns, it can't criticize social patterning as a
> whole, for it's very life is as dependent upon social patterns as
> social patterns are dependent upon biological beings for their
> instantiation.
>
> We've been over this before, sorry if it's getting boring.

Dan:
I am unsure how you are disagreeing with the quote I offered, if indeed you are.

>
>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Well, unfortunately the quote has mysteriously vanished (is that part
>> of your Jr. College logic course? Destroy conflicting evidence? :-))
>> and so I will reproduce it here.
>
> Jc:  'twould be a rather cheap ploy since referal back is so easy, but
> don't mistake logical argument with debate team tactics - you sophist
> you ;)
>
>>
>> "I also have a concern of my own. This is the concern that
>>>> philosophers, instead of coming to grips with the philosophy at hand,
>>>> sometimes dismiss it by saying, “Oh he is saying the same as someone
>>>> else,” or “someone else has said it much better.” This is the latter
>>>> half of the well known conservative argument that some new idea is (a)
>>>> no good because it hasn't been heard before or (b) it is no good
>>>> because it has been heard before. If, as has been noted by R.C.
>>>> Zaehner, once the Oxford University Professor of Eastern Religions and
>>>> Ethics, I am saying the same thing as Aristotle; and if, as has been
>>>> noted in the Harvard Educational Review, I am saying the same thing as
>>>> William James; and if as has been noted now that I may be saying the
>>>> same thing as Spinoza: then why has no one ever noticed that Aristotle
>>>> and Spinoza and William James are all saying the same thing?"
>>>>
>>>> [Robert Pirsig, A Brief Summary of the Metaphysics of Quality,
>>>> http://robertpirsig.org/Intro.html]
>>
>> Dan comments:
>> Now, how does he start off? "I also have a concern of my own." He is
>> NOT saying that he's pulled together all the great thinkers. In fact,
>> he is saying precisely the opposite. He is claiming his ideas are
>> dismissed because academics are saying how someone else said it
>> already and said it better.
>>
>
>
> Jc:  Then why has nobody else noticed that (x,yz) are saying the same
> thing?"  That's the conclusion to his whole argument and it's implied
> that the significance of Pirsig's MoQ is in unifying these threads.
> That is the job of philosophy, btw, to unify, to universalize.    Art
> is more of a personal process but when lots of people love a work of
> art, then that art is unifying to them and thus "philosophical" in a
> sense.  Great Art is also great philosophy and vice versa.
>
> But lets be clear here.  The main thrust of Pirsig's argument is
> directed against the academic critics who rejected his work or took it
> seriously.   Comparing his work to those whom they DO take seriously,
> can only be of benefit now.  RMP is right, somebody who unifies
> Spinoza, James and  Aristotle is a fascinating thinker.  And has a lot
> in common with Royce, also long-neglected.   It starts to make one
> wonder, what social force is it that fears and keeps in check the
> philosophers that would free people from their SOM-induced prisons.

Dan:
So you can see better now how the intellectual level can oppose the
social level?

Thank you,

Dan

http://www.danglover.com