[MD] On Pirsig's letter to Paul Turner

[Jan-Anders Andersson]

Tukka

> 17 juli 2016 kl. 15:59 skrev mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net:
> 
> Dan, Adrie, all,
> 
> Thanks for your replies.
> 
> The question I'm asking is what do *we* use to identify pattern type.
> 
First, take your time and use your experience to find out how you learned what you know already about patterns at the four levels. 

Jan-Anders

> If what I'm suggesting here is wrong we're all heretics already!
> Unless we start taking DNA tests. I know one website, 23andme.com. You
> can send them your saliva and they'll analyze it and tell you whether
> you're human, if you don't already know. But you already know that and
> I'm asking you: how do you know?
> 
> I'm directing your attention to a more direct way of experience than
> that of a scientist.
> 
> 
> 
> Lainaus Dan Glover <daneglover at gmail.com>:
> 
>> Tuukka,
>> 
>>> On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 6:42 AM,  <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>>> Dan, all,
>> 
>>>>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> What wouldn't be a living thing? Would you consider the sun to be
>>>>>>>> dead?
>>>>>>>> Althought I don't know, I suppose you mightn't.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> I see the sun is a living thing just as the Earth. The inorganic
>>>>>>> patterns making up the sun are the molecules, however, just as are the
>>>>>>> inorganic patterns making up the guitar, and us, are molecules.
>>>>>>> Whether or not they are alive, the molecules, is open to debate,
>>>>>>> though for the sake of clarity it seems best to use DNA as the basis
>>>>>>> for biological patterns.
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> 
>>> Well, the sun doesn't contain DNA. According to Pirsig life is carbon
>>> chemistry. I take that to mean chemical reactions, so DNA isn't necessarily
>>> living if it's just sitting in some vial on a shelf. But anyway, if we use
>>> DNA as the basis for biological patterns, what does that mean? Suppose
>>> you're sitting in a room with three people and a dog. How do you use DNA as
>>> a basis for developing a model of that room?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> I think DNA is a useful distinction when delineating biological level
>> patterns from inorganic patterns. On the other hand, life has
>> implications beyond biological patterns. We might talk about living
>> stars vs dead stars or living cultures vs dead cultures. So when I say
>> the sun is alive, I don't mean it is a biological pattern. I mean it
>> is dynamic rather than static.
>> 
>>> 
>>> In my model it's simple. There are five biological patterns in the room and
>>> they can be identified with the senses. But in your model   it's not simple,
>>> because you have to find DNA somewhere before identifying a single
>>> biological pattern, and you need a laboratory in order to do that. Your
>>> solution only looks simple on paper.
>> 
>> Dan:
>> In a sense (:-)) the senses are our gateway to the world. They the
>> senses inform us of the value of reality. And so yes they do inform us
>> of biological patterns yet (as I think we agree) the MOQ is a set of
>> intellectual patterns worthy of investigating more deeply than senses
>> alone allow. Like science.
> 
> Tuukka:
> The model of value accumulation is yet another intellectual pattern.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The MOQ says that knowledge is derived from experience and my point is that
>>> people were able to tell biological patterns from inorganic ones already
>>> before DNA was discovered. And the question I'm trying to answer is: how did
>>> they do that?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Did biological and inorganic patterns exist before Robert Pirsig gave
>> us the MOQ?
> 
> Tuukka:
> Pirsig writes that the ancient Egyptians were social whereas the Greek
> were intellectual, but the MOQ wasn't invented back then. So I guess
> rocks were inorganic and dinosaurs biological, too.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The guitar isn't inorganic when Leonard Cohen inhales the  fragrance
>>>>>>>> of its
>>>>>>>> living wood. But that life is given to the wood by Cohen himself.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The notion of inorganicity may seem paradoxical since we as observers
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> inorganic patterns are anyhow biological patterns and can  perform
>>>>>>>> the act of
>>>>>>>> observing an inorganic pattern only by making it a part of our
>>>>>>>> cognition,
>>>>>>>> thus turning it alive.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> The wood is living. It contains DNA. That life isn't 'given' to it,
>>>>>>> the wood, by Leonard Cohen or by anyone.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Most people would say the wood is dead. There's lacquer all over it and no
>>> water except for atmospheric humidity. Pirsig wrote biologicality is "carbon
>>> chemistry", not "inert carbon compounds".
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> When Cohen inhales the fragrance of his guitar's living wood the
>>>>>>>> guitar
>>>>>>>> serves him as an instrument of self-reflection. He doesn't play   the
>>>>>>>> strings
>>>>>>>> but the guitar plays his mind, reminding him of the day he bought it.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> We may call inorganic patterns inorganic to emphasize the fact    that
>>>>>>>> they can
>>>>>>>> so easily be separated from what makes them alive.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Fingernails are biological patterns but fingernail clippings aren't.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>> difference isn't about something one can observe by putting a
>>>>>>>> fingernail
>>>>>>>> under a microscope. It's about the fact that even though the
>>>>>>>> clippings don't
>>>>>>>> come with us as we go we assume that they remain in existence after
>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>> discarded. That we remain able to perceive them even if we    wouldn't
>>>>>>>> use them
>>>>>>>> for anything and even if they didn't remind us of anything.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> Fingernail clippings ARE biological patterns. They contain DNA. The
>>>>>>> molecules making up the fingernail clippings are inorganic patterns.
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> 
>>> For a scientist, fingernail clippings could be quite biological. Same goes
>>> for hair. But the Indians used human hair for making clothes. Does this mean
>>> those articles of clothing were biological patterns?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Yes. Just as cotton and wool are biological patterns. On the other
>> hand, synthetic materials like nylon and rayon are inorganic patterns.
> 
> Tuukka:
> Okay, but even if they're biological I don't know how they accumulate
> biological value, so I guess they don't "accumulate" that. Unless
> someone thinks of a way.
> 
> Of course, plants accumulate value by growing, at least in some sense. Maybe all patterns accumulate value but then I'm not sure how to make sure the inorganic level will not accumulate more value than the biological one. I'll have to think about that.
> 
> Maybe, if an inorganic pattern accumulates value as the extension of a biological pattern, it simply retains the value.
> 
> Come to think of it, even in my current model the inorganic level can have more value than the biological if the biological level has negative value and a biological pattern uses an inorganic pattern to do something good. Perhaps I have to measure value here so that it never has negative value. Yeah, that would seem to work.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Do you see what I'm aiming at? In everyday life it doesn't matter whether an
>>> article of clothing is made from synthetic fibres or human hair. It's still
>>> an article of clothing. It's an object. It doesn't walk around on its own
>>> and it doesn't breathe, and so on. I just think this kind of a division
>>> between the inorganic and the biological is more in accord with everyday
>>> common sense use of language than focusing on the point that clothes made of
>>> human hair contain DNA. Who cares about that? And why?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> First of all, it is okay to use subject/object terminology as long as
>> it is remembered that those terms stand for patterns of value. Second,
>> we are discussing the MOQ and its terminology, which may or may not
>> differ from everyday terminology. Is blood a biological pattern? It
>> doesn't walk around and breathe. How about organs awaiting transplant?
>> A heart, or a set of lungs? Kidneys? Are those biological patterns?
> 
> Tuukka:
> Well, they're *parts* of a biological pattern.
> 
>> 
>> Who cares? Well, maybe no one. On the other hand, people still seem to
>> be reading Robert Pirsig and discussing his work. So maybe a few
>> people care. I know I care enough to be working out this reply to you.
>> I mean, I could just say the hell with it. I've got better things to
>> do. But I care. And too, it has been my experience, sometimes sad)
>> that common sense ain't all that common. Truthfully.
> 
> Tuukka:
> You can't seriously believe I, out of all people, intended to
> trivialize metaphysics.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> And, if DNA were the only proper way to define biologicality, how did people
>>> tell living things from inorganic things before DNA was invented?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Or before the MOQ was invented?
> 
> Tuukka:
> If we want to build an artificial intelligence based on the model of
> value accumulation we have to know what that more arcane way is.
> That's what brought us this far eventually, so the AI should walk the
> same path in order to seem human.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> A pacemaker isn't a biological pattern when it's sitting on the table
>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>> it's a biological pattern when in use.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> No. A pacemaker has never been alive. It does not now nor will it ever
>>>>>>> contain DNA.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> We have the notion of inorganic pattern for referring to things  that
>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>> serve as extensions of many different biological patterns. When  we
>>>>>>>> were at
>>>>>>>> the pier the guitar was an extension of the woman playing it but
>>>>>>>> had someone
>>>>>>>> else played it afterwards the guitar would've turned into an extension
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> that other person. That doesn't mean the woman who played the guitar
>>>>>>>> would've also turned into that other person's extension. Only the
>>>>>>>> guitar
>>>>>>>> changes with regards to whose extension it is.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> I think this tends to confuse the issue. Extensions.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> But in your model you have to find DNA before identifying a pattern as
>>> biological, and you need a laboratory for that. Doesn't *that* confuse the
>>> issue?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Well, take the search for extraterrestrial life. Probes've been sent
>> to various and numerous moons and planets in search of other living
>> organisms. And so if that extraterrestrial life is ever discovered,
>> how will we know it is really life?
> 
> Tuukka:
> DNA, I suppose. But according to what criteria do we take the DNA
> sample? We don't take a sample of something that's obviously a rock.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> An inorganic pattern has instrumental value when a biological
>>>>>>>>>>> pattern
>>>>>>>>>>> uses
>>>>>>>>>>> it to actualize a choice it has made. Obviously, this doesn't mean
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> guitar should be discarded after the song is over. Forgetting   the
>>>>>>>>>>> guitar
>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>> the pier and and thus exposing it to the elements would've been a
>>>>>>>>>>> bad
>>>>>>>>>>> choice. But as far as we are concerned of quality, the guitar
>>>>>>>>>>> inherently
>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>> none. The reason for bringing it back in and taking care of it lies
>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> value of songs we'll play in the future, but preparing for the
>>>>>>>>>>> future
>>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>> way is an intellectual pattern. It doesn't mean the guitar would
>>>>>>>>>>> inherently
>>>>>>>>>>> have quality.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> No but see the guitar does have value! Even if I were to agree with
>>>>>>>>> you, which I don't, that the guitar is only an inorganic pattern, it
>>>>>>>>> is a pattern of VALUE! See what I think you are doing is mistaking a
>>>>>>>>> thing as having quality instead of it the thing being quality.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I am not claiming that the guitar is only an inorganic pattern.  I  am
>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>> emphasizing the inorganic aspect of the guitar in order to illustrate
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> metaphysical point. The guitar, as the extension of a guitar
>>>>>>>> player, is also
>>>>>>>> biological.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> But if we begin extending values like this, aren't we destroying the
>>>>>>> power of the MOQ?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> 
>>> What is the tradeoff here? Is it that it's pleasantly simple to define life
>>> as "containing DNA" or "carbon chemistry"? I agree it sounds simple but
>>> wouldn't that mean life didn't exist before the discovery of DNA or the
>>> discovery of chemistry?
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Life as we know it.
>> 
>>> 
>>> How does a dog tell the man from the stick? It doesn't matter to the dog
>>> that both contain DNA. I agree that the stick is biological metaphysically,
>>> but it's not biological with regards to value accumulation.
>> 
>> Dan:
>> I am not a dog so I cannot answer your question. However, I do know
>> how to tell a stick from a dog.
>> 
>>> 
>>>>>>>> I wrote that "as far as we're concerned of quality, the guitar
>>>>>>>> inherently
>>>>>>>> has none". These are kind of meaningless words as Buddhist philosophy
>>>>>>>> doesn't introduce essences, that is, things that would inherently have
>>>>>>>> value.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> By saying that I just tried to express that since the guitar doesn't
>>>>>>>> make
>>>>>>>> decisions, attributing value to it doesn't change its behavior,
>>>>>>>> whereas
>>>>>>>> attributing value to a person might change that person's    self-image
>>>>>>>> and thus
>>>>>>>> behavior. I suppose, perhaps mistakenly, that we don't need to take an
>>>>>>>> animistic viewpoint in this discussion, unless that is what you want.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I also suppose, perhaps equally mistakenly, that we don't subscribe to
>>>>>>>> essentialism. You indeed seem to be suggesting the guitar essentially
>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>> value, but the question is, what do you intend to do with that  value
>>>>>>>> apart
>>>>>>>> from using it to disagree with my previous post?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> Not exactly. No, I am not saying the guitar essentially has value. I
>>>>>>> am saying that is not the proper way to approach the question Value,
>>>>>>> or quality, has the guitar. Remember how Rigel asks: Does Lila have
>>>>>>> quality? And the answer Phaedrus came up with was yes. But as he
>>>>>>> considered things, he realized how quality has Lila, and how Rigel's
>>>>>>> question was based on the faulty assumption that patterns have quality
>>>>>>> rather than patterns are quality.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> While I'm inclined to think both of these are manners of speaking rather
>>> than metaphysical truths, I see no need to object to this. So, the guitar is
>>> quality.
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Ah. Excellent.
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The model I'm presenting here doesn't contradict physics, but  it's a
>>>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>> of value, not a model of atoms and molecules. The guitar  consists of
>>>>>>>> atoms
>>>>>>>> and molecules, which are value, but people don't perceive them, just
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> guitar, so the atoms and molecules are intellectual patterns. Do you
>>>>>>>> feel
>>>>>>>> the need to use these intellectual patterns to disagree with my
>>>>>>>> previous
>>>>>>>> post?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> It isn't clear to me what you mean by suggesting I mistake a thing
>>>>>>>> having
>>>>>>>> quality to a thing being quality. Everything is quality, so the notion
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> "everything is quality" doesn't help in analysis, which basically
>>>>>>>> means
>>>>>>>> splitting a whole into smaller parts. You can't split a whole  into
>>>>>>>> smaller
>>>>>>>> parts according to an attribute that is shared by every single part.
>>>>>>>> You
>>>>>>>> know this, and I know the MOQ is more than analysis. But I don't see
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>> other way to solve the problems Pirsig mentions in the Turner   letter
>>>>>>>> except
>>>>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> What I am attempting to do here is lay the groundwork, so to speak,
>>>>>>> for further exploration into the MOQ. For instance, you said the
>>>>>>> guitar has no quality as it, the guitar, does not make decisions. You
>>>>>>> might say the same thing about a head of lettuce. The head of lettuce
>>>>>>> has no quality because it just sits there making no decisions. Quality
>>>>>>> is only imbued to lettuce when someone eats it just as quality is only
>>>>>>> imbued to the guitar when someone plays it.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> So when I say I think you're confusing having quality with being
>>>>>>> Quality, what I am trying to say is that the guitar doesn't have
>>>>>>> quality so much as it is Quality. See, if we start with a faulty
>>>>>>> assumption, then we are forced into falling back onto the notion that
>>>>>>> since everything is quality we cannot analyze it. Quality. Sort of a
>>>>>>> ZMM assumption. In a way. But that is exactly what the MOQ is all
>>>>>>> about. Analyzing quality. And in a sense you are right. We can never
>>>>>>> completely analyze Quality. The process goes on and on.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> And I'm trying to explicate what kind of quality is the guitar. And since
>>> knowledge is derived from experience in the MOQ someone has to perceive the
>>> guitar in order for it to be quality.
>> 
>> Dan:
>> But isn't that so for the universe in general? When the story stops,
>> so does the universe.
> 
> Tuukka:
> Yeah. Quality is modeled by the mind, and the mind is biological.
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Biological patterns accumulate value according to the choices
>>>>>>>>>>> they make.
>>>>>>>>>>> This is because biological patterns may have volition, which makes
>>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>>>> possible to attribute the value of a choice to the pattern   that
>>>>>>>>>>> made the
>>>>>>>>>>> choice. This value is inherent to the biological pattern in the
>>>>>>>>>>> sense
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> it stays with the biological pattern even after the choice has
>>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>>>> made.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>>>> Do you really believe biological patterns have volition? I can't see
>>>>>>>>> it. Biological patterns are constrained into a specific set of
>>>>>>>>> parameters which disable them, the biological patterns, from going
>>>>>>>>> outside those parameters. So really the volition or choice that
>>>>>>>>> biological patterns 'have' isn't that so much as being had by the
>>>>>>>>> quality that both surrounds them, the biological patterns, and
>>>>>>>>> permeates them, simultaneously making it seem as if free will exists,
>>>>>>>>> which of course it does, but only seem to. So in essence this tends
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> render your argument null and void if one follows said reasoning
>>>>>>>>> above
>>>>>>>>> to its logical conclusion.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I might understand the concept of volition in a much more  mundane
>>>>>>>> sense as
>>>>>>>> what you're aiming at. I understand volition simply as something
>>>>>>>> like, if a
>>>>>>>> rock is about to roll off a cliff and hit someone, the rock will
>>>>>>>> not stop if
>>>>>>>> you tell it that rolling off the cliff would have bad    consequences.
>>>>>>>> But if a
>>>>>>>> person were about to push that rock off the cliff he might stop   if
>>>>>>>> you told
>>>>>>>> him there's someone down below. Of course this kind of "volition" is
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> illusion, it's just an illusion that happens to be helpful.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Frankly, I can't parse the sentence: "So really the volition or
>>>>>>>> choice that
>>>>>>>> biological patterns 'have' isn't that so much as being had by the
>>>>>>>> quality
>>>>>>>> that both surrounds them, the biological patterns, and permeates them,
>>>>>>>> simultaneously making it seem as if free will exists, which of course
>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>> does, but only seem to."
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> Yeah, I can understand the difficulty here. Sometimes sentences get
>>>>>>> away from me and I have to whip them back into shape. What I seem to
>>>>>>> be saying is that 'having' volition is something like 'having'
>>>>>>> quality, that free will exists, just as biological patterns have
>>>>>>> quality. But as you say, that is only an illusion. Free will only
>>>>>>> seems to exist just as we only seem to have quality.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Fair enough. Like I said, the concept of free will is unnecessary. I only
>>> used it because I thought it'd be helpful, not because I'd be attracted to
>>> the concept itself. I also take this to mean that, in the context of value
>>> accumulation, volition *is* biologicality. Perhaps not so in another
>>> context. I don't want to contradict Pirsig, just explain things he didn't.
>>> Value accumulation.
>> 
>> Dan:
>> Yes, I can see that. But can't we say the same of social and
>> intellectual patterns?
> 
> Tuukka:
> The volition of social and intellectual patterns manifests via biological patterns.
> 
> Regards, Tuk
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> Good. This is a good beginning.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Yeah, and now that I'm on MD I have another good reason for waking up in the
>>> morning. :)
>> 
>> Dan:
>> This makes me smile. Which is good. Smiling. Thanks, Tuukka.
>> 
>> Dan
>> 
>> http://www.danglover.com
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