[MD] On Pirsig's letter to Paul Turner

[Dan Glover]

Tuukka, All,

On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 8:59 AM,  <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> Dan, Adrie, all,
>
> Thanks for your replies.
>
> The question I'm asking is what do *we* use to identify pattern type.
>
> If what I'm suggesting here is wrong we're all heretics already!
> Unless we start taking DNA tests. I know one website, 23andme.com. You
> can send them your saliva and they'll analyze it and tell you whether
> you're human, if you don't already know. But you already know that and
> I'm asking you: how do you know?
>
> I'm directing your attention to a more direct way of experience than
> that of a scientist.

Dan:
First of all, I am not saying you are wrong and I am right. This is
not a debate. I am simply partaking in a discussion. Well, hopefully
we are. Partaking in a discussion. And no I am not seeking to
complicate matters. I agree things should be simple. And too, I have
been told before that my sense of humor is a bit shall we say droll.
Or maybe dry is a better word. Either way, those who are easily
offended tend to get pissed off with me. Oops. There I go again.
Anyway...

>
>
>
> Lainaus Dan Glover <daneglover at gmail.com>:
>
>
>> Tuukka,
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 6:42 AM,  <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> Dan, all,
>>
>>
>>>
>>> The MOQ says that knowledge is derived from experience and my point is
>>> that
>>> people were able to tell biological patterns from inorganic ones already
>>> before DNA was discovered. And the question I'm trying to answer is: how
>>> did
>>> they do that?
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Did biological and inorganic patterns exist before Robert Pirsig gave
>> us the MOQ?
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Pirsig writes that the ancient Egyptians were social whereas the Greek
> were intellectual, but the MOQ wasn't invented back then. So I guess
> rocks were inorganic and dinosaurs biological, too.

Dan:
Remember the gravity analogy from ZMM? That pertains to this point
too. When we begin to mistake the map for the territory, when we take
concepts as concrete reality, well then it only seems common sense to
think biological and social patterns existed before Robert Pirsig
invented the terms for his MOQ. Just like gravity existing before
Newton's laws of gravity. If we think about it, however, the only
conclusion we can make is that like gravity, biological and social
patterns did not exist before they were invented.

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The guitar isn't inorganic when Leonard Cohen inhales the  fragrance
>>>>>>>> of its
>>>>>>>> living wood. But that life is given to the wood by Cohen himself.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The notion of inorganicity may seem paradoxical since we as
>>>>>>>> observers
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> inorganic patterns are anyhow biological patterns and can  perform
>>>>>>>> the act of
>>>>>>>> observing an inorganic pattern only by making it a part of our
>>>>>>>> cognition,
>>>>>>>> thus turning it alive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> The wood is living. It contains DNA. That life isn't 'given' to it,
>>>>>>> the wood, by Leonard Cohen or by anyone.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Most people would say the wood is dead. There's lacquer all over it and
>>> no
>>> water except for atmospheric humidity. Pirsig wrote biologicality is
>>> "carbon
>>> chemistry", not "inert carbon compounds".
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When Cohen inhales the fragrance of his guitar's living wood the
>>>>>>>> guitar
>>>>>>>> serves him as an instrument of self-reflection. He doesn't play
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> strings
>>>>>>>> but the guitar plays his mind, reminding him of the day he bought
>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We may call inorganic patterns inorganic to emphasize the fact
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> they can
>>>>>>>> so easily be separated from what makes them alive.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Fingernails are biological patterns but fingernail clippings aren't.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>> difference isn't about something one can observe by putting a
>>>>>>>> fingernail
>>>>>>>> under a microscope. It's about the fact that even though the
>>>>>>>> clippings don't
>>>>>>>> come with us as we go we assume that they remain in existence after
>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>> discarded. That we remain able to perceive them even if we
>>>>>>>> wouldn't
>>>>>>>> use them
>>>>>>>> for anything and even if they didn't remind us of anything.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> Fingernail clippings ARE biological patterns. They contain DNA. The
>>>>>>> molecules making up the fingernail clippings are inorganic patterns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> For a scientist, fingernail clippings could be quite biological. Same
>>> goes
>>> for hair. But the Indians used human hair for making clothes. Does this
>>> mean
>>> those articles of clothing were biological patterns?
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Yes. Just as cotton and wool are biological patterns. On the other
>> hand, synthetic materials like nylon and rayon are inorganic patterns.
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Okay, but even if they're biological I don't know how they accumulate
> biological value, so I guess they don't "accumulate" that. Unless
> someone thinks of a way.
>
> Of course, plants accumulate value by growing, at least in some sense. Maybe
> all patterns accumulate value but then I'm not sure how to make sure the
> inorganic level will not accumulate more value than the biological one. I'll
> have to think about that.

Dan:
Well, you can't just think of it as plants growing. You have to take
the entire ecosystem into account. For instance, grapes grown for wine
production tend to do well in poorer soil as a stressed plant produces
better grapes, but there is more to it than that.

What they call the terrior of wine is affected by not only the soil
but by the terrain of the land as well as nearby water and even other
plants growing in the vicinity of the vineyard. The climate plays
important factors in the terrior of wine too, as does the tradition,
or knowledge, of the grower of grapes.

See, when you think of a growing plant, normally you don't take into
account of how most all of our domesticated crops were bred into
existence thousands and tens of thousands of years ago using selective
breeding processes still in use today. Biological values have been
deeply affected by social and intellectual forces at work as well as
by the biological entities themselves evolving and mutating in
response to environmental pressures.

>
> Maybe, if an inorganic pattern accumulates value as the extension of a
> biological pattern, it simply retains the value.
>
> Come to think of it, even in my current model the inorganic level can have
> more value than the biological if the biological level has negative value
> and a biological pattern uses an inorganic pattern to do something good.
> Perhaps I have to measure value here so that it never has negative value.
> Yeah, that would seem to work.

Dan:
If there is no negative value, then what impetus drives progress and evolution?

>
>>
>>>
>>> Do you see what I'm aiming at? In everyday life it doesn't matter whether
>>> an
>>> article of clothing is made from synthetic fibres or human hair. It's
>>> still
>>> an article of clothing. It's an object. It doesn't walk around on its own
>>> and it doesn't breathe, and so on. I just think this kind of a division
>>> between the inorganic and the biological is more in accord with everyday
>>> common sense use of language than focusing on the point that clothes made
>>> of
>>> human hair contain DNA. Who cares about that? And why?
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> First of all, it is okay to use subject/object terminology as long as
>> it is remembered that those terms stand for patterns of value. Second,
>> we are discussing the MOQ and its terminology, which may or may not
>> differ from everyday terminology. Is blood a biological pattern? It
>> doesn't walk around and breathe. How about organs awaiting transplant?
>> A heart, or a set of lungs? Kidneys? Are those biological patterns?
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Well, they're *parts* of a biological pattern.

Dan:
So is a baby part of a biological pattern too?

>
>>
>> Who cares? Well, maybe no one. On the other hand, people still seem to
>> be reading Robert Pirsig and discussing his work. So maybe a few
>> people care. I know I care enough to be working out this reply to you.
>> I mean, I could just say the hell with it. I've got better things to
>> do. But I care. And too, it has been my experience, sometimes sad)
>> that common sense ain't all that common. Truthfully.
>
>
> Tuukka:
> You can't seriously believe I, out of all people, intended to
> trivialize metaphysics.

Dan:
You asked the question. I take it that it was rhetorical. The question.

>
>>
>>>
>>> And, if DNA were the only proper way to define biologicality, how did
>>> people
>>> tell living things from inorganic things before DNA was invented?
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Or before the MOQ was invented?
>
>
> Tuukka:
> If we want to build an artificial intelligence based on the model of
> value accumulation we have to know what that more arcane way is.
> That's what brought us this far eventually, so the AI should walk the
> same path in order to seem human.

Dan:
What makes you think artificial intelligence is human? Or will seem human?

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A pacemaker isn't a biological pattern when it's sitting on the
>>>>>>>> table
>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>> it's a biological pattern when in use.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> No. A pacemaker has never been alive. It does not now nor will it
>>>>>>> ever
>>>>>>> contain DNA.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We have the notion of inorganic pattern for referring to things
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>> serve as extensions of many different biological patterns. When  we
>>>>>>>> were at
>>>>>>>> the pier the guitar was an extension of the woman playing it but
>>>>>>>> had someone
>>>>>>>> else played it afterwards the guitar would've turned into an
>>>>>>>> extension
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> that other person. That doesn't mean the woman who played the guitar
>>>>>>>> would've also turned into that other person's extension. Only the
>>>>>>>> guitar
>>>>>>>> changes with regards to whose extension it is.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> I think this tends to confuse the issue. Extensions.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> But in your model you have to find DNA before identifying a pattern as
>>> biological, and you need a laboratory for that. Doesn't *that* confuse
>>> the
>>> issue?
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Well, take the search for extraterrestrial life. Probes've been sent
>> to various and numerous moons and planets in search of other living
>> organisms. And so if that extraterrestrial life is ever discovered,
>> how will we know it is really life?
>
>
> Tuukka:
> DNA, I suppose. But according to what criteria do we take the DNA
> sample? We don't take a sample of something that's obviously a rock.

Dan:
Well, some years ago there was a bit of excitement over fossilized
bacterial remains discovered inside a rock, a meteorite to be exact.
Later it came out how geological processes could possibly imitate
those fossils. So yeah, until something better comes along, the
presence of DNA seems to be one reliable indicator of life both here
and in the universe.


>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The model I'm presenting here doesn't contradict physics, but  it's
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>> of value, not a model of atoms and molecules. The guitar  consists
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> atoms
>>>>>>>> and molecules, which are value, but people don't perceive them, just
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> guitar, so the atoms and molecules are intellectual patterns. Do you
>>>>>>>> feel
>>>>>>>> the need to use these intellectual patterns to disagree with my
>>>>>>>> previous
>>>>>>>> post?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It isn't clear to me what you mean by suggesting I mistake a thing
>>>>>>>> having
>>>>>>>> quality to a thing being quality. Everything is quality, so the
>>>>>>>> notion
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> "everything is quality" doesn't help in analysis, which basically
>>>>>>>> means
>>>>>>>> splitting a whole into smaller parts. You can't split a whole  into
>>>>>>>> smaller
>>>>>>>> parts according to an attribute that is shared by every single part.
>>>>>>>> You
>>>>>>>> know this, and I know the MOQ is more than analysis. But I don't see
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>> other way to solve the problems Pirsig mentions in the Turner
>>>>>>>> letter
>>>>>>>> except
>>>>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> What I am attempting to do here is lay the groundwork, so to speak,
>>>>>>> for further exploration into the MOQ. For instance, you said the
>>>>>>> guitar has no quality as it, the guitar, does not make decisions. You
>>>>>>> might say the same thing about a head of lettuce. The head of lettuce
>>>>>>> has no quality because it just sits there making no decisions.
>>>>>>> Quality
>>>>>>> is only imbued to lettuce when someone eats it just as quality is
>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>> imbued to the guitar when someone plays it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So when I say I think you're confusing having quality with being
>>>>>>> Quality, what I am trying to say is that the guitar doesn't have
>>>>>>> quality so much as it is Quality. See, if we start with a faulty
>>>>>>> assumption, then we are forced into falling back onto the notion that
>>>>>>> since everything is quality we cannot analyze it. Quality. Sort of a
>>>>>>> ZMM assumption. In a way. But that is exactly what the MOQ is all
>>>>>>> about. Analyzing quality. And in a sense you are right. We can never
>>>>>>> completely analyze Quality. The process goes on and on.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> And I'm trying to explicate what kind of quality is the guitar. And since
>>> knowledge is derived from experience in the MOQ someone has to perceive
>>> the
>>> guitar in order for it to be quality.
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> But isn't that so for the universe in general? When the story stops,
>> so does the universe.
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Yeah. Quality is modeled by the mind, and the mind is biological.

Dan:
Ideas come first. Then comes the biological mind.

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Biological patterns accumulate value according to the choices
>>>>>>>>>>> they make.
>>>>>>>>>>> This is because biological patterns may have volition, which
>>>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>>>> possible to attribute the value of a choice to the pattern   that
>>>>>>>>>>> made the
>>>>>>>>>>> choice. This value is inherent to the biological pattern in the
>>>>>>>>>>> sense
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> it stays with the biological pattern even after the choice has
>>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>>>> made.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>>>> Do you really believe biological patterns have volition? I can't
>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>> it. Biological patterns are constrained into a specific set of
>>>>>>>>> parameters which disable them, the biological patterns, from going
>>>>>>>>> outside those parameters. So really the volition or choice that
>>>>>>>>> biological patterns 'have' isn't that so much as being had by the
>>>>>>>>> quality that both surrounds them, the biological patterns, and
>>>>>>>>> permeates them, simultaneously making it seem as if free will
>>>>>>>>> exists,
>>>>>>>>> which of course it does, but only seem to. So in essence this tends
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> render your argument null and void if one follows said reasoning
>>>>>>>>> above
>>>>>>>>> to its logical conclusion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I might understand the concept of volition in a much more  mundane
>>>>>>>> sense as
>>>>>>>> what you're aiming at. I understand volition simply as something
>>>>>>>> like, if a
>>>>>>>> rock is about to roll off a cliff and hit someone, the rock will
>>>>>>>> not stop if
>>>>>>>> you tell it that rolling off the cliff would have bad
>>>>>>>> consequences.
>>>>>>>> But if a
>>>>>>>> person were about to push that rock off the cliff he might stop   if
>>>>>>>> you told
>>>>>>>> him there's someone down below. Of course this kind of "volition" is
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> illusion, it's just an illusion that happens to be helpful.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Frankly, I can't parse the sentence: "So really the volition or
>>>>>>>> choice that
>>>>>>>> biological patterns 'have' isn't that so much as being had by the
>>>>>>>> quality
>>>>>>>> that both surrounds them, the biological patterns, and permeates
>>>>>>>> them,
>>>>>>>> simultaneously making it seem as if free will exists, which of
>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>> does, but only seem to."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>>> Yeah, I can understand the difficulty here. Sometimes sentences get
>>>>>>> away from me and I have to whip them back into shape. What I seem to
>>>>>>> be saying is that 'having' volition is something like 'having'
>>>>>>> quality, that free will exists, just as biological patterns have
>>>>>>> quality. But as you say, that is only an illusion. Free will only
>>>>>>> seems to exist just as we only seem to have quality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Fair enough. Like I said, the concept of free will is unnecessary. I only
>>> used it because I thought it'd be helpful, not because I'd be attracted
>>> to
>>> the concept itself. I also take this to mean that, in the context of
>>> value
>>> accumulation, volition *is* biologicality. Perhaps not so in another
>>> context. I don't want to contradict Pirsig, just explain things he
>>> didn't.
>>> Value accumulation.
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Yes, I can see that. But can't we say the same of social and
>> intellectual patterns?
>
>
> Tuukka:
> The volition of social and intellectual patterns manifests via biological
> patterns.

Dan:
I would say rather that biological patterns manifest at the behest of
ideas, or intellectual patterns.

Thank you,

Dan

http://www.danglover.com