[MD] Annotations to LC

Sun Nov 6 08:22:38 PST 2016

snip from Tuuk's mail.

"I posted an article about this to a peer-reviewed journal. It didn't
pass peer-review because the referee found the conclusion to be
"obvious". Apparently it isn't that obvious.

The article features the notion of "nonrelativizably used predicate".
A predicate has an intension, such as: "calculator", and an extension,
such as my blue calculator, my teacher's scientific calculator, my
neighbor's green calculator and so on, i.e. all calculators. The
extension is what the predicate refers to and the intension is how it
refers to that."

---------------------
Would this be like => the denotations try to maintain their relation of
dependency with the connotations or vice-verca.?

snip from the start of the thread

""The existence of collective masses of electrons can be inferred from
experience and there is every reason to think they exist independently of
the mind. But in the case of the spin of an *individual* electron, there is
*no* experience. In addition, the nature of the Heisenberg Theory of
Indeterminacy prevents any inference from general collective experience of
electrons to certify the spin of any individual electron. If you can't
experience something and you can't infer it either, then you have no
scientific basis for saying that it exists."

I have inferred the Heinous Quadrilemma. Therefore it exists."
---------------------------------

Adrie comments.
the great strengt and power of generalisations is that they are mostly
partly  true.
But only partly.
If we take the complete alinea above for true and only true,most Of
Einsteins
work, that was partly deducted from intuition rules of thumb,
probability...!!
would be worthless, hempty, and invalid.The scientifical world seems to
think otherwise.
The theory of interditerminance works within the bounderies of some quantum
level experiments, its valid within the world of elektrons, muons, quarks
etc,
but it won't bake fries,pancakes,or deliver tools for carpenting , writing,
philosphy etc.

a carpenter should make joints fit,an elektrician does the cablenetwork in
your house and the painter paints it.

But in 'I INFERRED THE HEINOUS QUADRILLEMMA? THEREFORE IT EXISTS" it seems
to be so that there is an lc-moq version,in your opinion,
and in this Lc-moq,Bodvar excludes the moq from the interlechual level,
platt finds......, Donny thinks,......magnus says, etc,etc...and on the
summit
of this stack of knowledge, 2 decennia after the event itself,tuuk arises
to demand from Pirsig only to carry some water to the sea.

its abit like trying to give oneself a handjob, without having a boner.

2016-11-06 15:37 GMT+01:00 <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>:

> dmb, David, all,
>
>
> Tuk wrote:
>>>
>>> The question is, if idealism and the MOQ are both bad ideas, can
>>>  idealism still be good for understanding the MOQ?
>>>
>>
>> David wrote:
>>
>> Why start with ?the MOQ is a bad idea??  If that is your starting  point,
>> why should Dan or dmb or anyone bother to discuss the MOQ  with you?
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first
> post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier
> message at the end of that post.
>
>
>
>> "[44] RMP: It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I
>> think definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I
>> just didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious. But in view of
>> all the trouble people are having, I'm doing it now in these notes."
>>
>> Tukka said:
>>
>> Pirsig fails to mention an important point. Static quality is also
>> impossible to define. I have demonstrated this with formal logic in an
>> article I offered to a peer-reviewed journal perhaps 2008. The journal
>> rejected the article on grounds of the conclusion being "obvious".
>> However, make no mistake! We didn't demonstrate that the theory of
>> static value patterns is impossible to define. It can be defined. It's
>> just the general notion of static value that's undefinable.
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> This is very confusing. (A) You say Pirsig fails to mention a point
>> that he just mentioned, (B) you contradict that point for no      apparent
>> reason, and (C) you say the theory can be defined but the      general
>> notion can't be defined for no apparent reason. I'd be      surprised if
>> anyone can make sense of that.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> If we're speaking of a dictionary definition of static quality, sure.
> If we're speaking of a logical definition, nope. Pirsig asserts the
> MOQ to be logically consistent so I guess it's fair of me to seek for
> a logical definition.
>
> I posted an article about this to a peer-reviewed journal. It didn't
> pass peer-review because the referee found the conclusion to be
> "obvious". Apparently it isn't that obvious.
>
> The article features the notion of "nonrelativizably used predicate".
> A predicate has an intension, such as: "calculator", and an extension,
> such as my blue calculator, my teacher's scientific calculator, my
> neighbor's green calculator and so on, i.e. all calculators. The
> extension is what the predicate refers to and the intension is how it
> refers to that.
>
> Suppose predicate "a number whose successor is 0". In the theory of
> integers the extension of this predicate includes the number -1. In
> the theory of natural numbers the extension is empty.
>
> We are using nonrelativizably the predicate "a number whose successor
> is 0" if we use it so that it's unclear whether we have relativized it
> to the theory of integers or to the theory of natural numbers.
>
> You seem to suppose that the theory of static value patterns turns
> "static quality" into a relativizably used predicate. I see the point.
> Perhaps it was too harsh of me to state that static quality is
> "impossible" to define. However, the act of defining static quality
> confines us to a particular perspective. This perspective could be
> changed by Dynamic Quality. Therefore, even though we can define
> "static quality" at a particular moment the definition will not
> include the things we would consider static after the definition has
> changed. And a central point of the MOQ is that the Dynamic changes
> the static.
>
> However, I don't think a nonrelativizably used predicate qualifies as
> an intellectual pattern. It doesn't seem to belong to any of Pirsig's
> static levels. Any opinions on this? I know Pirsig says anything
> static belongs to one of his levels, but what is intellectual about a
> nonrelativizably used predicate?
>
> Furthermore, Pirsig intends the MOQ as logically consistent. While
> this is impossible to achieve for undefinable concepts it's possible
> to achieve for the theory of static levels. But if the intellectual
> level can include nonrelativizably used predicates then the
> intellectual level isn't a well-formed set. This can't be Pirsig's
> intention because in that case even the theory of static levels
> couldn't be determined as logically consistent.
>
>
>
>> "[50] RMP: This seems too restrictive. [To say SOM is identical to
>> the intellectual level of the MOQ] It seems to exclude
>> non-subject-object constructions such as symbolic logic, higher
>> mathematics, and computer languages from the intellectual level and
>> gives them no home. Also the term 'quality' as used in the MOQ    would
>>  be excluded from the intellectual level. In fact, the MOQ,    which
>>  gives intellectual meaning to the term quality, would also    have to   be
>> excluded from the intellectual level."
>>
>> Tukka said:  Important point for my case. I've been accused of
>> trying to impose SOM
>> on the MOQ. But this annotation states that symbolic logic isn't SOM.
>> Very convenient. We shouldn't need to argue about this anymore.
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> Pirsig is explaining why it's "too restrictive" to say that SOM is
>> identical to the intellectual level, right? And so he's pointing   out
>> some intellectual things that are not SOM. This has no   bearing on
>> whether or not you've understood the relation between   SOM and the    MOQ.
>> I have already offered some criticism of exactly   that - But    that was
>> done without making any references to   symbolic logic or    regular logic.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> You stated that subjects and objects aren't real and that: "In the MOQ
> subjects and objects are concepts rather than actually existing
> substances or ontological structures." But concepts are intellectual
> patterns and intellectual patterns are real. What did you intend me to
> make of this contradiction?
>
>
> Tukka said:  The MOQ doesn't contradict logic. Some people seem to
>> imply it does,
>> though. I feel this way. Am I wrong?
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> I don't know who implied such a thing but logical contradictions are
>> invalid in the MOQ, just as they are in any other philosophy.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Not in dialetheistic philosophy, like Ron just pointed out.
>
>
> dmb:
>>
>> From the SODV (Subjects, Objects, Data and Values) paper:
>> "In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things:
>> mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object
>> does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be
>> independently derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived
>> from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs
>> at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing.
>> It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of
>> the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality
>> is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made
>> possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject
>> and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is
>> deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of
>> the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the
>> cause of the Quality!
>> And:
>> [65] RMP: ...In the Copenhagen Interpretation, and in all
>> subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the
>> observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In
>> the MOQ, nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation
>> creates the intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer.'
>> Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where
>> there are no observations?''
>>
>> Tukka said:
>> Deduced? Hardly. The argument seems inductive rather than deductive. If
>> it is deductive it is still apparently not deduced but instead declared
>> as an axiom. If it is indeed deduced, from which axioms? What kind of a
>> deduction has an undefined concept as a premise?
>>
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> Yes, deduced. This is what I've been trying to tell you about the
>> relations between SOM and the MOQ, about the place of subjects and
>> objects in the MOQ. The real deal with subjects and objects, I
>> answered in response to your question, is that they are not really
>> real. They're just ideas derived from experience. And that's what
>> Pirsig is saying here. In all subject-object metaphysics, he  says,
>>  both the object and the subject are assumed to exist prior  to the
>>  observation but in the MOQ, the intellectual patterns  called
>>  'observed' and 'observer' are derived from experience.  This is not
>>  idealism, by the way, because it puts experience  first, not mind or
>>  subjectivity. This point is also made at the  end of chapter 29 of
>>  Lila and there you'll see that he and  William James call this     radical
>> empiricism, not idealism.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> I know this is intended as some kind of a variant of the Two Truths
> Doctrine. But it isn't well-made. This isn't logical deduction, because
> according to Pirsig one can't put Quality into a formula.
>
> Pirsig could've meant some informal notion of deduction, such a the one
> Sherlock Holmes talks about when he makes arguments that are really
> inductive. But that's an unwise thing to do when presenting a theory he
> claims to be logically consistent.
>
>
>
>>
>> Tukka said: ...but complementarity doesn't allow multiple
>> contradictory views to
>> coexist in the same consistent logical system in the same context. And
>> the only context Pirsig provides for materialism is "good ideas" and the
>> only context provided for idealism is "true ideas".
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> The MOQ is the context,
>> which means Pragmatic truth, which means   that truth is plural -
>> among other things. In Pragmatism truth is   not what corresponds to    the
>> one and only objective reality but it   has to agree with the    experience
>> when it's put into practice for a   particular purpose.    Idealism doesn't
>> make much sense when you're   doing empirical    science but materialism
>> will work even if it's not   true in any    ultimate sense or in any
>> metaphysical sense. Physics   isn't    necessarily any truer than
>> philosophy or poetry and each   domain is    allowed to have its own
>> standards of excellence.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> When does idealism make sense, except when attempting to understand the
> MOQ?
>
> Pirsig states the intellectual level is the mind. But both the
> intellectual and the social level are subjective. What is the difference
> between the mind and subjectivity?
>
>
>
>>
>> And just one more. I'm out of time and steam.
>>
>>
>> [73] RMP: In the MOQ, the
>> static self is composed of both body and mind and thus is both object
>> and subject. It is better to define subject as social and intellectual
>> patterns and object as biological and inorganic patterns. This seems to
>> help prevent confusion later on."
>>
>>
>> Tukka said: It doesn't "seem" to prevent confusion now.
>>
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> I think you've hereby admitted that you're confused about the
>> relation between SOM and the MOQ, about how to map subjects and
>> objects onto the four levels of value. If I try to help with that
>> confusion, you might want to consider thanking me instead of      scolding
>> me. It hardly seems fair to pose the question and then      attack those
>> who presume to answer, you know?
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> I'm not confused about the relation between SOM and the MOQ. I'm also not
> confused about how to map subjects and objects onto the four levels of
> value. I'm confused about how Pirsig maps subjects and objects onto the
> four levels of value.
>
>
> Thank you,
> Tuk
>
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-- 
parser