[MD] Annotations to LC

[Dan Glover]

Tuk, all,

On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
<mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all,
>
>
> On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote:
>>
>> Tuk, all,
>>
>> I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David
>> Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted
>> them.
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>  wrote:
>>>
>>> >Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a
>>> >dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
>>> > that
>>> >is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has been
>>> >done. The MOQ is an idea."
>>> >
>>> >If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
>>> > Pirsig
>>> >doesn't get it.
>>
>> Dan:
>> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
>> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
>>
>> dichotomize
>>
>> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>> 1.
>> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
>> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>> 2.
>> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
>> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
>>
>>
>> Dialetheism
>>
>> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
>>
>> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
>> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
>> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
>> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
>> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
>> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
>> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
>> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
>>
>> Dan comments:
>> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> What Donny actually says is:

Dan:
Yes, just as I said.

>
> "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B),
> iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
>
> Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
>
> (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
> B))))
>
> This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
>
> The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
> dichotomistic distinction to itself.

Dan:
I fail to see that as an option. From what I understand, you are still
working with the assumption 'everything is either A or B' regardless
of is or not. There is no problem here other than your
misinterpretation of what Donny (and Pirsig) is saying.

>
>
>>
>>> >
>>> >"So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of
>>> > thought.
>>> >It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element of Mind.
>>> > But
>>> >what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing
>>> > consciousness;
>>> >it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM is an object,
>>> > a
>>> >/Gegenstand/  (literally 'stands over against' consciousness). So, I
>>> > hope now
>>> >that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different. Pirsig missed that
>>> > little
>>> >point.
>>> >[108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no
>>> >reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis.
>>> >I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence
>>> >(Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you
>>> >destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion."
>>> >
>>> >Then why call bodies objects in the first place?
>>
>> Dan:
>> Pirsig is replying to a post that introduces 'body.'
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> A native English speaker would be accustomed to thinking of material things
> as "objects". In Finnish we have a different word for that, so my normal
> meaning of "object" ("objekti" in Finnish) is something like "the object of
> a sentence" or "JavaScript-object" or "mathematical object". This probably
> explains why Pirsig's use of the word "object" is so counterintuitive for
> me.

Dan:
Yes even in English the term 'object' has multiple meanings. It is all
about context.

>
>
>
>>
>>> >
>>> >"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>> >object.'
>>> >[111] RMP: Object: n.
>>> >Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision
>>> > or
>>> >touch; a material thing.
>>> >   1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>> >   2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>> >   3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>> >affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>> > substantive
>>> >following and governed by a preposition.
>>> >   4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>> >   (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>> >The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological
>>> >patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>> >'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>> > that
>>> >in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>> > between
>>> >them is meaningless."
>>> >
>>> >If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of
>>> >attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>> >
>>> >Why is there no Definition #5?
>>
>> Dan:
>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>
>> Object: n.
>>
>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>
>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>
>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>
>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>
>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>
>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>
>> The “objects” in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>> patterns. The “objects” Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>
> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA. The
> distinction is very sharp."
> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist
> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>
> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social things,
> but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and physical
> objects.

Dan:
It isn't meaningless. Where do you get that from?

>
>
>>
>>
>>> >
>>> >"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>> >experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel gives
>>> > a
>>> >strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>> >
>>> >Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>> >deduction?
>>
>> Dan:
>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains why
> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ doesn't
> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
> deduction.

Dan:
Oh. I see the confusion. Logical deduction is a static value pattern,
not experience. In the MOQ, experience and Dynamic Quality are
synonymous.

>
>
>>
>>> >
>>> >At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
>>> > to
>>> >sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
>>> > shark.
>>> >But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and the
>>> >profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Prove it.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of
> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
> important contribution to process philosophy.

Dan:
Nice. Hey though. I just searched Amazon and came up empty.

>
>
>>
>>> "Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
>>> Quality of being reality?
>>> [135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
>>> the
>>> SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
>>> assertion
>>> that values are unreal."
>>>
>>> I agree.
>>>
>>> "Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
>>> Mostly
>>> for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
>>> dilemmas.
>>> It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize
>>> dilemmas.
>>> [143]
>>> RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
>>> cite
>>> the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can
>>> two
>>> opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own
>>> choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S.
>>> Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context for
>>> understanding."
>>>
>>> Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained how
>>> to
>>> correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given
>>> situation.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Not sure what you are objecting to here.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
> "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
> contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
> materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that can
> be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in bad
> ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in good
> ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer.

Dan:
Look at it this way: we 'believe' in neither idealism or materialism.
Instead, the MOQ encompasses both in a more expansive framework

>
>
>>
>>> "Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
>>> RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
>>> arbitrary.
>>> If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ, even
>>> though he personally prefers four levels."
>>>
>>> What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
>>
>> Dan:
>> Yes.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous
> Quadrilemma.

Dan:
This five+ levels in the MOQ came from Doug Renselle, who went on to
develop his own offshoot of the MOQ which if memory serves he named
Quantonics.

>
>
>>
>>> That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
>>> potency
>>> of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>
>> Dan:
>> How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls
>> apart.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ.

Dan:
Well, yes. If the MOQ is faulty, then the argument falls apart. But I
haven't seen any proof of that. It is kind of funny not funny ha ha
just funny huh but your Heinous Quadrilemma seems based upon Donny's
dichotomistic distinction while the MOQ is based more on a dialetheia.
So I can sort of see why you objected to my answer on that query.

>
>
>
>>
>>> "Q&A [4]
>>> Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
>>> should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
>>> on
>>> the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them entirely
>>> to
>>> help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid
>>> of
>>> them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper
>>> two
>>> levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw
>>> that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply
>>> distinguishing between biological and social levels.
>>> If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
>>> modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
>>> latter
>>> ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has
>>> caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at
>>> present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase
>>> values
>>> and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt
>>> of
>>> the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ.
>>> At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be
>>> dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
>>> expressions of independent scientific reality."
>>>
>>> Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
>>> he
>>> reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
>>> logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other kind
>>> of
>>> changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the MOQ.
> Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ correctly... "

Dan:
When I first found out that Robert Pirsig was reading LC (the original
manuscript, without annotations, of course) and that he agreed to
supply me though I mean us with the annotations he was making, I sort
of freaked. I first read ZMM back in 1974 give or take and I was
instantly captivated by Robert Pirsig's powerful words. Fast forward
20some years and all of a sudden here I am actually talking with the
man. I always thought of him as this guy who taught like his hair was
on fire and me I've never been much of a student so what common ground
did we have? Honestly, though, Mr. Pirsig was such a delight to work
with. Not once did he talk down to me. So when I see words like "If I
understand the MOQ correctly" it only enhances that delight I felt.
You are right. He doesn't claim the final word on the MOQ.

>
>
>>
>>> "Q&A [4]
>>> RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
>>> important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
>>> materialist
>>> system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist
>>> system
>>> matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one
>>> meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are
>>> levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can
>>> coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger
>>> reality.
>>> The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
>>> composed
>>> of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely
>>> high
>>> quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But
>>> the
>>> MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is
>>> still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent scientific
>>> material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific
>>> discoveries
>>> come in."
>>>
>>> Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
>>> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual box
>>> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>>> MOQ
>>> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>>> put
>>> the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>
>> Dan:
>> No idea what you are saying here.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of sand.

Dan:
I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of
view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic
idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ.
That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent
with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila
cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on
materialism due to our Western culture's biases.

Thank you,
Dan

http://www.danglover.com