[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

Tuukka Virtaperko mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Fri Oct 21 08:02:51 PDT 2016


Dan,


On 21-Oct-16 6:24, Dan Glover wrote:
> Tuk, all,
>
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 6:40 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>> Dan,
>>
>> okay, looks like I should've studied Lila's Child better. However, if it's
>> true that "matter comes before mind" and "mind comes before matter" then the
>> MOQ is inconsistent. Obviously, the MOQ is not intended to be inconsistent.
>> Furthermore, resorting to a notion of "complementarity" doesn't make the MOQ
>> consistent.
> Dan:
> You are right. You should study Lila's Child better.

Tuukka:
Well, I have it right here. However, it seems I can reply to some things 
you wrote before having studied that work again.


>
>> In order to make the MOQ consistent, the statements "matter comes before
>> mind" and "mind comes before matter" must be assigned to different contexts.
>> In the citations you provided, Pirsig seems to make a rudimentary such
>> assignment by implying that ontologically and/or epistemologically mind
>> comes before matter whereas morally matter comes before mind.
> Dan:
> I can't copy and paste the entire book but obviously Robert Pirsig is
> responding to specific contexts.


Tuukka:
The issue I am trying to raise is not: "Did Robert Pirsig respond to 
specific contexts in LC annotation 67?"


>
>> But if it's moral to believe matter to come before mind it cannot be moral
>> to also believe mind to come before matter unless it's moral to be
>> inconsistent. And scientists are highly unlikely to find it moral to be
>> inconsistent.
> Dan:
> This isn't what the citations I offered stated.


Tuukka:

I didn't imply your citations would've stated what I stated. I meant to 
uncover the logical consequences of LC RMP annotation 67 as follows. The 
annotation includes the statement:

"The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas, which 
produce what we know as matter."

This is a metaphysical statement. To be more exact, it is an ontological 
statement that is equivalent to idealism insofar as we're using defined 
concepts.

"The scientific community that has produced Complementarity, almost 
invariably presumes that matter comes first and produces ideas."

This presumption typically made by the scientific community is another 
ontological statement. It is called materialism.

"However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that the idea 
that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"

According to this statement, materialism is moral (ie. is a high quality 
idea). Materialism is inconsistent with idealism. Consequently, either 
idealism is immoral or inconsistency is moral. Inconsistency isn't 
moral. If idealism is an immoral ontological thought and the MOQ is 
idealistic insofar as we're using defined concepts, then the MOQ is 
ontologically immoral insofar as we're using defined concepts.

"I think Bohr would say that philosophic idealism (i.e. ideas before 
matter) is a viable philosophy since complementarity allows multiple 
contradictory views to coexist."

Viability, coexistence and complementarity do not mean that idealism and 
materialism are consistent with each other.




>
>> Therefore Pirsig's rudimentary context assignment implies that the MOQ is
>> ontologically and/or epistemologically bad philosophy. Why would he
>> intentionally imply that? The implication seems unintentional.
> Dan:
> Your interpretation twists the ideas that Pirsig is offering up in
> ways that do indeed make the MOQ bad philosophy. Why would you
> intentionally do that? Or is it unintentional?


Tuukka:
It is completely unintentional. I am merely following premises to their 
logical conclusion while assuming that if this would uncover a logical 
defect in the MOQ it'd be obvious that I'm not willfully causing the 
defect but exposing a defect that was already there.


>
>> A more appropriate context assignment would seem to be: "Subjectively mind
>> comes before matter but objectively matter comes before mind." However, this
>> implies that Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is objective. Is that
>> a problem?
> Dan:
> As dmb pointed out, subjective and objective are meant to simplify the
> MOQ, not complicate it. It is okay to use those terms as long as we
> remember they represent patterns of value. So yes, this is a problem,
> since you seem to be pointing to subjects and objects as primary.
>


Tuukka:

According to LILA, the primary split of the MOQ is dynamic/static. If 
static quality is split into subjects and objects, that's secondary, not 
primary.

It's important to remember that the definition of static quality and the 
theory of static value patterns are two different things.

If Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is objective it doesn't 
follow that static patterns of value are inherently objective.

Can you find some other reason to consider this a problem?

Regards,
Tuk

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