[MD] To Pirsig and all: Why are sociality and intellectuality strictly subjective?

mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Sat Oct 15 06:23:19 PDT 2016


All,
As I've not been endowed with Pirsig's e-mail address I thought to  
write this open letter I hope to pertain to all those who are present.  
I remember how Pirsig complained during the Baggini interview about  
Baggini not asking him about the Metaphysics of Quality, so I thought  
maybe somebody should ask something.

In order to approach the topic of my inquiry, let's consider the  
following ZAMM quote. This quote defines subjectivity and objectivity  
and the uses of these concepts. Emphasis by me.

"Time to get on with the Chautauqua and the second wave of  
crystallization, the metaphysical one. This was brought about in  
response to Phædrus' wild meanderings about Quality when the English  
faculty at Bozeman, informed of their squareness, presented him with a  
reasonable question: ``Does this undefined `quality' of yours exist in  
the things we observe?'' they asked. ``Or is it subjective, existing  
only in the observer?'' It was a simple, normal enough question, and  
there was no hurry for an answer. Hah. There was no need for hurry. It  
was a finisher-offer, a knockdown question, a haymaker, a  
Saturday-night special...the kind you don't recover from. Because if  
Quality exists in the object, then you must explain just why  
scientific *instruments* are unable to detect it. You must suggest  
*instruments* that will detect it, or live with the explanation that  
instruments don't detect it because your whole Quality concept, to put  
it politely, is a large pile of nonsense. On the other hand, if  
Quality is subjective, existing only in the observer, then this  
Quality that you make so much of is just a fancy name for whatever you  
like."

In LILA Pirsig presents the idea that social quality and intellectual  
quality are subjective. If so, how can they be detected by scientific  
*instruments*?

We all probably can agree that BDI (Beck Depression Inventory) is an  
instrument. Yet it is a mere questionnaire - a slip of paper, on which  
the test subject selects certain answers and, according to these  
answers, the psychiatrist determines how depressed the subject is. But  
even though BDI is clearly an instrument, perhaps depression is  
biological. And if depression is biological it is objective - not  
subjective - according to the SODV stance that Pirsig already presents  
in LILA.

If social and intellectual quality are subjective, as Pirsig claims in  
LILA and SODV, according to the above ZAMM quote instruments should be  
unable to detect them. Well, are instruments unable to detect them?

Here's the abstract of a scientific paper at  
http://cpa.sagepub.com/content/45/7/607.short:

"This paper reviews some recent research on the mental health of the  
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis of Canada. We summarize evidence for  
the social origins of mental health problems and illustrate the  
ongoing responses of individuals and communities to the legacy of  
colonization. Cultural discontinuity and oppression have been linked  
to high rates of depression, alcoholism, suicide, and violence in many  
communities, with the greatest impact on youth. Despite these  
challenges, many communities have done well, and research is needed to  
identify the factors that promote wellness. Cultural psychiatry can  
contribute to rethinking mental health services and health promotion  
for indigenous populations and communities."

This is definitely about social matters, not just biological matters.  
But is this science? Scientific truth is objective. If social and  
intellectual matters are subjective, this paper is not science. Yet it  
has passed peer-review and obviously appears to be science. Obviously  
some kind of *instruments* have been used in the production of this  
scientific result. According to the LILA/SODV stance this should be  
impossible because social and intellectual patterns are subjective.

So, what does it mean that social and intellectual values are  
subjective instead of objective? If they can be objectively detected,  
they are necessarily objective. But in the SODV paper Pirsig doesn't  
even present an overlap between the subjective and the objective. They  
are portrayed as strictly different. Why?

Regards,
Tuk



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