[MF] Testing Testing

[Matt Kundert]

Paul suggested:
Judging by some recent postings (just catching up after the birth of our 
second child!), and something I've been thinking might be useful for a 
couple of years now, there may be value in splitting the forum into what may 
be described as a 'PIRSIG' forum and a 'CRIT' forum.
...
The 'PIRSIG' forum would be used for the discussion and clarification of MOQ 
basics based mainly on the available Pirsig material and also for the 
development and extrapolation of Pirsig's ideas, linking them to other 
supporting work and academic developments.  With respect to debate, Pirsig 
quotes would hold some authority in their own right on this forum.
...
The 'CRIT' forum, equally as valuable, would be used to pull the MOQ to bits 
- philosophically - where contributors wouldn't feel the need to announce 
themselves as 'dissenters'.  With respect to debate, Pirsig quotes wouldn't 
hold so much authority on this forum.  Being overtly critical of the MOQ, 
the posts to this forum would not be seen as necessarily representative of 
Pirsig's ideas and so there wouldn't so much of the "That's not what Pirsig 
says..." type arguments....

Matt:
I think this is a great idea with many up-shots.  For one (and selfishly), 
it would be less confusing for people in keeping track when I'm doing one 
(digging out what Pirsig means) and doing the other (defending or critiquing 
what Pirsig means).

I have three suggestions or warnings or caveats (or whatever):

One, I think both forums will have "dissenters."  Because the activities of 
ferreting out how Pirsig views himself and philosophy is distinct enough 
(just barely enough) from how someone themself views Pirsig and philosophy, 
you can expect dissenters on both forums, just dissenting in a different 
way.  For instance, the establishment of a forum dedicated to exegetical 
analysis of Pirsig will generate a mainline interpretation.  There will be 
those, however, who disagree, those who might dissent from this or that 
particular point of exegesis (or in general, who knows?).  Any healthy 
inquiry will run into that.  And that will be different than thinking Pirsig 
is wrong on this or that philosophical topic.  It's the difference between 
thinking Pirsig's answer to the free will problem is wrong and thinking that 
Pirsig's readers are getting _Pirsig's_ answer wrong.  So theoretically, we 
could not only get people who are mainline interpreters in exegesis and are 
also defenders against criticism, but also people who dissent against the 
mainline interpretation and defend Pirsig or accept the mainline and 
criticize Pirsig.  And then there's the most complicated relationship of 
all: someone who dissents the mainline and also criticizes Pirsig 
(considering you need a pinned down answer before you can criticize it).  
And naturally, some (if not most) people will fly all over the board 
depending on what particular issue is being discussed.  (Predicting my own 
position, I would probably dissent on some exegetical points while accepting 
others, in addition to dissenting on some Pirsigian doctrines while 
defending others _and_ (most strangely of all) dissent on some of the 
dissenting positions I'm trying to exegetically establish.  And those are 
all logically possible.)

Two, given this state of affairs, this might prove to be something of a 
problem for "the development and extrapolation of Pirsig's ideas" in the 
exegetical forum.  You have to agree first on an interpretation before you 
can develop it, and if that's what's at issue, you'll get different 
developments in different directions.  This doesn't have to be a problem so 
much as you might have to realize that some of these variant developments 
aren't critiques so much as they are different directions, but it is 
possible (again, predicting my own behavior) that a variant direction 
conflicts with the sentiment of the other directions--that a variant will 
look like a critique, and indeed is one.  (This is the problem when you 
think that the exegetically correct position is a position that 
philosophically conflicts with itself.)  Maybe the only thing to do there is 
to say: sure, try and establish the exegetical point, but don't pursue the 
critique half of it.  Save that for the other forum.

The third thing I wanted to suggest is that the issue of how much authority 
Pirsig has in either forum is moot (as it always has been (or should be)).  
In the exegetical forum, it isn't an issue because Pirsig is the _object_ of 
inquiry, not a _participant_ in it.  Its not that Pirsig's texts have 
authority in that forum, its that they are what we are dissecting.  That's 
why critique is easily seen as besides the point in an exegetical situation 
and philosophical dissenters could be just as good at ferreting out what 
Pirsig means as those who think Pirsig is great.  We aren't interested in 
critiquing what we find in Pirsig's text, we are simply interested in _what_ 
we find.

In the general philosophy forum it isn't an issue either, but this time 
because authority given to Pirsig is internal to the acceptance of his 
arguments and philosophy as _good_ arguments and a _good_ philosophy.  If I 
said to Scott (who is simply convient) that he was deviating from Pirsig's 
playbook (and showed that he was), Scott would (as he always has on 
particular points) shrug it off because Scott doesn't _accept_ the play 
Pirsig has drawn out as a good play.  In some cases that's _exactly_ what 
he's critiquing, so why wouldn't one expect him to shrug it off?  However, 
if I said to Paul that he was deviating and presented some convincing 
evidence, Paul would think about it longer (depending, again, on situation 
and issue) because he thought that Pirsig's argument was a good one and he 
had tried not to deviate from it.  (And then in thinking about it, he would 
either become convinced that he wasn't deviating (thus rejecting my 
exegetical evidence), or that he was indeed deviating, at which point he 
would have to choose between Pirsig's argument or the argument he was 
propounding.)

The moral of the story is that sometimes using a staccato Pirsigian 
argument, the reminding of a Pirsigian position (and _what_ those are are 
established exegetically, which is why exegesis can't be avoided in the 
wider forum), is sometimes useful and sometimes not, all depending on who 
you're talking to.  In other words, its not that "Pirsig quotes wouldn't 
hold so much authority on this forum," its that Pirsig quotes would hold as 
much authority as they ever had.  What will hopefully go out of style is the 
ridicule that often accompanies the pointing out of a difference with 
Pirsig, which is what I suspect Scott is tired of.  And also the idea that, 
because its a difference, its a closed issue--it ends the conversation.  
Because in the open philosophy form, the Crit Forum, those differences are 
exactly what are supposed to be faced openly and honestly and discussed.

Oh, and I would suggest different names for the forums.  Maybe PIRSIG is 
alright for the exegetical one, but I think something like Open Philosophy 
(or whatever) might be better for the other, because its not as though its 
just critique that is outside the bounds of exegetical analysis, but also 
the placing of Pirsig in varied and different contexts (religious, 
philosophical, political, etc.), the exploration of issues other than the 
ones Pirsig pursued (which is also why I think linking Pirsig with other 
people's ideas, "supporting work and academic developments," is probably 
more appropriate for the non-exegesis forum).

Matt

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