[MF] A thirty-thousand page menu with no food?
david buchanan
dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Sat Jan 28 16:21:31 PST 2006
Kevin, Matt and all MOQers:
Kevin asked:
Why is the Metaphysics of Quality NOT like a restaurant where they give you
a thirty-thousand page menu but no food?
Matt answered:
I'd have to say it is because Pirsig (like others) realizes the limits of
metaphysics. The section you quoted extensively from shows Pirsig running
together the function of metaphysics with the
function of language...
dmb says:
I think you're projecting Rorty onto Pirsig here and have mixed things up in
the process. The section Kevin quoted is all about OVERCOMING the two most
formidible opponents of metaphysics. The mystics and the positivisits are
both anti-metaphysical, but for opposite reasons. The mystics think
metaphysics is too scientific and the scientists think metaphysics is too
mystical. The positivists think that science is "the only source of
knowledge" and that "metaphysics is simply a collection of unprovable
assertions".
Matt continued:
...In that section it would seem that mystics take language itself to be
metaphysical. If we think of the mystics as saying that we don't need menus,
only the food, and the positivists as saying that there is no food, only the
menu, Pirsig's way of splitting the difference between mystics and
postivists can be put in two different ways:
dmb says:
Huh? What does it mean to say that language is metaphysical? It seems to me
that the mystics are simply saying that reality and names about reality are
two different things. (Metaphysics, as Pirsig defines it in that section, is
"that part of philosophy which deals with the nature and structure of
reality".) The mystics aren't saying that we don't need menus, they're just
saying that looking at menus and eating lunch are two different things. But,
again, I don't think its correct to construe Pirsig as "splitting the
difference" between the two kinds of anti-metaphysical positions. I think
its pretty clear that he's trying to use metaphysics to build a bridge
between the two. "if there is a bridge between the two", he writes,
"metaphysics is where that bridge is located".
Matt continued:
1) Pirsig sides with the mystics in saying that language will itself never
get us the food, but the positivists are right in thinking that language can
help us, in fact by pointing the way towards the
food.
dmb says:
Positivists think language can point the way towards the food? But, but, but
didn't you just say that the positivists think "there is no food, only the
menu"? At least one of us is a bit mixed up here.
Matt continued:
2) Pirsig sides with the positivists in saying that language isn't itself
metaphysical, that it isn't supposed to get us at the food, but the mystics
are right in thinking that there is food that isn't
language.
dmb says:
No, Pirsig sides with the positivists in saying that knowledge has to be
based on experience. "The MOQ RESTATES the empirical basis of logical
positivism with more precision, more inclusiveness, more explanatory power
than it has previously had." (Emphasis is Pirsig's) And in saying that
"Values are MORE empirical, in fact, than subjects and objects" and that
"Quality is the primary empirical reality", the MOQ is agreeing with the
mystics in thinking that language (descriptions and judgements) is not that
primary empirical reality, that names about reality (sq) is distinct from
reality (DQ).
Matt continued:
I think both ways more or less amount to the same thing. I think people
tending towards mysticism will, following Pirsig, prefer the first
description. People tending towards positivism, which is to say
anti-metaphysics, will, like me, prefer the second description. But the
consequences of the two positions, I think, are the same and its a kind of
pragmatism that gets us there. As long as people who like the first
remember that language can be helpful and people who like the second
remember that there is food that isn't language, then there's no
philosophical difference between the two (at least at this level of
generality and on this particular point).
dmb says:
As I just tried to explain, I think you're misreading this section and so
neither description seems right. Again, in this section Pirsig is saying
that metaphysics is the bridge between these two anti-metaphysical stances
and he's trying to overcome their objections to metaphysics with
metaphysics. And so I'm quite baffled at the assertion that all this can be
interpreted as anti-metaphysical.
Matt added:
(And for anyone who has been following my arguments with DMB over the last
few years, I've concluded that this is a very basic way of describing our
philosophical differences. DMB prefers the first description, I prefer the
second. As far as I can tell, DMB still thinks there is a very large
philosophical disagreement between us, but more and more I've not been able
to discern what it is. It seems more and more to me to be simply a verbal
disagreement: he likes the first, I like the second. That being said, I
still think DMB hooks his train up to the wrong language once in a while
(like "pure sensation"), and those occasions have led me to think there _is_
a philosophical disagreement in the area, but if there is, I thinks it's in
the minutiae rather than in the broad area of agreement we do in fact seem
to hold.)
dmb says:
Its kind of funny that we disagree even about our disagreement. As I
understand that section, you've offered choices wher Pirsig did not intend
to offer either. On top of retaining the distinction mystic make between
names and reality and retaining the empirical basis of positivism, he also
overcomes their anti-metaphysical objections by pointing out that neither of
them can escape metaphysics, that metaphysics is part of life. "As long as
you're inside a logical, coherent universe of thought you can't escape
metaphysics. Logical positivism's a criteria for 'meaningfulness' were pure
metaphysics, he thought". It seems to me that even Rorty's slogan that its
"words all the way down" is pure metaphysics too. It says that the nature
and structure of reality is linguistic.
I recently came across a paper on ZAMM by a Bruce Charlton. I'd say that it
could have been written by you, except that I could actually comprehend what
the guy is saying. In any case, he quotes Rorty approvingly and otherwise
tends to make the same moves. He also doesn't like language like "pure
sensation". In response to the assertion that value is "the leading edge of
reality", that "value is the predecessor of structure. Its the
pre-intellectual reality that gives rise to it", Charlton complains that
Pirsig is "coming close" to epistemology and thinks epistemolgy "is just
what he is warning us aganst". He then concludes that "the whole discussion
makes no sense and is not necessary" He complains that Pirsig "reifies"
Quality in these claims and that theygo "against the treand of the rest of
the book". In other words, he is misreading Pirsig the same way you do. He
applies that Rortarian critique and wants to see Pirsig as the same kind of
pragmatist.
There is a post script in which Charlton explains that this paper was
written before Lila was published. "It differs significantly in explicitly
pursuing a 'Metapysics of Quality', and therefore advocating a different
philosophy from that of ZAMM: no longer Pragmatism but something else." He
also says that he sent his paper to Pirsig and recieved a response. He
doesn't quote Pirsig, but explains that "for reasons explained in Lila,
Pirsig has now come to believe that Pragmatism is incomplete and that the
MOQ is its completion."
Thanks.
dmb
_________________________________________________________________
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
More information about the Moq_Focus
mailing list