[MD] Choosing Chance

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Krimmel,

On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 4:20 PM, Krimel <Krimel at krimel.com> wrote:
> [Steve]
> Randomness is a useful concept for making decisions but a poor choice
> for a metaphysical description. If we just take randomness as an
> epistemological notion, then saying that something is random is a way
> of saying that you don't know what will happen, but you do know the
> relative frequency of its occurence. As a teacher of statistics, I
> know that there is a lot of mileage to get from this concept of
> randomness and also that nothing is lost if we just stick to the
> epistemological view of randomness as a term that applies to specific
> perspectives and what can be known from a given perspective rather
> than as a metaphysical notion describing what sorts of things possess
> the property that they cannot ever be known even from a
> perspectiveless God's-Eye-View.
>
> [Krimel]
> As someone well versed in statistic you should know better than this. In the
> random world of coin tossing it is entirely possible to toss 1 trillion
> heads in a row. But if you were on the 500 billionth toss the outcome of the
> next toss might seem to be certain or appear have some cause. I have argued
> repeatedly that the MoQ is or at least should be exactly what Pirsig said it
> might be like: a Metaphysics of Randomness. DQ is chance (randomish patterns
> of head or tails. SQ is statistical anomalies like 1 trillion heads. Both
> result from random outcomes.
>
> [Steve]
> It is better to drop such metaphysical claims about the intrinsic
> nature of preferences (free choice?, random?, deterministic?...) and
> simply say that we aren't in an epistemological context to know the
> whole story of the evolution of the entire universe to be able to
> describe the origin of our particular patterns of preferences with
> great specificity, but the MOQ gives us a useful "big picture" to
> describe the evolution of value patterns on a broad scale.
>
> [Krimel]
> I say it is better to embrace randomness and our responses to it, as
> integral to epistemology and metaphysics. Evolution is entirely about how
> static patterns emerge and persist in a random universe. Until the MoQ wises
> up on this score, the "big picture" it offers will remain a shadow of what
> might have been if Pirsig hadn't chicken out on his Metaphysics of
> Randomness.

Steve:
Do you have any evidence that Pirsig ever toyed with the idea of a
Metaphysics of Randomness? If you were referring to this passage
below, I think a re-reading will clear up your misconception:

Pirsig in Lila:
"Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that there
is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these things.  A
metaphysics must be divisible, definable and knowable, or there isn't any
metaphysics.  Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind of dialectical
definition and since Quality is essentially outside definition, this means
that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a contradiction in terms, a
logical absurdity.
It would be almost like a mathematical definition of randomness.  The more
you try to say what randomness is the less random it becomes.  Or "zero,"
or "space" for that matter.  Today these terms have almost nothing to do
with "nothing."  "Zero" and "space" are complex relationships of
"somethingness."  If he said anything about the scientific nature of mystic
understanding, science might benefit but the actual mystic understanding
would, if anything, be injured.  If he really wanted to do Quality a favor
he should just leave it alone."


Steve:
Pirsig draws an analogy between "a metaphysics of Quality" and "a
mathematical definition of randomness," but he does not equate Quality
with randomness in any way.

Best,
Steve