[MD] What does Pirsig mean by metaphysics?

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,

 dmb said to Steve:
> This attitude [Dewey's] is compared to Rorty's. Hickman quotes him saying,
> "Liberals have come to expect philosophy to do a certain job - namely,
> answering questions like 'Why not be cruel?' and 'Why be kind?' - and they
> feel that any philosophy which refuses this assignment must be heartless.
> But that is a result of a metaphysical upbringing. If we could get rid of
> the expectation, liberals would not ask ironist philosophy to do a job it
> cannot do, and which it defines itself as unable to do."
>
> Steve replied:
> Rorty doesn't think "our hands are tied morally." He thinks we should avoid
> cruelty. He just doesn't think that philosophy will ever make good on its
> promise to provide an ahistorical foundation for our belief that we should
> avoid cruelty.
>
> dmb says:
> Hmmm. Could it be that you didn't notice who was saying, that "answering
> questions" about why we should be kind or not be cruel is "a job it cannot
> do, and which defines itself as unable to do". Rorty said that. I mean, the
> question is not about Rorty's personality traits or his own moral
> sensibilities. It's about the consequences of his pragmatism or the effects
> of his philosophical position. I understand that he has reasons for holding
> "the position that philosophy is incapable of addressing ethical issues", as
> Hickman puts it. "Rortian postmodernism" ties our hands morally, Hickman
> says, because Rorty thinks "there is no adequate common denominator for
> human experience." What I don't get is why we need an ahistorical foundation
> to address ethical issues. Who ever decided that foundationalism and
> groundlessness are the only two options? That's my point, really. The
> classical pragmatists reject both of those options.
>
Steve:
Rorty doesn't say that "philosophy is incapable of addressing ethical
issues," as Hickman puts it. He says that philosophy is incapable of
addressing such issues in a particular way--that of providing a foundation
for our beliefs about ethics. As I understand you, you agree.




> Steve said:
> Experience can't serve as the sprt of foundation that philsopher's of the
> past have promised. It can't give us any to the question, "why be kind?" can
> it?
>
> dmb says:
> I don't know fulfilling what philosophers of the past have promised but I
> fail to see why experience isn't good enough to address ethical issues.
> Pirsig grounds his MOQ in experience and it discusses morality and values
> all day long. So what's the problem? Why are we "incapable of addressing
> ethical issues" just because there is no such thing as eternal truth or
> whatever? This kind of all-or-nothingism always baffled me.
>
Steve:
Rorty doesn't say that we nothing without a foundation. That is a fear that
other people have that Rorty thinks we don't need to have.




>
>
> Steve said:
> We all certainly make assumptions. The question is, what makes an
> assumption metaphysical? For Rorty, the claims that he calls metaphysical
> are the ones that you agree that pragmatists don't want to make. It sounds
> like you and Rorty don't so much disagree here but are just using the word
> to mean different things.
>
> dmb says:
> Well, first of all, it's not just me. There is no shortage of Rorty
> critics, especially among the pragmatists in academia.




Steve:
The reason that there is no shortage of Rorty critics is because the way to
say something interesting is to disagree with Rorty. That's how academia
works.  I mean, there are no DMB critics out there, because DMB is not yet
considered worth even disagreeing with. But if you turn out to be
successful, I'm sure all kinds of people will be interested in disagreeing
with you. If that happens, you will hope that such people at least show an
understanding of what you are saying rather than just putting words in your
mouth as you and Hickman seem to be doing.

DMB:

> What Hickman and others point out is that the pragmatists sought to reform
> metaphysics whereas Rorty thinks we should just drop it altogether.


Steve:
But you seem to have missed the point that Hickman and Rorty are using the
word to mean different things, so they may not even really be disagreeing.
Both agree that the project that Rorty labels metaphysics is one we are
better off dropping. And both think there is still a lot to talk about once
we drop that project.

DMB:

> Same with truth theories and epistemology. I'm trying to show you that
> Pirsig, James and Dewey differ from Rorty about what to do AFTER the attack
> on modern foundationalism has cleared the way. You see how Pirsig in Lila
> first rejects positivism, traditional empiricism and the assumptions of SOM
> but then goes on to adopt an expanded form of empiricism, namely radical
> empiricism. He adopts the pragmatic theory of truth as well. This is not
> something Rorty would approve of and in fact adopts only selected parts of
> Dewey. Hickman and others see this as an injurious misreading of Dewey, a
> misrepresentation of Dewey. Basically, all agree with the deconstruction
> part but Rorty goes a different way after that. His work is almost entirely
> negative whereas the classical pragmatists add a positive project, a
> reconstruction project after the demolition.
>
Steve:
What do you think Rorty says we should do after that?



Steve said:
Of course we can and should promote kindness and oppose cruelty, and we are
in no way paralyzed if we follow Rorty anymore than Pirsig is promoting
relativism...

dmb says:
I never subscribed to "the notion that the Metaphysics of Quality claims to
be a quick fix for every moral problem in the universe". But we certainly
are talking about relativism here. In the same way that there is a middle
ground between absolutism and relativism, there is a middle ground between
foundationalism and utter groundlessness.

Steve:
Rorty would simply say that without the notion that our moral claims need a
foundation, this absolutism-relativism false choice doesn't come up. Pirsig
would say that this dualism is the sort of Platypus (equivalent to, is the
Quality a property of the subject or the object?) that gets disolved once we
drop the subject-object picture.



DMB:
Professionals like Hickman are using the term "platform" to describe a
provisional, modest kind of ground to stand upon.


Steve:
That sounds like a cool term that Hickman can probably get a lot of
philosophical mileage out of, but it is one that Rorty never thought to
retool. I wonder if he would have thought to try to do so if not for being
inspired by Rorty's criticism of the foundation metaphor for the goal of
philosophy.


DMB:
"Dewey's commitment to evolutionary naturalism stresses the commonalities
which can serve as platforms on which global publics can be formed and from
which they can be launched.

Steve:
I don't see where Rorty would disagree with this.


DMB:
Second, the Pragmatic method has implications with regard to cultural
conflict, and consequently the problem of relativism. Pragmatism, as I have
characterized it, advances a moderate version of cultural relativism but
rejects a stronger skeptical version known as cognitive relativism."

A self-described cognitive relativists explains that it "takes as its object
judgments in general" and it "is based on two theses: 1) The truth value of
all judgments is relative to some particular standpoint (otherwise variously
referred to as a theoretical framework, conceptual scheme, perspective, or
point of view). 2) No standpoint is uniquely or supremely privileged over
all others." (from a 1996 issue of PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM)
To the extent that first thesis describes perspectivism it is consistent
with classical pragmatism, Hickman explains. But "the second thesis is
somewhat more complex", he says, "but if it is taken to mean that with
respect to judgments in the general sense all perspectives or standpoints
are equally valuable, or even that they are equally valuable for the
solution of specific problems at hand, then it is inconsistent with the
experimental methods of classical Pragmatism." Inquiry, he says, "usually
tends to render some perspectives or standpoints tenable and others
untenable". "...one of the core features of Pragmatism is its perspectivism.
But the Pragmatist's perspectivism is the result of limited access; it is
not the result of intellectual promiscuity."

If I understand Hickman rightly, the cognitive relativist thinks we need a
God's-eye view or a uniquely privileged standpoint in order to say that some
perspectives are better than others and they differ from the pragmatists on
this point. The pragmatists emphasis on experience as the test of truth, on
experimentation and inquiry, lets us get at the relative merits of the
various perspectives without anything so grandiose. James and Hickman both
use a metaphor from a third pragmatist, whose name escapes me. Pragmatism is
like a big hotel with a different kind of inquirer in each of the rooms.
They all there own perspectives, their own areas of interest but they all
must pass through the corridor to get to their rooms. The pragmatic theory
of truth is something they all have in common, meaning each of their
perspectives will be tested in experience, which is the only place where the
word "truth" has any meaning. This is what keeps the occupants from being
intellectually promiscuous and yet it allows for an unlimited number of
different perspectives.

Steve:
Again, I don't see where Rorty disagrees with any of this.

Best,
Steve