[MD] What does Pirsig mean by metaphysics?

[david buchanan]

Steve said:
Rorty doesn't say that we [have] nothing without a foundation. That is a fear that other people have that Rorty thinks we don't need to have.

dmb says:
Yes, I realize that Rorty doesn't worry about that. In fact, I learned the meaning of the word "insouciance" from Hickman's discussion of Rorty. It means "a casual lack of concern; indifference". Hickman says this is precisely what "rankles" people. That means to "cause annoyance or resentment that persists" and "irritate", although the term originally referred to a festering sore.  


Steve said:
The reason that there is no shortage of Rorty critics is because the way to say something interesting is to disagree with Rorty. That's how academia works.  I mean, there are no DMB critics out there, because DMB is not yet considered worth even disagreeing with. But if you turn out to be successful, I'm sure all kinds of people will be interested in disagreeing with you. If that happens, you will hope that such people at least show an understanding of what you are saying rather than just putting words in your mouth as you and Hickman seem to be doing.

dmb says:
Well, thanks for taking me seriously enough to disagree. I mean that. But I think it's quite unfair to dismiss Hickman or accuse him of putting words in anyone's mouth. He's a respected Dewey scholar, Director of the Dewey Center in fact, and his work is peer reviewed and all that. I certainly think he should be allowed to have an opinion of Rorty. The idea that Rorty has so many critics because he's so interesting and successful is only true to a point, however. That doesn't seem to be the consensus among other philosophers anyway.
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy has an article on Rorty, which Matt recommended a week or two ago, which says...
"The broad scope of Rorty's metaphilosophical deconstruction, together with a penchant for uncashed metaphor and swift, broad-stroke historical narrative, has gained Rorty a sturdy reputation as an anti-philosopher's philosopher. While his writing enjoys an unusual degree of popularity beyond the confines of the profession, Rorty's work is often regarded with suspicion and scepticism within academic philosophy."
And Susan Haack, one of Rorty's harshest critics and a big fan of Peirce, is much less kind about it. She says that he has a fan-base outside of philosophy, usually in English departments and such, because that's where you find the pretentious dilettantes. Ouch. Even I winced at that.  


Steve said:
But you seem to have missed the point that Hickman and Rorty are using the word to mean different things, so they may not even really be disagreeing. Both agree that the project that Rorty labels metaphysics is one we are better off dropping. And both think there is still a lot to talk about once we drop that project.

dmb says:
Yes, Hickman points out the areas of agreement and I realize that dropping everything bad about metaphysics is not very different from dropping it altogether and calling the remainder something else. But if you could read what I just read, you'd surely agree that it's really not plausible to say Hickman has no real disagreements with Rorty on these issues. In several of the essays, he lays out a disagreement or two on nearly every page. (In most of the essays he's not mentioned at all.) ".. his neopragmatism seems somewhat timid and even nebulous when compared to the robust program of experimental reconstruction advanced as a part of Dewey classical Pragmatism" "Rorty's postion on these matters hardly matches up with Dewey's version of Pragmatism." "Rorty may describe himself as a 'follower' of Dewey in these matters, but his Dewey is not one that I am able to recognize. As I read him, Dewey thought that philosophy and philosophers still have important work to do,.. As I read him, Dewey thought that the denotative [experiential] method was at the heart of philosophical inquiry." Or better yet, I'll give a substantial and beautiful passage from Dewey. Hickman says this an important feature of Dewey's thought and quite "at variance" with Rorty's take. He also says the careful reader can see that Dewey is attacking "the modernist metaphysics of fixity and certainty" (which is a way to say "static", which contrast nicely with flux and the "dynamic". He also says, "A careful reader can also ascertain a respone to those postmodernists who argue that metaphysics uberhaupt, including metaphysics as the study of the generic traits of existence, is now defunct." I'm posting this not just because it's relevant but also because it's beautiful in its own right and it's beautifully Pirsigian too, I think.
In EXPERIENCE AND NATURE Dewey says...

We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate. They are mixed not mechanically but vitally like the wheat and tares of the parable. We may recognize them separately but we cannot divide them, for unlike wheat and tares they grow from the same root. Qualities have defects as necessary conditions of their excellencies; the instrumentalities of truth are the causes of error; change gives meaning to permanence and recurrence makes novelty possible. A world that was wholly risky would be a world in which adventure is impossible, and only a living world can include death. Such facts have been celebrated by thinkers like Heracleitus and Lao-tze; they have been greeted by theologians as furnishing occasions for exercise of divine grace; they have been elaborately formulated by various schools under a principle of relativity, so defined as to become itself final and absolute. They have rarely been frankly recognized as fundamentally significant for the formation of a naturalistic metaphysics.
Before James adopted the terms "static" and "dynamic" he expressed the notion in terms of "flights" and "perches". That's what Dewey is talking about here. Dewey's similar pairing is "precarious" and "stable". I think the basic idea here is that you get rid of fixity and certainty and instead have a metaphysics of flux and growth, one that doesn't try to tidy up the place in advance, one that deals with these generic traits of existence with warts and all. 
I guess that's about enough for tonight.
Later,
dmb

 		 	   		  
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