[MD] loopty-loop

[Ian Glendinning]

Hi Marsha, that's why I like Hofstadter ... you said

"He does plenty of talking about patterns, and I did get a little
hopeful, but no he's a materialist.  One wants to ask him why wouldn't
he think the same patterns that create the self, creates objects."

I believe he does think that too. It's just not the subject of the
book you are currently reading.

Ian

On Mon, May 31, 2010 at 5:42 PM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Platt,
>
> Yes, it does seem that way.  He does plenty of talking about patterns, and
> I did get a little hopeful, but no he's a materialist.  One wants to ask him why
> wouldn't he think the same patterns that create the self, creates objects.  Seems
> like an obvious consideration.
>
> Wonder what it will take?  But you are correct, it is too bad.
>
>
> Marsha
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On May 31, 2010, at 11:58 AM, Platt Holden wrote:
>
>> Hi Marsha,
>>
>> Like most academics, Hofstadter buys into SOM hook, line and sinker. Too
>> bad, really.
>>
>> Platt
>>
>> On Mon, May 31, 2010 at 6:50 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  "What would make a human brain a candidate for housing a loop of
>>> self-representation?  Why would a fly brain or a mosquito brain not be just
>>> as valid a candidate?  Why, for that matter, not a bacterium, an ovum, a
>>> sperm, a virus, a tomato plant, a tomato, or a pencil?  The answer should be
>>> clear:  a human brain is a representational system that knows no bounds in
>>> terms of the extensibility or flexibility of its categories.  A mosquito
>>> brain, by contrast, is a tiny representational system that contains
>>> practically no categories at all, never mind being flexible and extensible.
>>> Very small representational systems, such as those of bacteria, ova,
>>> sperms, plants, thermostats, and so forth, do not enjoy the luxury of
>>> self-representation.  And a tomato and a pencil are not representational
>>> systems at all, so for them, the story ends right there (sorry, little
>>> tomato! sorry, little pencil!).
>>>    "So a human brain is a strong candidate for having the potential of
>>> rich perceptual feedback, and thus rich self-reresentation.  But what kinds
>>> of perceptual cycles do we get involved in?  We begin life with the most
>>> elementary sorts of feedback about ourselves, which stimulate us to
>>> formulate categories for our most obvious body parts, and building on this
>>> basic pedestal, we soon develop a sense for our bodies as flexible physical
>>> objects.  In the meantime, as we receive rewards for various actions and
>>> punishments for others, we begin to develop a more abstract sense of "good"
>>> and "bad", as well as notions of guilt and pride, and our sense of ourselves
>>> as abstract entities that have the power to decide to make things happen
>>> (such as continuing to run up a steep hill even though our legs are begging
>>> us to just walk) begins to take root.
>>>   "It is crucial to our young lives that we hone our developing
>>> self-symbol as precisely as possible.  We want (and need) to find out where
>>> we belong in all sorts of social hierarchies and classes, and sometimes,
>>> even if we don't want to know thee things, we find out anyway.  For
>>> instance, we are all told, early on, that we are "cute"; in some of us,
>>> however, this message is reinforced far more strongly than in others.  In
>>> this manner, each of us comes to realize that we are "good-looking" or
>>> "gullible" or "cheeky" or "shy" or "spoiled" or "funny" or "lazy" or
>>> "original", or whatever.  Dozens of such labels and concepts accrete to our
>>> growing self-symbols.
>>>   "As we go through thousands of experiences large and small, our
>>> representation of these experiences likewise accrete to our self-symbols.
>>> Of course a memory of a visit to the Grand Canyon, say, is attached not
>>> only to our self-symbol but to many other symbols in our brains, but our
>>> self-symbol is enriched and rendered more complex by this attachment."
>>>        (Hofstadter, Douglas,'I Am A Strange Loop', pp.182-183)
>>>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> A extremely interesting explanation of self-forming, yet ALL in this
>>> explanation are patterns and analogs including the concept of a "human
>>> brain" (sorry little marsha).
>>>
>>>
>>> Does the concept 'dna' as a pattern have any more substance for the
>>> biologist than for the police officer?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ___
>>>
>>>
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