[MD] The Greeks?

[Mary]

Hi Matt,

Failed to clean this up before sending.  I really did reply, and it is
below.  ;)

> Hi Mary,
> 
> Mary said:
> The levels are but a representation of reality.  Given a
> choice, would you prefer to access the representation or
> the thing represented?
> 
> Matt said:
> This is what I would call a fake choice, between a
> representation and a thing-in-itself.
> 
> Mary said:
> Yeah, poor choice of words.  I have almost exactly 2
> minutes to respond right now before I am late for something,
> so let me just say quickly that the "thing represented" I was
> referring to was not an objective reality, but Dynamic Quality,
> or more precisely, an acknowledgement that DQ is available
> and underlies all, since as we all have had pointed out to us
> by the MoQ, there is no objective reality.
> 
> Matt:
> Perhaps just a poor choice of words, but linguistic habits are
> a large part of philosophy, and I think (largely accidental)
> Kantian interpretations of Pirsig's static/dynamic distinction is
> a large part of what I see in some interpretations of Pirsig
> and what I spend my time trying to work people out of.
> 
> For example, say we repeat what you said but explicitly
> with Pirsig's vocabulary: "Given a choice, would you prefer
> to access the static patterns or Dynamic Quality?"  It's
> still a fake choice, because in practice, in the moment of
> experiencing, it supposes that we _know_ which is which.
> But what I call Pirsig's indeterminancy of Dynamic Quality
> thesis cogently says that that ability is unavailable: "The
> problem is that you can't really say whether a specific
> change is evolutionary at the time it occurs.  It is only
> with a century or so of hindsight that it appears
> evolutionary." (Lila, Ch. 17, 256)  We experience life, of
> course, in a constant state of choosing the best option
> we feel is available, but the distinction between static
> and dynamic cannot help us with those choices because
> it is too abstract: because if Hitler had learned the
> Pirsigian vocabulary, he would have said _he_ was being
> Dynamic (this is what I once called the "blood, race, and
> soil" interpretation of the MoQ).
> 
[Mary Replies] 
Ok.  Have more time now. :)  What I said was, "the "thing represented" I was
referring to was not an objective reality, but Dynamic Quality,
or more precisely, an acknowledgement that DQ is available
and underlies all."  Meaning that the choice then, is not between Static and
Dynamic Quality.  That is the first cut and according to Pirsig, about that
cut we have no choice.  In the instant Dynamic Quality is experienced, it
becomes Static Quality before we are aware of it.  We can only be aware of
Static Quality.  Under every day circumstances, discernment of DQ is
inaccessible to us.  

The choice we do have is in how we interpret the Static Quality once
experienced.  It is this cut that Pirsig says we have a choice about, and it
is necessary in Pirsig's Universe to realize a couple of things and hold
these concepts simultaneously and at all times.  First, that Static Quality
is not an absolute, and second, that DQ underlies all.  If you are not privy
to the concept of Dynamic Quality, it would be difficult to discern the
ephemeral nature of Static Quality.  Without an acknowledgement of an
underlying DQ, one would be tempted to just punt and say that the Static
Quality you see _is_ reality.  But if you do that, you are locked into a
world where SQ is divided as subjects but mostly (quantity-wise) as objects.
Now I've given this a fair amount of thought, but I cannot come up with
anything else SQ (temporal reality) could logically be if the concept of
underlying DQ is absent.  If you have, I'd be seriously delighted to hear
about it.  

The issue resolves into an examination of the choice one makes in how to
interpret the SQ experienced; and as we know, most Westerners give this
little thought and go with the obvious answer that what they as a subject
experience is a range of external objects that are distinct from themselves
- or more precisely, distinct from their 'mind'.  As a professional in the
field, I'm sure you can point to others, but for me, Pirsig was the first
person to make a convincing argument that this is not the case; that the
choice of dividing experience into subjects and objects is nothing more than
a choice, and further, that a much better choice would be to slice
experience into Patterns of Value first.  Given this line of reasoning, I
have to say with all due respect that the quandary you've constructed in
your reply above is what actually represents the "fake" choice.  We have no
choice in the Pirsigian Universe about Static versus Dynamic Quality.  

 
> Unless somebody is willing to say that the Dynamic Quality
> choice is not always the best choice (which reverts you to
> ZMM problems about the good and reasonable), there's no
> theoretical answer to what Pirsig called the central problem
> of the MoQ's theory of evolution: "how do you tell the
> saviors from the degenerates?"  Analogously, to go back to
> religious imagery and the Pirsigian Church, how do you tell
> the saint from the heretic?  Pirsig posed the problem himself
> when he repeated the old chestnut that there's nothing a
> priest hates more than a saint in the steeple.  But how do
> you tell which is which, which a step forward (me) and
> which a step back (Bo)?  (And parenthetically adding your
> opinion doesn't dissolve the abstract connundrum.)
> 
[Mary Replies] 
This speaks directly to a similar question I posed in a mail addressed to
Joe yesterday where I wanted to know if it was possible for any SQ to exist
that was totally devoid of Quality.  By implication, Pirsig suggests not,
but I can think of a few things that I struggle to "classify" as having any
sort of Quality at any of his four levels.  I leave this an open question.
Pirsig's Universe is decidedly upbeat, viewing everything as having Value
for one of the Levels no matter how heinous it may appear to us at first
glance.  This begs the question of why Pirsig himself would pose any sort of
question about "degeneracy", though I know you are correct, and he did.
Perhaps this is a "latching" issue?  Perhaps truly degenerate experiences
will ultimately fail to latch at any level.  That seems to be his only
escape route, though.  On a derivative note, you'll have to explain further
about your comment that you represent a step forward and Bo a step back,
since I do not know enough about your position to comment.

> The problem of philosohical rhetoric, of the choice in
> vocabulary a philosopher makes in explicating what they
> think, is the only reason I might be inclined to favor the
> Reader of Philosophical History in recommendations of
> vocabulary.  When one wonders whether a particular
> vocabulary (i.e. system) works or not, there are two ways
> to construe the question: is it consistent? or is it
> effective?  The first has to be a lead into the second, but
> the second cannot be judged solely by the first.
> Effectivity must, at some point, be about a philosopher's
> ability to win chess matches with her neighbor.  And the
> trouble with philosophical chess, is that usually
> head-to-head opponents don't agree on who the winner
> was, which means success largely depends on your ability
> to convince the audience watching the match that you
> were the winner.  (But even here, that doesn't properly
> end a philosophical match, which properly has no ending.)
> And if this description seems pernicious, think of it this
> way: it's your ability to convince your audience to pick
> up some of the moves you displayed.  Which, given my
> Pirsigian metaphor, is your ability to showcase and
> convince your audience to use your vocabulary in
> confronting situations (whatever they may be).
> 
[Mary Replies] 
Yes.  Nothing is more important than being able to "sell" your position to
your audience.  If you fail to do so, it does not matter that you have in
actuality "won" the logical joust.  Logos, ethos, pathos.  All are in play
and must be used skillfully.

> And what the Reader of Philosophical History has on her
> side is that she has watched the contours of philosophical
> battle over a long period of time, which puts her at particular
> kind of advantage when suggesting what little vocables,
> particular bits of philosophical rhetoric and system, might
> produce what kinds of effects on a particular kind of
> audience.  It doesn't mean she's necessarily right, just as
> no philosopher knows for sure whether she or her opponent
> is _really_ the right one.  But we make our judgments as we
> go, and the Reader has that extra merit, perhaps, of having
> seen a lot of chess matches and a lot of different kinds of
> moves.
> 
> Which is what leads me to say this: representationalism is
> the name Richard Rorty came to use for what Platonism
> turned into after Descartes and Locke, and in most cases
> he suggests we stay well away from that metaphoric
> because of the empty conundrums it produces which add
> no practical help to the situation: like, given a choice,
> would we choose static patterns or Dynamic Quality?
> 
[Mary Replies] 
I think I've already responded to this...

> Calling it an "an acknowledgement that DQ is available and
> underlies all" is technically right, but consider further how
> far that acknowledgment gets you.  What do we _gain_,
> what further can we _assert_ from that point?  I'm arguing:
> not as much as Descartes and Kant certainly thought.
>
[Mary Replies] 
...and also at least tried to point at what gains this acknowledgement gets
you - though only, of course, if you are willing to buy into the Pirsigian
Universe.

Best,
Mary