[MD] On Time?

[Scott Roberts]

Ian,

> Scott:
> Yes and no. I see consciousness, intellect, and value as three words (and
> there are others) that -- to put it into Fregean terms -- have the same
> denotation (call it the Tao, perhaps), but different connotations.

[IG] - "Yes and No" is what we'd both already said ! This semantic
point, about many possible words and concepts (and sub-concepts) in
play, was really the point I was making - I wasn't picking on the
particular three words.

Scott:
Ok. But observe that I am making a distinct point in saying that 
consciousness and intellect have the same denotation as value. In short, 
this means that I am treating consciousness and intellect the same way that 
the MOQ treats quality (well, subject to my disputes with the MOQ). In 
particular reference to this discussion, it means that consciousness has a 
dynamic aspect that is not susceptible to being studied scientifically -- or 
as I've been putting it, the study of form always leaves out awareness of 
form.

> Scott:
> For why you shouldn't suspend disbelief that physics will actually explain
> the whole of nature, I've given two reasons: the Munchhausen fallacy, and
> the one that the debate with Case has been on about, that examination of
> form (which is what physics is limited to) can never encompass awareness 
> of
> form. Which is, basically, Chalmers' "hard problem".

[IG] Clearly I don't buy that. Your "can never" sounds suspiciously
like a folk intuition rather than an argument. You may have to point
me at the specific arguments you refer to, if we're going to progress
here. To use Dennett's words Chalmers' version of the hard problem is
a chimera - though I'm still open to the need for some hard explaining
in this space.

Scott:
I can see that whenever I raise my objections to physicalism, the answer 
will always be "intuition pump". Is that also your answer to Pirsig's saying 
that DQ is undefinable?

Scott said:
> - it is supported by some mystical revelation (see, for instance, Franklin
> Merrell-Wolff's "Philosophy of Consciousness-Without-an-Object" reprinted 
> in
> "Experience and Philosophy", especially the chapter "A Mystical 
> Unfoldment")
> - it is consistent with known empirical data, plus it provides an answer 
> to
> the quantum measurement problem

[IG] Hmmm - can't comment, so I'll have to read. (Sound's suspiciously
like the new-age-physics silver-bullet that Dennett abhors ?)

Scott:
It isn't. If you can imagine someone who's mystical insight is comparable to 
that of Eckhart or Shankara, but who was a 20th century American, 
well-versed in modern philosophy, science, and mathematics -- that's FM-W. 
He is well able to stand back and critique his own mystical experience.

> [IG] This you will recognise, given our other thread, as Chalmers hard
> problem - the subjective aspect of consciousness. Clearly some forms
> of consciousness, are unaware with no apparent first person "view".
>
> Scott:
> I wouldn't say it was clear -- since we don't know what non-human
> consciousness is like -- but ok.

[IG] - this is just semantics - we are using "consciousness" very
broadly here with no pre-agreed tight definitions - I could have said
"Clearly we could chose to define some forms of consciousness ... "
Let's not reduce this to pedantry, I felt we were making progress.

Scott:
One must be pedantic to make clear our differences. Forms of consciousness 
are just forms, in my vocabulary -- one needs to bring in the ubiquitous but 
undefinable Dynamic aspect of consciousness as well. So from my point of 
view, we cannot "clearly" define some forms of consciousness, no more than 
we can clearly define some forms of quality.

>
> Ian continued:
> Why awareness ? is simple, because it evolved as being something
> better than being conscious without it (I don't buy Chalmers' Zombie
> remember).
>
> Scott:
> Not simple: that's the hard problem, after all. So here you are just 
> begging
> the question that it evolved.

[IG] Now you're not playing fair. Not so much begging the question,
but taking it as my metaphysical basis, as you already said. It's
called the MoQ. Shit evolves.
(And it's not that I'm closed minded - I keep saying I suspend
disbelief - If anyone could show me a single piece of evidence to
undermine this is, or show any inconsistency or unanswerable question
- I'd really like to hear it.)

Scott:
Actually, I've found that the MOQ does not clearly state that there was no 
consciousness until some point in time. When I raised this question a while 
back, I got ambiguous answers from DMB and Ant.

You're not going to find scientific evidence to support or undermine your 
position (or mine). Mystical evidence is another question, however.

> , but isn't this consistent
> with my answer to Case? Or rather, isn't it just a different focus? What
> makes human consciousness different from, say, atomic consciousness, is 
> that
> they operate under different rules, where one of the human rules is "first
> person awareness". What is not obvious is that human consciousness evolved
> out of atomic consciousness (through biological and social or however). If
> space and time are products of consciousness, then they can't be assumed 
> to
> be givens in explaining origins of various manifestations of 
> consciousness.

[IG] Agreed, we are substantially agreeing despite our different
metaphysical basis. (Could I just point out that your's doesn't seem
to be the MoQ. And you seem to deny evolution too. I'd say you had a
lot more explaining to do than I.) Whatever - that "atomic
consciousness" must have some quite different attributes to some
"high-level-reflective-awareness-consciuousness". We agree there are
building blocks - you call 'em consciousness I call 'em information.
(I know which sounds simpler)

Scott:
I have my differences with the MOQ, though the ubiquity of value is not one 
of them, nor is the dynamic/static dichotomy. I do not deny evolution, 
though I agree that there is a huge question -- to which I don't have an 
answer -- of what it means if time is not presupposed. But I do not see 
consciousness as a matter of building blocks. Again, the dynamic pole of 
consciousness/value cannot be thought of in that way. Only SPOV can. Now if 
SPOV is information (I agree to this), then consciousness is information 
processing, and to deal with that (in general) one requires the logic of 
contradictory identity.

- Scott