[MD] On Time?

[ian glendinning]

Scott, inserted ...

On 12/16/05, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> Ian,
>
> > Scott:
> > Yes and no. I see consciousness, intellect, and value as three words (and
> > there are others) that -- to put it into Fregean terms -- have the same
> > denotation (call it the Tao, perhaps), but different connotations.
>
> [IG] - "Yes and No" is what we'd both already said ! This semantic
> point, about many possible words and concepts (and sub-concepts) in
> play, was really the point I was making - I wasn't picking on the
> particular three words.
>
> Scott:
> Ok. But observe that I am making a distinct point in saying that
> consciousness and intellect have the same denotation as value. In short,
> this means that I am treating consciousness and intellect the same way that
> the MOQ treats quality (well, subject to my disputes with the MOQ). In
> particular reference to this discussion, it means that consciousness has a
> dynamic aspect that is not susceptible to being studied scientifically -- or
> as I've been putting it, the study of form always leaves out awareness of
> form.

[IG] I'm clearly not getting the subtlety of "denotation" - but I
agree with your last cluase.

>
> > Scott:
> > For why you shouldn't suspend disbelief that physics will actually explain
> > the whole of nature, I've given two reasons: the Munchhausen fallacy, and
> > the one that the debate with Case has been on about, that examination of
> > form (which is what physics is limited to) can never encompass awareness
> > of
> > form. Which is, basically, Chalmers' "hard problem".
>
> [IG] Clearly I don't buy that. Your "can never" sounds suspiciously
> like a folk intuition rather than an argument. You may have to point
> me at the specific arguments you refer to, if we're going to progress
> here. To use Dennett's words Chalmers' version of the hard problem is
> a chimera - though I'm still open to the need for some hard explaining
> in this space.
>
> Scott:
> I can see that whenever I raise my objections to physicalism, the answer
> will always be "intuition pump". Is that also your answer to Pirsig's saying
> that DQ is undefinable?

[IG] This is close to the crux I think. That's the first time I've
every used the intuition pump defence with anyone - I'm not in the
habit - it's not my main argument - I only used it because you chose
to claim "can never" with no hint of reason or explanation.

I don't see why physics should be restricted to the study of form,
rather than the study of awareness or interaction with form. Clearly
that's what I'm applying physics to - the quality interaction.

The undefiniablity of DQ - is indeed no different to the hard problem
- the ineffability of qualia (the subjective qualities of awareness).
It may be ineffable with any given resources of language and science
(world model / physics / metaphysics). That is simply a difficulty,
not a blockage to progress. The definition will improve as progress is
made - to a point where it ceases to be a problem. (Just look at the
history of "elan vital" - the inconceivable factor was just how much
information about life could be packed redundantly in to the chemistry
of every cell nucleus - once that was appreciated the mystery
evaporated - uintil then it was a mystery - a "hard problem" -
intuitions can be misleading for many generations, and still turn out
to be wrong.)

>
> Scott said:
> > - it is supported by some mystical revelation (see, for instance, Franklin
> > Merrell-Wolff's "Philosophy of Consciousness-Without-an-Object" reprinted
> > in
> > "Experience and Philosophy", especially the chapter "A Mystical
> > Unfoldment")
> > - it is consistent with known empirical data, plus it provides an answer
> > to
> > the quantum measurement problem
>
> [IG] Hmmm - can't comment, so I'll have to read. (Sound's suspiciously
> like the new-age-physics silver-bullet that Dennett abhors ?)
>
> Scott:
> It isn't. If you can imagine someone who's mystical insight is comparable to
> that of Eckhart or Shankara, but who was a 20th century American,
> well-versed in modern philosophy, science, and mathematics -- that's FM-W.
> He is well able to stand back and critique his own mystical experience.

[IG] OK - I'll need to research unless you'd like to give some
specific insights ?

>
> > [IG] This you will recognise, given our other thread, as Chalmers hard
> > problem - the subjective aspect of consciousness. Clearly some forms
> > of consciousness, are unaware with no apparent first person "view".
> >
> > Scott:
> > I wouldn't say it was clear -- since we don't know what non-human
> > consciousness is like -- but ok.
>
> [IG] - this is just semantics - we are using "consciousness" very
> broadly here with no pre-agreed tight definitions - I could have said
> "Clearly we could chose to define some forms of consciousness ... "
> Let's not reduce this to pedantry, I felt we were making progress.
>
> Scott:
> One must be pedantic to make clear our differences. Forms of consciousness
> are just forms, in my vocabulary -- one needs to bring in the ubiquitous but
> undefinable Dynamic aspect of consciousness as well. So from my point of
> view, we cannot "clearly" define some forms of consciousness, no more than
> we can clearly define some forms of quality.

[IG] Again it's the level of pedantry. When I said "define" I meant in
a useful ontological sense make distinctions between - dead / alive /
sleeping / unconscious / applying lingustics symbolic manipulation /
being more or less intelligent / being reflective / being first person
aware of ... etc.

I suspect you are reserving bthe word conscousness for this ineffable
human first person awareness - I wasn't, I was being more general
about the subject as a whole, starting from simplest behaviourism ?
(I've made no human / non-human distinctions in talking about the
subject generally)

>
> >
> > Ian continued:
> > Why awareness ? is simple, because it evolved as being something
> > better than being conscious without it (I don't buy Chalmers' Zombie
> > remember).
> >
> > Scott:
> > Not simple: that's the hard problem, after all. So here you are just
> > begging
> > the question that it evolved.
>
> [IG] Now you're not playing fair. Not so much begging the question,
> but taking it as my metaphysical basis, as you already said. It's
> called the MoQ. Shit evolves.
> (And it's not that I'm closed minded - I keep saying I suspend
> disbelief - If anyone could show me a single piece of evidence to
> undermine this is, or show any inconsistency or unanswerable question
> - I'd really like to hear it.)
>
> Scott:
> Actually, I've found that the MOQ does not clearly state that there was no
> consciousness until some point in time. When I raised this question a while
> back, I got ambiguous answers from DMB and Ant.

[IG] Whatever Pirsig has stated or not - I think it's fair game to
debate which view creates the most consistent workd-view.

>
> You're not going to find scientific evidence to support or undermine your
> position (or mine). Mystical evidence is another question, however.
>
> > , but isn't this consistent
> > with my answer to Case? Or rather, isn't it just a different focus? What
> > makes human consciousness different from, say, atomic consciousness, is
> > that
> > they operate under different rules, where one of the human rules is "first
> > person awareness". What is not obvious is that human consciousness evolved
> > out of atomic consciousness (through biological and social or however). If
> > space and time are products of consciousness, then they can't be assumed
> > to
> > be givens in explaining origins of various manifestations of
> > consciousness.
>
> [IG] Agreed, we are substantially agreeing despite our different
> metaphysical basis. (Could I just point out that your's doesn't seem
> to be the MoQ. And you seem to deny evolution too. I'd say you had a
> lot more explaining to do than I.) Whatever - that "atomic
> consciousness" must have some quite different attributes to some
> "high-level-reflective-awareness-consciuousness". We agree there are
> building blocks - you call 'em consciousness I call 'em information.
> (I know which sounds simpler)
>
> Scott:
> I have my differences with the MOQ, though the ubiquity of value is not one
> of them, nor is the dynamic/static dichotomy. I do not deny evolution,
> though I agree that there is a huge question -- to which I don't have an
> answer -- of what it means if time is not presupposed.

[IG] I see this time debate is a red-herring here - any causal
sequence argument would suffer, not just evolution, and the fact that
time has some mysteries shouldn't lead us to assume time ceases to be
a valid concept.

But I do not see
> consciousness as a matter of building blocks.

[IG] This is that semantic pedantry again. Let's stick to the subject.
Forget building-blocks, just a short-hand. Use "pre-existence of
consciousness". Forget their form if you like.

Again, the dynamic pole of
> consciousness/value cannot be thought of in that way. Only SPOV can. Now if
> SPOV is information (I agree to this), then consciousness is information
> processing, and to deal with that (in general) one requires the logic of
> contradictory identity.

[IG] Again a claim "you need" but not the slightest hint of reason or
explanation.

>
> - Scott
>
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