[MD] Windmills and Intellectual Pots

[Paul Turner]

Mike,

>There is nothing arbitrary about denying that carbon is matter. Carbon
>is a pattern of value, i.e. it displays particular behavior in
>particular conditions. It values bonding with itself in certain ways
>to form graphite or diamond, or bonding with other elements to form
>carbon dioxide etc etc. Matter, on the other hand, displays no
>particular values. Matter doesn't display anything at all, to the
>senses at least. Matter is merely a concept by postulation. Assuming
>the existence of an objective substance is an attempt to explain why
>(as described in LILA) properties hang together in a stable way. These
>properties are what we now label as "inorganic patterns of value".

Paul:  But that's precisely my point.  What is commonly referred to as
matter is now referred to as inorganic patterns of value, so matter is not
inextricably linked to the intellectual level, as Bo suggests, but rather,
in the structure of the MOQ, it becomes redescribed as part of the first
level of value patterns and is not assumed to be the whole of reality as a
materialist might have it.

"Matter is just a name for certain inorganic value patterns.  Biological
patterns, social patterns, and intellectual patterns are supported by this
pattern of matter but are independent of it."  [LILA, p178]

>Or, to put it more simply, carbon, as a stable pattern of value, can
>be known empirically. Matter, on the other hand, is not empirical, in
>the same way as causation isn't. The accusation you anticipated that
>Bo might give, that the word "matter" is somish, would not be
>unfounded, unless by "matter" you mean something other than objective,
>independently-existing substance.

Paul:  I gave my definition of matter in the first post in which I made this
argument.  Here it is again:  Something that has mass and exists as a solid,
liquid, gas, or plasma.  By this definition, do you still deny that carbon
is matter?

Thanks for a good reply, Mike.

Regards

Paul