[MD] Windmills and Intellectual Pots

[Michael Hamilton]

Paul,

Thanks for your comments.

> >There is nothing arbitrary about denying that carbon is matter. Carbon
> >is a pattern of value, i.e. it displays particular behavior in
> >particular conditions. It values bonding with itself in certain ways
> >to form graphite or diamond, or bonding with other elements to form
> >carbon dioxide etc etc. Matter, on the other hand, displays no
> >particular values. Matter doesn't display anything at all, to the
> >senses at least. Matter is merely a concept by postulation. Assuming
> >the existence of an objective substance is an attempt to explain why
> >(as described in LILA) properties hang together in a stable way. These
> >properties are what we now label as "inorganic patterns of value".
>
> Paul:  But that's precisely my point.  What is commonly referred to as
> matter is now referred to as inorganic patterns of value, so matter is not
> inextricably linked to the intellectual level, as Bo suggests, but rather,
> in the structure of the MOQ, it becomes redescribed as part of the first
> level of value patterns and is not assumed to be the whole of reality as a
> materialist might have it.

By saying that matter is "redescribed" as inorganic patterns of value,
without emphasising the significance of the redescription, i.e. the
change of meaning, you risk losing that significance, which is:
inorganic patterns of value, such as the ones that form our living
bodies and are investigated by the natural sciences and are apparent
in sensory experience, are not the same as the objects that our
intellects deduce (or perhaps more accurately, induce) in order to
explain sensory experience from a third-person viewpoint. This act of
deduction (or more accurately, induction) is an act of creating a new
pattern of value.

So, the redescription is all well and good, but if we want to defeat
the materialist completely, we need to make absolutely sure that we
don't conflate static patterns of value that are postulated
intellectually (such as, "virus", "photon", "Proxima Centauri" and,
admittedly, "carbon"), with static patterns of value known empirically
(such as "fever", "blue", "bright point of light in the sky" and
"likes to bond with both metals and non-metals"). To conflate them is
to throw away the insight of Pirsig's revolutionary suggestion that
subjects and objects are deduced from Quality events, from
non-intellectual patterns of value.

> "Matter is just a name for certain inorganic value patterns.  Biological
> patterns, social patterns, and intellectual patterns are supported by this
> pattern of matter but are independent of it."  [LILA, p178]

I think that going on this passage alone leaves us open to all kinds
of confusions as to the differences between inorganic patterns of
value on the one hand, and pragmatically valuable
intellectual/scientific concepts on the other hand.

> >Or, to put it more simply, carbon, as a stable pattern of value, can
> >be known empirically. Matter, on the other hand, is not empirical, in
> >the same way as causation isn't. The accusation you anticipated that
> >Bo might give, that the word "matter" is somish, would not be
> >unfounded, unless by "matter" you mean something other than objective,
> >independently-existing substance.
>
> Paul:  I gave my definition of matter in the first post in which I made this
> argument.  Here it is again:  Something that has mass and exists as a solid,
> liquid, gas, or plasma.  By this definition, do you still deny that carbon
> is matter?

Remember, the "something" is deduced from the mass and the state (and
other things), which, I think, are inorganic patterns of value. And
the "something" (which, by your definition, could be classified
"matter") is an intellectual pattern of value.

To take that further, the mass and the state may themselves be
intellectual patterns, deduced from Quality events such as (the
inherent S/O construction of the English language make the description
of the following rather clumsy) the sensation of weight in one's hand
(mass) and the sensation of water flowing between one's fingers
(state).

I realise that this may be taking things a bit further than Pirsig
did, but I think it's necessary, if we want to be serious about the
concept of a hierarchy of static _patterns of value_ , as opposed to
hierarchy of substances. If the MOQ is to describe an evolution of
value instead of an evolution of matter, we need to distinguish
between the four levels based on the type of Quality event. And in
this post I'm arguing that inorganic patterns of value are chemical
interactions (which I think can include 'raw' sense data), as opposed
to the interacting entities which (as is implied by the word
"INTERactions") we deduce from them.

Hope I'm making sense.

Regards,
Mike