[MD] Ham on Esthesia

[Ham Priday]

Hi Mark --


> Quality, as is clearly stated in ZMM, is the basis of
> a monist philosophy.  Quality, 2, 4 and 7 are therefore
> all synonyms.
> This is the MoQ position and you have every right to
> disagree with the MoQ if you wish Ham.
> But, in MoQ terms, and as Essence is a synonym for
> 2,4,6 and 7, Essence is therefore a synonym for Quality.

Mark, this by-the-numbers exercise to make everything synonomous does not
make for a productive dialogue.  Pirsig has already equated Quality with
everything, so you will take that position and I will not.  My interest is
not in the particular terms used in an author's thesis, but in the concept
he is postulating.

> You are at liberty to hold your own opinions Ham.
> However, The MoQ does distinguish DQ from sq: DQ is
> the One and sq is the many.  N.B. The many do not
> necessarily have to divide into subjects and objects.

Quality is quality, Mark, whether it is labeled "static" or "dynamic".  To
call DQ "the One" and SQ "the many" is simply inventing labels to make them
seem different.  Quality has no potentiality to actuate except for evoking
the subject's response to it.  This is why I say Quality cannot logically be
theorized as the source of creation.

> You stated that esthesis is "a state of pure feeling
> characterized by the absence of conceptual and interpretational
> elements."  I am assuming the 'Absence of conceptual elements'
> may be termed unconceptual.  But Essence can't be
> conceptualised either, and yet you insist esthesis must
> be a capacity possessed by essence.  Therefore your Essence
> is more than a monism, it is a dualism at  least.

I don't follow your argument.  What you seem to be saying is that an Essence
of pure sensation is an invalid proposition because it cannot be conceived.
Does this mean that nothing inconceivable or unimaginable can be real?   Do
the faithful abandon their belief in a God they can't fathom?

Cusa postulated his 'first principle' as the "not-other" because it
expressed the nature of a God he could not otherwise describe.  He reasoned
that an infinite source would be present in everything without being an
other to itself.  There is nothing wrong with this logic, provided that it
refers to absolute potentiality.  If, as Pirsig says, experience is the
source of physical reality, it doesn't have absolute potentiality because it
can't create itself.  Only an essence that transcends all difference can
create a differentiated universe.

> The MoQ does not suggest DQ is the Prime mover.
> However, the MoQ suggests that sq is migrating toward DQ.

What, then, is the prime mover or source?  "SQ migrating toward DQ" is an
unwarranted supposition which avoids the question as to the primary cause.
Only biological evolution has demonstrated the capacity to move toward a
higher state of organic complexity.  This tells us nothing about the
inorganic universe, the comos as a whole, or man's role in it.

> You see, value is empirical. Value is not a theory or
> hypothesis.  There are cultures other than our own which
> see this more clearly than we do, and an exploration of
> them and appreciation of them may help in this regard?
> Perhaps this is the root of the matter: The MoQ is
> empirical in nature while your philosophy is heavy on
> theory/hypothesis.  There is a long and fine tradition of
> rationalist philosophy of which your contribution may be
> a valuable extension. The MoQ belongs closer to the
> empiricist tradition and regards values as real as
> experience itself.

Empirical means relying on experience without regard to system theory.
Sure, we can say "I feel cold" or "I have a pain" without resorting to
theory. We can even call it a "low quality" experience.  But it doesn't
attempt to explain the cause or meaning of the experience.  You say my
philosophy is "heavy on theory/hypothesis".  Well, that's exactly what it
is: a metaphysical hypothesis.  Pirsig called his "Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance" a metaphysics and his LILA an "Inquiry into Morals".  He has
alluded to these topics, providing a loose framework for them, without
really giving us a codified thesis.  And we have to read between the lines
to glean even that.  I don't know whether Essentialism qualifies as a
"rationalist" philosophy, but it does set forth in well-defined terms a
plausible theory as to how existence arises and why man is central to it.

I said, previously:

> The Primary Source [Essence] is the absolute, sensible
> One from which difference and all otherness are derived.

You say:

> The MoQ puts this the other way around and begins with
> experience which generates logic. ...
> The Moq again would place this in a mirror relationship to
> your own: Experience - generates logic - generates scientific theory.

Again, you seem to be more interest in cause and effect than ontology.  I
have no problem with experience generating logic and scientific theory.  But
what comes out of this causal chain is a theory of the objective universe.
Do you know any scientists who refute this theory?   Yet, you say that
Pirsig does away with subject/object relations.  Is he, in your opinion, a
subjectivist then?  If so, his philosophy does not deal with what the author
insists is empirical reality.

> As we have seen, the MoQ and Essentialism follow different
> traditions: Essentialism appears to be rationalistic in that it is all
> logically posited.  The MoQ begins with experience which leads
> to logic.

Essentially we all begin with experience, whether as scientists,
philosophers, or ordinary observers.  From my perspective, existentialism is
diametrically opposed to essentialism, despite your regarding them both as
"rationalistic".  Mark, you are throwing around labels here, not ideas and
concepts.  As a consequence, there is little I can add that would change
your mind or provide new insight.

As I see it, we're either going to have to start from scratch, after you
review
my thesis, or discuss one particular topic at a time.

Thanks for the response.
--Ham