[MD] Ham on Esthesia

[Squonkonguitar at aol.com]

Greetings, Mark --

I don't believe we've talked before.

>  Hello Ham. I could not help butting in - i am attracted by your
>  arguments. May i ask a couple of questions of you please?
> Are the  following synonyms?
> 1. Consciousness as the primary source.
> 2.  The One, nonderivative Reality.
> 3. Root Consciousness.
> 4. The  Undifferentiated.
> (The MoQ calls the undifferentiated Dynamic  Quality.)
> So, Quality, Value and DQ are synonyms:
> 5. DQ.
>  6. Quality.
> 7. Value.

Ham: my answer is that 2, 4,  and
(possibly) 7 qualify as synonyms for what I call Essence.
 
Mark: Hello Ham. Thank you.
OK. Synonyms for Essence:
2. The One, nonderivative Reality.
4. The Undifferentiated.
7. Value (?)
All of the above are the basis of a monist philosophy.

Ham: Consciousness (1)
presupposes an object, as does Root  Consciousness (3), Quality (6), and -- 
depending on how you define it --  Value (7).
 
Mark: Quality, as is clearly stated in ZMM, is the basis of a monist  
philosophy.
Quality, 2, 4 and 7 are therefore all synonyms.
This is the MoQ position and you have every right to disagree with the MoQ  
if you wish Ham.
But, in MoQ terms, and as Essence is a synonym for 2,4,6 and 7, Essence is  
therefore a synonym for Quality.
Moving on to 1 and 3:
I can see that (self) consciousness may imply 'other' but i'm not sure  about 
root consciousness?
Pure undifferentiated consciousness is, by definition, lacking in  divisions.
 
Ham: In terms of Value I do not
recognize DQ as distinguishable from  SQ.
 
Mark: You are at liberty to hold your own opinions Ham.
However, The MoQ does distinguish DQ from sq: DQ is the One and sq is the  
many.
N.B. The many do not necessarily have to divide into subjects and  objects.
 
Ham: And I'm apprehensive about
defining Value as an absolute.  We  only know Value "differentially", as
experienced in finite phenomena.
 
Mark: Definitions belong to the many, while DQ is the One.
sq values belong to the many, Value as a synonym for DQ is the  One.

Ham: That would seem to eliminate your "expanded" list of  synonyms.
 
Mark: I am afraid not Ham. The expanded list still holds.
And you appear to have overlooked the fact that you agree, iff Essence is  
monistic.
(But it turns out to be a trinity below)

Mark:
> You theorise  that x.
> a. Is x a component of the theory or
> b. Is x outside the  theory?
> Ham from below: 'we are at the outer fringe of reality
>  when we try to describe Essence and its primary
> divisions in finite  terms.'
> If x is outside the theory, it is unconceptual and
>  therefore a synonym to be included with 1-9:

Assuming that x = Essence,  it is part of my theory.  However, I'm not sure
what you mean by  "unconceptual".  Even if it means "incomprehensible"  or
"inexperiencable", it can still be part of the theory.
 
Mark: Re: Unconceptual.
You stated that esthesis is, "a state of pure feeling characterized by the  
absence of conceptual and interpretational elements."
I am assuming the, 'Absence of conceptual elements' may be  termed 
unconceptual.
But Essence can't be conceptualised either, and yet you insist esthesis  must 
be a capacity possessed by essence.
Therefore your Essence is more than a monism, it is a dualism at  least.
If you wish to leave Essence, 'incomprehensible to the finite mind' then  you 
cannot state anything about it.
You certainly cannot suggest it has capacities.
If you identify Essence as the Prime mover; the first cause; then you are  
repeating Aristotle.
The MoQ does not suggest DQ is the Prime mover.
However, the MoQ suggests that sq is migrating toward DQ.
 
Ham: Essence is
incomprehensible to the finite mind.  Does that  place it "outside the
theory"?  Surely, there are many aspects to  Einstein's Theory of Relativity
that remain incomprehensible; yet it is  considered a valid theory.
 
Mark: I am not at all sure this is so Ham.
All aspects of Einstein's theories are self referencing as a set of logical  
relationships.
I do not believe there is a symbol for, 'that which cannot be accommodated  
by this set of logically self referencing relationships' in any of Einstein's  
theories?
I may be wrong.
 
Ham: If I
labeled my philosophy a "hypothesis" instead of a theory, (I  do in my
thesis) would it be more acceptable?
 
Mark: I don't think so Ham. You see, value is empirical. Value is  not a 
theory or hypothesis.
There are cultures other than our own which see this more clearly than we  
do, and an exploration of them and appreciation of them may help in this  regard?
Perhaps this is the root of the matter: The MoQ is empirical in nature  while 
your philosophy is heavy on theory/hypothesis.
There is a long and fine tradition of rationalist philosophy of which your  
contribution may be a valuable extension.
Rationalists view values as logical posits.
The MoQ belongs closer to the empiricist tradition and regards values as  
real as experience itself.

Ham: Let me be clear on my definitions for the  above:
The Primary Source [Essence] is the absolute, sensible One from  which
difference and all otherness are derived.  (It is logically  posited as the
"not-other".)
 
Mark: Here we go you see Ham? You're at it right from the 'get go.'

Ham: Existence is the experience of Essence differentiated by  nothingness.
 
Mark: And now, after the logical positing, we get to experience.
Very clear.
The MoQ puts this the other way around and begins with experience which  
generates logic.

Ham: Value is the (the individual's) psycho-somatic response to this  
experience.
 
Mark: And finally, experience is clearly placed in it's scientific context  
as a response in a brain.
The Moq again would place this in a mirror relationship to your own  Ham:
Experience - generates logic - generates scientific theory.
 
Mark:
> 1. Consciousness as the primary source.
> 2. The One,  nonderivative Reality.
> 3. Root Consciousness.
> 4. The  Undifferentiated.
> 5. DQ.
>
> 6. Quality.
> 7.  Value.
>
> 8. Essence. (replacing esthesia)
> 9. a state of  pure feeling characterized by the absence of conceptual and
>  interpretational elements.
> Esthesia divides into Human experience:  Sensibility - subjectivity which
has
> an objective content.

If  I follow your number scheme correctly, only 2, 4, 8, and 9  (with
reservations)are valid for me.  I reject Consciousness and Value  as synonyms
for Essence because they are relative to proprietary  awareness.
 
Mark: This was sorted out above.
I'm not sure what proprietary awareness is Ham?
 
I also
prefer the term "awareness" for differentiated cognizance,  reserving
"Sensibility" for the perception of value or the "esthesis" of  Essence, as I
explained to Platt.
 
Mark: I do not think this makes any sense even by your own lights as i  
explain above.

Mark:
> Subjectivity is privileged over the  objective:
> Ham from below: 'the awareness potential of "selfness"  may  not require an
> objective referent.'
> Thus, selfness can  differentiate without an objective referent.
> Therefore, selfness is a  differentiation of 1-9 without subject or object.
> This is very close to  the MoQ position which replaces som with a DQ/sq
> division.

Ham:  One correction: Only Value can be differentiated by the self without  an
objective referent.
 
Mark: As we have seen, the MoQ and Essentialism follow different  traditions:
Essentialism appears to be rationalistic in that it is all logically  posited.
The MoQ begins with experience which leads to logic.

Mark:
>  Quality and Value are synonyms Ham.
> Therefore, esthesia and value are  synonyms.
> This is going to become important:

Yes, I am quite  aware of my difference with official MoQ doctrine.  But the
difference  is more than a choice of terms.
 
Mark: I feel the difference lies in philosophical tradition Ham.
 
Ham: Let me ask you this, Mark: If
Quality (or Value) is relative to the  experiencing subject, how can Esthesia
be absolute and non-derivative as a  synonym?
 
Mark: Only sq is relative. Quality (DQ) is undifferentiated.
If esthesia IS relative, which you do indeed state, then it can't be  
undifferentiated.
That's why i knocked it out of the synonym list and replaced it with  essence.
 
Ham: You avoided naming Essence,
which I assume you regard as a synonym  for Quality.
 
Mark: I placed essence in the list of synonyms along with Quality as you  
read above.
I have negated the need for assumptions in this regard.
 
Ham: So I'll rephrase the
question: How can Quality be both absolute  (DQ) and derivative (SQ)?
 
Mark: Like this: Quality As pure empirical experience.
DQ is a metaphysical term for that which lies outside sq patterns of old  
experience, ideas, memory, DNA, atoms.
 
Ham: Or,
as a logical premise, how can Quality (or Value) be the SOURCE  of anything?
 
Mark: Note the conflicting traditions again Ham? Logic has a hard time  
dealing with anything that cannot be defined.
I do not think a monism - no matter what you call it - can be shown to be a  
source of anything as you say, without introducing terms, as Aristotle and  
followers of this tradition do, like: cause, capacity, potential, etc. Once you  
start down that road, and we've had 2,000 years of it, you end up with the  
extremely subtle and convoluted Theological reasoning as to why God can't be  
evil and stuff like that. Absolutely ruthless in it's uselessness.
 
Ham: My dispute with Pirsig isn't about choosing Quality over Value, it's  
that he
posits an esthetic reality without a source.
 
Mark: And here you land smack bang in an area of great interest for me Ham,  
and RP too!
Because the aesthetic (British spelling, sorry, force of habit) IS a  
response to the Monism when the differentiation's of our make up dissolve into  the 
One.
The Monism Quality (or synonym Value) is actually an aesthetic continuum.  We 
live in an aesthetic continuum. There is nothing but the aesthetic continuum  
Ham. The aesthetic continuum in it's most pure form is the One, Quality. That 
is  what the MoQ is saying.
All reality is an aesthetic continuum Ham.
Perhaps this is why you can't see the source? To see is to experience,  hence 
the empirical nature of the MoQ.
If you try to rationally posit and then derive logical relationships about  
these things then it can be easily shown to be crazy.
As i said, we've had 2,000 years of it and look where it has got  to?

Ham said:
> Value, even though experienced differentially, is  directly
> derived  from Essence, and MAY fill the void of  nothingness
> that I call the awareness potential of "selfness"  without
> requiring an objective referent.

Mark:
> This can  be unpacked as following:
> Sensibility distinguishes (undifferentiated)  value
> from (differentiated) value.
> The MoQ has 2 terms: DQ and  sq.
> You have 3 terms: That which is sensible, The undifferentiated,  The
> differentiated.

That is correct.  I have three terms;  but they are One in Essence.
 
Mark: Then your Essence has now flowered into a trinity ham.
Again, there is a fine tradition of philosophical trinities.
The MoQ remains Monistic.

Mark:
> Yes i see.
> There is  something, as yet unaccounted for, but which
> is denoted as 'Nothingness'  or 'the awareness potential
> of selfness' which:
> a. Is sensible  of differentiation's.
> b. Realises differentiation's.
> (At this  point i wish to emphasise that, 'Nothingness' is
> a synonym for 1-9 +  esthesia.)
> Were does the 'Potential' stand in relation to the
>  undifferentiated and the differentiated Ham?

Ham: Nothingness is  introduced by the negation of Essence.  It is the
differentiator of all  existents.  It is also the primordial subject
(negate).  That is, I  maintain that pure awareness -- the potential for
cognizance -- is  nothingness.  To be aware is to fill this nothingness with
objective  experience.
 
Mark: I'm having a problem following this, and i need to read your theory  in 
whole.
It's a very interesting logical construct. Using nothingness as a negation  
is all well and fine.
However, it's been done before and in the Rationalist tradition.
The MoQ is more aligned with the empirical tradition.

Mark:
>  I am reading this as follows: The potential realises and
> is sensible of  differentiation's.
> We seem to be dealing with causation  here?

Yes, Causation in the sense of Creation.
 
Mark: I'm glad i have been able to get some sort of grip on your philosophy  
Ham.
I am trying!

Mark:
> The MoQ replaces cause with  Value:
> 'In the Metaphysics of Quality "causation" is a
>  metaphysical term that can be replaced by "value".
> To say that "A causes  B" or to say that "B values
> precondition A" is to say the same  thing.
> The difference is one of words only.' (Lila. Chapter  8.)

Ham: I can accept Pirsig's general premise, but not as a time  sequence.
I would say that sensibility to value is the cause of intellection  (i.e.,
creating the appearance of finite beingness that represents the  particular
values sensed.)
 
Mark: Well, temporal sequencing is amenable to logical enquiry especially  
with regard to causation.
However that may be, you have made a mistake here Ham:
'I would say that sensibility to value is the cause of intellection'
But as i tried to indicate by the Lila quote, there is no scientific or  
logical change if the term 'cause' is replaced by the term 'value.'
So, you have just said, 'I would say that sensibility to cause is  the cause 
of intellection' or 'I would say that sensibility to value is  the value of 
intellection .'
It is the term value to which i was trying to draw your attension.

Ham said:
> As you see, we (Platt and Ham) are at the outer  fringe
> -- or, to use Pirsig's expression, the "cutting edge" -- 
>  of reality when we try to describe Essence and its
> primary divisions in  finite terms.

Mark:
> I think this clearly places Essence in the  list of
> synonyms Ham.  **

I looked for a reference to your  asterisks, but there were none.  You'll
have to explain how you arrive  at this conclusion, Mark.
 
Mark: I must have had something in mind i then forgot  Ham.

Ham:
>I feel safe in using Cusa's "not-other" as a  logical
> expression for Essence;

Mark:
> But Logic is  conceptual Ham. The only logical system
> i know which may express, 'not  other' is the tetralemma.

You are referring to the logic of contradictory  identity. Nicholas of Cusa
(15th c.) used it as the basis for his "not-other"  principle.  Check out how
I used his logic in the Creation section (#3)  of my thesis at
www.essentialism.net/mechanic.htm .
 
Mark: Will do. Cusa of the rationalist tradition?

Ham:
> I am  not that secure in defining the metaphysical nature
> of proprietary  awareness and the primary (undifferentiated)
> object of that  awareness.

Mark:
> But you've give it a good go? You should be  applauded for that.

I don't hear any applause, do  you?

Mark:
> I'm not sure you can get away with this Ham, but it's  a bold try.
> I wonder if you are aware of the existential  ramifications?

Thanks, Mark.  Not sure of what you mean by  "existential" ramifications.
I'm certainly aware of the MoQ ramifications,  and I won't get away from
them.
 
Mark: Existentialists like Sartre begin with Nothingness which then  
generates values and it struck me that you may have sympathy with this  view?


>Mark: I am wondering how the individual is  constructed
> from your own philosophy Ham?

I suggest that you read  the complete thesis, then get back to me with your
questions.  For your  analytical mind, there will be many.

Your interest and comments on this  subject are much appreciated, Mark.

Essentially yours,
Ham
 
Mark: Allot of reading ahead. I have tackled these initial responses of  
yours because i think the two traditions view: Rationalist and Empirical have a  
problem talking to each other. But we are up to the challenge i hope?
Love,
Mark