[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Ham Priday]

Mark, Platt, David --


Just to set the record straight, it was David M. who concluded that "Ham
thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenalism."   I replied that from an
epistemological viewpoint, the MoQ is closer to existentialism.

I've consulted my trusty Runes "Dictionary of Philosophy" for an
authoritative definition of Phenomenalism.  The term is derived from the
Greek 'phainomenon', which means "to appear".  It is the "theory that
knowledge is limited to phenomena, including [a] physical phenomena or the
totality of objects of actual and possible perception, and [b] mental
phenomena, the totality of objects of introspection.  Phenomenalism assumes
two forms according as it: [a] denies a reality behind the phenomena
(Renouvier, Shadsworth, Hodgson), or [b] expressly affirms the reality of
things-in-themselves but denies their knowability (Kant, Comte, Spencer)."

Yes, Platt; in either sense defined above, Phenomenalism may be considered a
form of Idealism.

I would characterize the MoQ ontology to be along the lines of [a] above,
notwithstanding its positing of an aesthetic reality.  That is to say,
Pirsigians believe that physical phenomena are "patterns of Quality"
perceived in the experience (of Quality), rather than actual material
objects.  Epistemologically, however, they seem to be in a quandary: the MoQ
doesn't explain what accounts for the patterns we experience as real
objects.  Is the patterning a function of the intellect or some undefined
level of SQ, or is the "specificity" of experienced phenomena intrinsic to
the cosmos itself?

Either the specific design of the universe is an accident of unknown
forces -- perhaps the Einsteinian energy, mass, and velocity of light -- or
it's the intent of a Creator.  Pirsig does not posit a creator or any
primary source other than Quality.  This would be solipsism if it were not
for the fact that the author has made Intellect and Consciousness
"universal" factors, as opposed to cognizant functions of the individual
subject.  If you substitute Being for Quality in the MoQ thesis, it would be
Existentialism.

It is my opinion that the MoQ and Essentialism are both phenomenologies
because they both theorize physical reality as "appearance".  For me, the
design of the universe is a metaphysical principle: it is the space/time
appearance of reality that occurs when awareness is negated from Essence.

But since it was David who raised the question, I assume he and I are both
curious as to where you folks stand on this issue.  This may be the kind of
question that Matt Kundert is best equipped to answer.  (Is he still with
us?)

Essentially yours,
Ham