[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Squonkonguitar at aol.com]

Mark, Platt, David --

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Ham quote: Phenomenalism assumes
two forms according as it: [a]  denies a reality behind the phenomena
(Renouvier, Shadsworth, Hodgson), or  [b] expressly affirms the reality of
things-in-themselves but denies their  knowability (Kant, Comte, Spencer)."

Yes, Platt; in either sense defined  above, Phenomenalism may be considered a
form of Idealism.

I would  characterize the MoQ ontology to be along the lines of [a]  above,
notwithstanding its positing of an aesthetic reality.  That is to  say,
Pirsigians believe that physical phenomena are "patterns of  Quality"
perceived in the experience (of Quality), rather than actual  material
objects.
 
Mark: Hello Ham.
A tad more thought is required:
MoQ ontology is divided into DQ and sq.
The MoQ states that both DQ and sq are totally real.
And now we are in a position to examine your analysis of  phenomenalism:
Your account of phenomenalism assumes there to be two types of substances:  
a. Material. b. Mental.
The MoQ says there is one Substance and this is DQ.
All patterns of sq are aspects of DQ if you like.
One consequence of all this is this: The evolving patterns of intellectual  
quality found in dictionaries and encyclopaedias become out of date.  
Phenomenalism has more forms now than it did when your dictionary or  encyclopaedia was 
compiled.
(Even physicists have abandoned 'matter' in the sense these philosophers  may 
have understood it?)
 
Ham: Epistemologically, however, they seem to be in a quandary: the  MoQ
doesn't explain what accounts for the patterns we experience as  real
objects.
 
Mark: Please allow me to put it this way so as you may understand:  
Explanations are intellectual constructs. As such they are intellectual patterns  of 
sq. As such they are aspects of DQ. As such they cannot account for that  which 
is greater than themselves.
Objects are patterns of sq.
 
Ham: Is the patterning a function of the intellect or some  undefined
level of SQ, or is the "specificity" of experienced phenomena  intrinsic to
the cosmos itself?
 
Mark: At the intellectual level, patterns are more or less beautiful.
High level abstractions are deduced and aim toward beauty as Human artistic  
creations.
Examples of mathematicians' and physicists' accounts of the aesthetic they  
experience are so common as to be taken as the norm within the field.
You may take this to be the answer to your misunderstanding  of MoQ 
epistemology:
MoQ epistemology is of values.

Ham: Either the specific design of  the universe is an accident of unknown
forces -- perhaps the Einsteinian  energy, mass, and velocity of light -- or
it's the intent of a Creator.   Pirsig does not posit a creator or any
primary source other than  Quality.
 
Mark: This is contradictory Ham. To say, Pirsig does not do x but does  do x 
is a bit childish.
 
Ham: This would be solipsism if it were not
for the fact that the author  has made Intellect and Consciousness
"universal" factors, as opposed to  cognizant functions of the individual
subject.
 
Mark: If consciousness is equated to preferences, and if preferences are  
values, then it is no problem to suggest values are the fundamental simples of  
reality. At the inorganic level, values are relatively unsophisticated, but at  
the intellectual level they are exquisitely sophisticated.
So, you can see that intellect is not equated with consciousness in equal  
sense because intellect is exquisite in sophistication while social and  
biological patterns are less so.
In other words, the intellect is high level consciousness.
High level consciouse patterns like the intellect are embedded in  lower 
level consciouse patterns of the social, which in turn, like a  Russian Doll, are 
embedded in even lower level consciouse  patterns like the biological, etc. 
Values, not turtles, all the way  down.
Objects, when aligned with the inorganic and biological do look like  objects.
Subjects, when aligned with the social and intellect do look like  subjects.
But this arrangement has its roots and evolutionary history in ancient  
culture and is not written in stone.
 
Ham: If you substitute Being for Quality in the MoQ thesis, it would  be
Existentialism.
 
Mark: And if we substituted Matter for Quality in the MoQ thesis it would  be 
Materialism.
In order to stop the tautological silliness it may be valuable to remember  
that Quality is not defined.
I may be wrong, but the last time i read Sartre's, 'Being and Nothingness'  
being was defined in that work.

Ham: It is my opinion that the MoQ  and Essentialism are both phenomenologies
because they both theorize physical  reality as "appearance".
 
Mark: If your are stating that Ham Priday's essentialism may be viewed as  
Idealism then i quite agree.
(Ham from above: 'Yes, Platt; in either sense defined above, Phenomenalism  
may be considered a
form of Idealism'.)
This accords nicely with my assertion that essentialism is part of the  
rationalist tradition. I'm glad you agree Ham.
Mark from above: The MoQ says there is one Substance and this is DQ. All  
patterns of sq are aspects of DQ.
DQ - the essence of sq, is not an idea or material substance. DQ is pure  
experience prior to differentiation's.

Ham: For me, the
design of the universe is a metaphysical principle: it  is the space/time
appearance of reality that occurs when awareness is negated  from Essence.
 
Mark: Jolly good. A nice idea. And as an idealist, we cannot expect any  more 
than that.

Ham: But since it was David who raised the question, I  assume he and I are 
both
curious as to where you folks stand on this  issue.  This may be the kind of
question that Matt Kundert is best  equipped to answer.  (Is he still with
us?)

Essentially  yours,
Ham
 
Mark: Perhaps, 'Idealistically yours' would be a better sign off  Ham?