[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Ham Priday]

Hi Mark -- 


Ham quoted Dagobert Runes on Phenomenalism:
> "Phenomenalism assumes two forms according as it:
> [a] denies a reality behind the phenomena (Renouvier,
> Shadsworth, Hodgson), or
> [b] expressly affirms the reality of things-in-themselves
> but denies their knowability (Kant, Comte, Spencer)."
>
> I would characterize the MoQ ontology to be along
> the lines of [a] above, notwithstanding its positing of
> an aesthetic reality.  That is to say, Pirsigians believe
> that physical phenomena are "patterns of Quality"
> perceived in the experience (of Quality), rather than
> actual material objects.

Mark said:
> A tad more thought is required:
> MoQ ontology is divided into DQ and sq.
> The MoQ states that both DQ and sq are totally real.
> And now we are in a position to examine your analysis
> of phenomenalism: Your account of phenomenalism
> assumes there to be two types of substances:
> a. Material. b. Mental.
> The MoQ says there is one Substance and this is DQ.
> All patterns of sq are aspects of DQ if you like.
> One consequence of all this is this: The evolving patterns
> of intellectual quality found in dictionaries and
> encyclopaedias become out of date.  Phenomenalism has
> more forms now than it did when your dictionary or
> encyclopaedia was compiled.  (Even physicists have
> abandoned 'matter' in the sense these philosophers may
> have understood it?)

I have given this ontology a lot of thought, Mark.  Over several years, in
fact.  My conclusion is that the division of Quality into DQ and sq is a
duality in itself, replacing the subject/object duality that Prisig claims
to have done away with.  Your over-simplified analysis of the phenomenalist
view that there are two types of substances, material and mental, is not
quite what Runes was saying.  Nor is it how Pirsig outlined the problem
faced by Bohr and Heisenberg at their first quantum physics meeting with
Einstein.

"Since the phenomena from the measurements are not about to change, Bohr
concluded that the logic of science must change to accommodate them.
...This view, known as phenomenalism, says that what we really observe is
not the object. What we really observe is only data.  ...Bohr's
Complementarity was accused of being subjectivistic.  If the world is
composed of subjects and objects, and if Bohr says the properties of the
atom are not in the objects, then Bohr is saying that the properties of the
atom are in the subject.  But if there is one thing science cannot be it is
subjective."  -- [Pirsig: SODV presentation paper]

Heisenberg, in the tradition of Kant and Spencer, took the position that
"the reality of things-in-themselves was unknowable".  That doesn't
necessarily mean they are
"material".  His colleague Bohr argued for "Complementarity", the view that
we do not observe objects at all, but only (statistical) data.  His
inference was that we "objectify" the data values to create an image of the
phenomenon.  This doesn't necessarily mean that phenomena are "mental".

Pirsig went on to say: "Quality is not a thing.  It is an event.  It is the
event at which the subject becomes aware of the object."  While he has since
disavowed the subject/object distinction, I think his SODV statement was
spot on.

Ham, previously:
> Epistemologically, however, they seem to be in a quandary:
> the MoQ doesn't explain what accounts for the patterns we
> experience as real objects.

 Mark:
> Please allow me to put it this way so as you may understand:
> Explanations are intellectual constructs. As such they are
> intellectual patterns of sq.  As such they are aspects of DQ.
> As such they cannot account for that which is greater than
> themselves.  Objects are patterns of sq.

That does not explain what the patterns are; it only explains what an
explanation is.  "Aspects of DQ" is meaningless.  All appearances are
aspects of something.  The question I had asked was: What causes them, and
why do they take this particular form?

 Mark:
> At the intellectual level, patterns are more or less beautiful.
> High level abstractions are deduced and aim toward beauty
> as Human artistic creations.
> Examples of mathematicians' and physicists' accounts of the
> aesthetic they experience are so common as to be taken as
> the norm within the field.
> You may take this to be the answer to your misunderstanding
> of MoQ epistemology: MoQ epistemology is of values.

Not all values are aesthetic, Mark.  It may be poetic license to apply the
word "Beauty" to mathematical equations, but it doesn't clarify the cause or
design of your assumed patterns.  An original metaphysical theory must be
more than metaphors and euphemisms.

 Ham said:
> Either the specific design of the universe is an accident
> of unknown forces -- perhaps the Einsteinian energy, mass,
> and velocity of light -- or it's the intent of a Creator.
> Pirsig does not posit a creator or any primary source other
> than Quality.

Mark:
> This is contradictory Ham.  To say, Pirsig does not do x but
> does do x is a bit childish.

I didn't accused Pirsig of contradicting himself.  My contention is simply
that he didn't account for the source of his patterns.

Mark:
> At the inorganic level, values are relatively unsophisticated,
> but at the intellectual level they are exquisitely sophisticated.
> So, you can see that intellect is not equated with consciousness
> in equal sense because intellect is exquisite in sophistication
> while social and biological patterns are less so.
> In other words, the intellect is high level consciousness.

Just because it is "sophisticated?

Mark continues:
> High level consciouse patterns like the intellect are embedded
> in lower level consciouse patterns of the social, which in turn,
> like a Russian Doll, are embedded in even lower level consciouse
> patterns like the biological, etc.
> Values, not turtles, all the way down.
> Objects, when aligned with the inorganic and biological do look
> like objects.

Since as we can only experience objects "aligned with the inorganic and
biological", in your opinion, does that make them inorganic, biological, or
intellectual?

> Subjects, when aligned with the social and intellect do look like
> subjects. But this arrangement has its roots and evolutionary
> history in ancient culture and is not written in stone.

What do "subjects" look like?  I've never seen one, not have I any reason to
believe that they underwent an evolutionary change in history.

Ham said:
> It is my opinion that the MoQ and Essentialism are both
> phenomenologies because they both theorize physical reality
> as "appearance".

Mark:
> If you are stating that Ham Priday's essentialism may be
> viewed as Idealism then i quite agree.
> This accords nicely with my assertion that essentialism is
> part of the rationalist tradition. I'm glad you agree Ham.
> Mark from above: The MoQ says there is one Substance
> and this is DQ. All patterns of sq are aspects of DQ.
> DQ - the essence of sq, is not an idea or material substance.
> DQ is pure experience prior to differentiation's.

I fail to see how there can be any experience prior to the differentiation
of subject and object.  Are you saying that Quality "experiences"?  If so,
what does it experience?

 Ham:
> For me, the design of the universe is a metaphysical principle:
> it is the space/time appearance of reality that occurs when
> awareness is negated from Essence.

Mark:
> Jolly good. A nice idea. And as an idealist, we cannot expect
> any more than that.

Well, you've placed me in the "rationalist tradition", and defined me as an
idealist.  I don't know why this gives you the jollies, or why these labels
lower your expectations of what you can expect of me.  I suppose Plato and
Plotinus, as idealists, didn't live up to your expectations either.

I wonder what label you would affix to Mr.Pirsig.

Regards,
Ham