[MD] Quantum Physics

[Laird Bedore]

Hi Dan,
>>>> Laird:
>>>> My comment points
>>>> at a basic premise of the MoQ - that it is inclusive in its nature,
>>>> particularly moreso than SOM. I certainly have not gained an impression
>>>> of Pirsig as a dissenter to quantum theory, and the quote in question 
>>>> is no different in that regard.
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> Dan:
>>> The disavowal isn't in regard to quantum theory but rather the way 
>>> quantum theory and the MOQ relate. The context is different. If you've 
>>> read LILA'S CHILD you know the quote I'm referring to, right?
>>>
>>>       
>> [Laird]
>> The impact of our different scopes has mixed us up here as well. In SODV
>> he discusses potential compatibility between MoQ and complementarity in
>> particular, but in the quote in Lila's Child he broadens to MoQ with
>> science in general, quantum theory (of which complementarity is a
>> subset) as example. The contexts are quite different indeed.
>>     
> Dan:
> You are still missing the point.
>
>   
Laird:
Would you care to shed some light upon the point then? I think the 
discussion has veered off-course. I'd be happy to start front-and-center 
and go from there.


>> Laird:
>> To go back to your initial comments following the quote, you shot a
>> little wide-of-target by saying "RMP seems to be disavowing _any_
>> supposed link between quantum theory and the Metaphysics of Quality."
>> Pirsig may have disavowed his prior association (made in SODV)
>> specifically between complementarity and the MoQ. Disavowing _any_
>> supposed link would indicate a baseline incompatibility between quantum
>> theory and MoQ, which would be an admission that the MoQ isn't meeting
>> the mark of what a metaphysics is supposed to do. Certainly not good rigor.
>>     
> Dan:
> >From the SODV paper:
>
> When I sent in the title of this paper in February I hadn't written this 
> paper yet and so I kept the title very general to allow myself plenty of 
> room. Now the paper is finished and I can add a subtitle that is more 
> specific. The subtitle is, "Some Connections Between the Metaphysics of 
> Quality and Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Complementarity." As I see it, Bohr's 
> Complementarity and the Metaphysics of Quality stand midway between Einstein 
> and Magritte. I have concentrated on Bohr's work as a way of making the 
> larger connection. (Robert Pirsig)
>
> This the "supposed link" that I refer to. You seem to be focusing on _any_ 
> which is a mistake. I didn't place any such emphasis in my original post as 
> you can clearly see for yourself if you take the time.
>
>   
Laird:
I suspected you didn't intend such emphasis but your wording allowed for 
it. I was just looking for (and suggesting) clarification.


>>     
>>>>>> [Laird]
>>>>>> He's allowing for improved explainations of
>>>>>> phenomena (his slit experiment/light example) to emerge but not
>>>>>> dictating one in particular: "There may be a higher quality one that
>>>>>> contradicts [the highest-quality assumption one can make about light]
>>>>>>             
>>>>> [Dan]
>>>>> This is falsification. Science is based on falsification as well as
>>>>> the MOQ. Religion is not.
>>>>>
>>>>>           
>> [Laird]
>> Given the use of 'falsification' as the scientific principle of such (I
>> first read it otherwise), your comment is a tautology.
>>     
> Dan:
> Please explain how my comment is a tautology.
>
>   
Laird:
Your comment is a statement of evident fact. "Science is based on 
falsification" - yes, by definition of falsification. Attempts at 
science which do not adopt falsification are pseudoscience. Thus science 
can only be science if it adopts falsification. On the MoQ, it was born 
through the process of falsification against the question "Is quality in 
the subject or in the object?". It's like saying I must have a 
biological mother because I'm human (yup, it's a requirement of 
reproduction!). Circular truth, like the identity property of 
mathematics, is the case of "A implies A" in boolean logic: tautology.


>> Pirsig's
>> statement is use of preemptive falsification to allow for an improved
>> future explanation.
>>     
>
> No. Scientific theories are advanced to explain the 2 slit experiment but 
> there may be a higher quality explanation that contradicts present theories. 
> That's recognizing the value of science as well as the scientific process.
>
> Oh, and by the way, what (on earth!) is a preemptive falsification?
>
>   
Laird:
By preemptive I mean that he's projecting a falsification into 
imaginings of the future in order to stage his scenario. We're falling 
toward semantics here.


>> There's not a whole lot I can say to a tautology!
>>     
>
> Then I suppose you should keep quiet. That's what I do.
>
>   
Laird:
(crickets chirping) ;)

>> To falsification, rather, falsifiability as a means of judging the rigor
>> of a scientific theory. One has to use a very broad brush of
>> falsifiability to paint a philosophy within its grasp (the testability
>> aspect often leads to a bootstrap problem). It's quite a challenge to
>> use the falsifiability principle on this scope, but if done well can
>> provide a defensible degree of rigor (to the MoQ).
>>     
>
> I am afraid you're talking past me here.
>
>   
Laird:
If you're planning on using falsification outside the confines of 
science, the above is tremendously important. Falsification is a tool 
focused on the tasks of science, and using it outside of those confines 
requires that special care be taken. It's like using a screwdriver to 
mount a tire to a wheel - yeah, it can be done, but compared to using a 
tire spoon you've got to be really careful not to puncture the tire or 
scratch up the rim.

-Laird