[MD] Food for Thought
Arlo Bensinger
ajb102 at psu.edu
Wed Dec 20 10:55:33 PST 2006
[SA]
I hope you continue to help me understand, and I still think Pirsig
left this open for us to clarify.
[Arlo]
By "this", I assume you mean the social-intellectual distinction (let
me just use S/I from now on).
[SA]
Yes, hand shaking is symbolic, but this idea is understood in the
mind (another term Pirsig used to describe intellect).
[Arlo]
Well that's the point. It is a symbolically mediated activity, and as
such IF we place all symbolically mediated activity on the
intellectual level then handshaking MUST BE intellectual. To go in
the direction I think you're going, its like saying "talking" is a
social level pattern but "thinking" is an intellectual level pattern.
This points to an S/I distinction that physical interactivity, even
when guided by symbols, is a social pattern, and intellect is then
"the content of our thinking".
But this presents problems. For example, is "sex" a biological
pattern or a social pattern? Or both? Is "sex" between animals
"social" as well? If not, what makes human sex "social" and canine
sex "biological"?
It is clear that Pirsig considers some "thought patterns" social, as
he includes the mythos in (or "as") the social level. And the mythos
is NOT simply physical interactivity. So I don't think making the
case that social patterns are physical and intellectual patterns are
mental can be supported by LILA. You could make the case that this is
a "better" distinction than the one offered, and as Ian and I had
discussed I think it has merit (although it is not without problems
of its own).
[SA]
Language is a medium of social interaction, but without the mind,
language is just sounds trying to relate, socially.
[Arlo]
What is the medium of intellectual interaction? Can we have
"language" without the mind? I'm not so sure.
[SA]
if logic defines intellect, then painters are on the fringe, again.
[Arlo]
And I don't think that's what Pirsig wanted, as he criticizes
intellect for being SOM. But in differentiating what makes a symbolic
pattern "intellectual" or "social", it seems he paints himself into a
corner where the ONLY distinctions offered are those he argues against.
Why is "science" an intellectual pattern but "theology" a social
pattern, if NOT for the very SOMist things (deculturizing and
decontextualizing) the MOQ argues against? What I think is that
Bodvar's SOLAQI has accurately describes what Pirsig "wrote", but I
don't think its what he "meant". I'm just unsure as how to resolve it.
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