[MD] Food for Thought

[Laird Bedore]

Hiya DMB,
(a quick question before killin' the eggnog!)

> Laird and y'all:
>
> dmb had said:
> ...Radical Empiricism does not allow a metaphysician to posit any entity or 
> cause that can't be known in experience. As you very likely already know, 
> this would exclude metaphysical entities such as God and Kantian 
> things-in-themsleves.
>
> Laird asked:
> Just to be an interjecting pain-in-the-ass (woo hoo!), if you were to treat 
> the MoQ the same way as Kant's TITs when looking through radical empiricism, 
> you'd have to throw out static patterns of value, since they'd also be 
> "against the rules". I'm not sure that gets us anywhere with comparing 
> Kant's TITs with the MoQ.
>
> dmb says:
> We'd have to throw out static patterns of value? As I understand it, the 
> various levels static quality are known in experience. They are categories 
> of experience. Even DQ is known in experience as is revelaed in the monikers 
> "primary empirical reality" and "pre-intellectual experience". I think your 
> question is not a pain at all. Please feel free to ask away.
>
>   
[Laird]
I might be mis-corrolating Kant's TITs and their positioning in his 
philosophy, but without his TITs, his philosophy has no experience at 
all. For lack of a better term, TITs are the 'subject', the source, of 
his experience. Maybe it's more like ripping DQ out of the MoQ. Surely 
without any source of experience Kant would get a big fat F on a radical 
empiricism (or any empiricism) scale? Seems kind of unfair to remove his 
access to experience and then try to judge him in terms of experience.

-Laird