[MD] Capital Punishment

[Ham Priday]

Arlo --


[Arlo]:
> What Pirsig tried to do was present a coherent framework (I know you
disagree
> with his success in this matter) as to how a behavior can be "moral" in
one
> cultural setting, and "immoral" in another, without succombing to pure
> relativism (anything goes). His response was to say that behavior that
does not
> bring lower levels into control of higher levels, or lower levels
destroying
> higher levels, is not "immoral". When such an inversion occurs, however,
the
> behavior is always "immoral".

I have reservations as to the "coherency" of Pirsig's thesis; however, your
first assertion that "behavior can be moral in one cultural setting, and
immoral in another" expresses the relative nature of morality which is
exactly the point I've been trying to make with you and Platt.  Your second
assertion is one I have difficulty following, no doubt because the
lower/higher level epistemology has no parallel in my philosophy.  Again, if
we don't know the difference between a higher level and a lower level (of
quality?), which seems to be demonstrated in our arguments, then behavior
remains relative, which means that there is no moral "standard" -- even in
retrospect.

> For example (to get away from capital punishment for a moment), since
Samoan
> sexual behavior, within Samoan cultural context, does not violate the MOQ
> hierarchy (the biological patterns of value do not threaten social
patterns of
> value), the behavior cannot be said to be immoral. However, that same
behavior
> imported into American culture does (the arguement goes) potentially
undermine
> social patterns and so one could argue that such behavior is "immoral".

Yes, "one could argue"; but the fact that morality is debatable only
confirms its relativity.  If there were a standard known by someone -- King
Solomon or Robert Prisig, perhaps? -- then it would seem that such a person
would feel obliged to set it out in detail so that all mankind would have no
excuse for wrong behavior.  Don't you see how that would destroy the whole
idea of individual freedom?   The omission of this wisdom from the cognizant
apprehension of man is no accident or fluke of nature; it is the cosmic
principle of an intelligent designer.  The path we take in working out our
values must be unbiased by absolute knowledge.  It is only by his innocence
that man can be a free and autonomous agent in the world.

> This certainly comes across as relativistic (I like Ian's or Marsha's or
> someone's "relationistic"), but the MOQ hierarchy itself is an absolute
frame
> for considering moral issues in that biological patterns that threaten or
> destroy social patterns are always absolutely immoral, societal patterns
that
> threaten or destroy intellectual patterns are always immoral. Social
patterns
> that prohibit non-threatening biological patterns are immoral.
Intellectual
> patterns that prohibit non-threatening societal patterns are immoral.

No matter how absolute the "frame", without a key to decode it we are left
to our own devices.  Existence is God's playground, not his identity.  We
can hypothesize the concept of Absolute Truth, an All-knowing Creator, or
Perfect Goodness.  We can talk about aspiring to such ultimate values.  But
we can't realize them or "become" them in a relativistic universe.  To
pretend that we can is the equivalent of a physicist trying to predict the
outcome of a process by calculating every force acting on it.  Man is not
omniscient.  Those who believe that humans are "as gods" in this world are
deluded by "pie in the sky" ideology.

[Ham, previously]:
> In addition to demanding revenge for brutal acts, most people still feel
that
> capital punishment is a deterrent to crime, and I'm not sure all the
evidence
> is in on this issue.

 [Arlo]:
> To me, the burden of proof must rest with the executioners. That is, we
should
> not blindly accept capital punishment and wait for those who oppose it to
make
> their case, we should reject it and wait for those in favor of it to make
> theirs.
>
> But, keep in mind, I am not universally opposed to capital punishment.
There may
> indeed be situations where it is warranted. However, I do not feel revenge
and
> retribution are Quality reasons for the taking of a life.

I doubt if the executioners could make their case in any way that would
change your mind, Arlo.

 [Ham, previously]:
> If there is sufficient prison space for all the hard-core criminals,
perhaps it
> would be feasible to commute the death sentence for life imprisonment; but
> society would never rest easy with the possibility of time off for good
> behavior or early release.

 [Arlo]:
> I am in favor of hard labor and life in prison. No parole (determined of
course
> by a jury).

I agree, and would add that the product of such labor should be used to make
restitution to the crime victims and their families.

> This is not about "fighting terrorists", and I do believe
> that society has a right to protect itself from threats (provided
> it is not a "intellectual threat"). So we need an army to take
> appropriate action against an enemy that is committed to
> destroying us. Certainly. And according to the MOQ,
> such a thing is moral.

Good!  I'm happy that we have the moral endorsement of the MOQ in defending
our country.  (That's more than I can say for the NEA, ADL, NOW, or ACLU.)

> How can something be immoral by any standard if all standards
> are contextually derived? Seems like you, too, believe there are
> some "absolutes", such as "freedom for all men". So, does that
> mean slavery is always immoral? Or am I misunderstanding,
> can slavery be moral?

Rather than getting trapped in the quagmire of absolutes again, I'd put it
this way: If freedom for all men is a moral imperative, as I believe it is,
then slavery cannot be moral.

[Ham, previously]:
> The southern lynch mobs left a black mark in our history and
> created a racial divide from which we may never fully recover.
> This was a type of gang warfare that was repulsive to mainstream
> America and could hardly be an expression of our national morality.

[Arlo]:
> This confuses me as well. If morality is culturally bound, why does
> Pennsylvanian opposition to slavery matter to the question of
> Alabama's determination that slavery was moral?

Again, one must define the universe of the culture or society in question.
Lincoln assumed that he had a responsibility for maintaining the Union;
hence his universe was that of the entire United States.  The Confederates
believed they were fighting for states' rights.  You can't have it both ways
in such a contest.  (Perhaps we should insert Platt's "Law of the Jungle"
here, and concede that Might makes Right.)  Personally, I believe Lincoln
was morally right, but I've heard convincing arguments to the contrary.

[Ham, previously]:
> Every culture has it own morality system.  This is demonstrated in the
> behavior of people when they are free to express their values.

[Arlo]:
> You postmodernists baffle me.

That's very funny!  I've never been called a "postmodernist" before.  I
generally reserve that label for materialistic naturalists and philosophical
nihilists.  You of all people should be aware that I have no truck with
either of these groups.

Good luck in getting additional responses to this thread.  It seems that
even Platt has baled out on us.

Have a good week,
Ham,