[MD] Is Quality Value?

[Ham Priday]

Howdy Platt --

Back to the original subject heading (no offense, I hope, to Arlo) ...

> I'm not sure why you use "value" to describe reality if
> the word to most people means something other than what
> you intend it to mean. Why fight common understanding
> of what words mean? If one is trying to persuade, isn't
> it good practice to use words that are readily comprehended?

That's exactly my complaint, Platt.  Consistent word usage is particularly
critical when an author is outlining an ontology based on subjective
concepts.  This is why I continue to push for definitions that can be
universally understood.  That becomes difficult, of course, when an author
refuses to define what he means by a word like Quality because "everybody
knows what it is".

Unfortunately, you have misconstrued my use of the word Value, probably due
to careless explication on my part.  When I said that "Value connotes an
essential reality that exists independently of man's experience." I did not
intend to equate Value with Absolute Reality.
Rather, I was trying to distinguish my understanding of Value from the
commonly inferred meaning of Pirsig's Quality.

This is how I define Value in my Glossary: "The conditional affinity for
Essence whereby desire is aroused and ultimately redeemed.  That aspect of
Essence which is differentially derivable from, and is the teleological
object of, human experience."

Perhaps that's an inadequate definition for the "conditional essence" of
man.  The semantic problem one encounters when referring to a "derived
essence" is to keep it distinct from Absolute Essence.  To avoid confusion,
I've resorted to an existentialist term used by Heidegger and Sartre:
"essent".  I define an essent as "one of two value-deprived essences created
by the primary negation of Essence from which existence arises."  A complete
explanation of this ontology appears in my Creation hypothesis and is too
involved to outline here.  Suffice it to say that the two primary essents
are "other" and "not-other".  Essentially, "other" is experiential
"beingness" (the objects of awareness), while "not-other" is the "negate" or
subject of awareness.  Both of these essents are contingencies of Value;
that is, they exist by virtue of the Value of Essence.

Now I know this sounds complicated, and it requires some study; but without
getting into the the thesis itself, perhaps you can see that Value is
essential to my philosophy, not just a euphemism for "goodness", "morality",
or a measure of what pleases us in life.  It's possible, of course, that
I've failed to grasp the real meaning of Pirsig's Quality in the absence of
a proper definition or a formal development of his theory.  To date, having
reviewed the MoQ discussions, Pirsig's SODV paper, and McWatt's doctoral
thesis, I'm not convinced that the MoQ's Quality is a transcendent reality
or a derivative thereof.  If I'm wrong, perhaps someone will take me in tow
and explain it to me.

> Philosophy would be so much more attractive to people
> if philosophers disciplined themselves to use plain, everyday
> English. In that regard, they would do well to follow
> Pirsig's model.

I agree with your sentiments.  But while Pirsig may be exemplary in his use
of the English language, his novels do not serve as a model for metaphysical
understanding.

[Ham, previously]:
> Since Freedom is absolute in principle, I don't believe
> I'm inconsistent in asserting that slavery is immoral
> by this definition.

[Platt]:
> I see no inconsistency either when it comes to slavery, but I
> do see an inconsistency in your previous assertion that only
> Essence is absolute and now your claim that individual
> autonomy is an absolute principle. That makes
> two absolutes it seems. But, I could be wrong.

I'll defer to the logicians on this point.  To me, an absolute principle is
a universal law or maxim that applies to contingencies.  For example: 'Act
only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
would become a universal law'.  Absolute principles are capable of being
violated but not invalidated.

> Finally, shall I give up any hope that you might consider
> the behavior of atoms and animals as being limited by
> physical and biological rules much as human behavior is
> limited by societal and intellectual rules?  In other
> words, can you entertain the thought that morality extends
> beyond the insular world of man?

I believe there is an order to existence and a teleology by which it moves
toward certain ends.  My objection to its being called "morality" is the
common understanding (which you normally revere) of morality to mean human
behavior.  Would you accept the behavior of atoms and animals as a function
of "intelligent design"?   That would of course imply a Designer.  Man is
the "designer" of cultural morality.  Who or what would you say is the
designer of physical morality??

Regards,
Ham