[MD] Where have all the values gone?

Ham Priday hampday1 at verizon.net
Fri Jan 13 11:41:29 PST 2006




 Hey, Platt --

I guess reverting to the original subject heading got my note screened out
of your system.    Anyway, since you haven't responded to my reply to your
1/11 message, I'm sending it again under your heading.  (By the way, you
must know that I'm totally empathetic with your lament over society's lost
values.)

> I'm not sure why you use "value" to describe reality if
> the word to most people means something other than what
> you intend it to mean. Why fight common understanding
> of what words mean? If one is trying to persuade, isn't
> it good practice to use words that are readily comprehended?

That's exactly my complaint, Platt.  Proper and consistent word usage is
particularly critical when an author is outlining an ontology based on
subjective
concepts.  This is why I continue to push for definitions that can be
universally understood.  It becomes difficult, of course, when an author
refuses to define what he means by a word like Quality because "everybody
knows what it is".

Unfortunately, you have misconstrued my use of the word Value, probably due
to careless explication on my part.  When I said that "Value connotes an
essential reality that exists independently of man's experience," I did not
intend to equate Value with Absolute Reality.  Rather, I was trying to
distinguish
my understanding of Value from the commonly inferred meaning of Pirsig's
Quality.

This is how I define Value in my Glossary: "The conditional affinity for
Essence whereby desire is aroused and ultimately redeemed.  That aspect of
Essence which is differentially derivable from, and is the teleological
object of, human experience."

Now perhaps that's an inadequate definition for the "conditional essence" of
man.  The semantic problem one encounters when referring to a "derived
essence" is to keep it distinct from Absolute Essence.  To avoid confusion
in my thesis I've borrowed an existentialist term used by Heidegger and
Sartre:
"essent".  I define an essent as "one of two value-deprived essences created
by the primary negation of Essence from which existence arises."  A complete
explanation of this ontology appears in my Creation hypothesis and is too
involved to outline here.  Suffice it to say that the two primary essents
are "other" and "not-other".  Essentially, "other" is experiential
"beingness" (the objects of awareness), while "not-other" is the "negate" or
subject of awareness.  Both of these essents are contingencies of Value;
that is, they exist by virtue of the Value of Essence.

I know this sounds complicated, and it requires some study; but without
getting into the thesis itself, perhaps you can see that Value is essential
to my philosophy, not just a euphemism for "goodness", "morality",
or a measure of what pleases us in life.  It's possible, of course, that
I've failed to grasp the full meaning of Pirsig's Quality in the absence of
a proper definition or a formal development of his theory.  To date, having
reviewed the MoQ discussions, Pirsig's SODV paper, and McWatt's doctoral
thesis, I'm not convinced that the MoQ's Quality is a transcendent reality
or a derivative thereof.  If I'm wrong, perhaps someone will take me in tow
and explain why.

> Philosophy would be so much more attractive to people
> if philosophers disciplined themselves to use plain, everyday
> English. In that regard, they would do well to follow
> Pirsig's model.

I agree with your sentiments.  But while Pirsig may be exemplary in his use
of the English language, his novels are hardly a model of metaphysical
exposition.

[Ham, previously]:
> Since Freedom is absolute in principle, I don't believe
> I'm inconsistent in asserting that slavery is immoral
> by this definition.

 [Platt]:
> I see no inconsistency either when it comes to slavery, but I
> do see an inconsistency in your previous assertion that only
> Essence is absolute and now your claim that individual
> autonomy is an absolute principle. That makes
> two absolutes it seems. But, I could be wrong.

Well, I'll defer to the logicians on this point.  To me, an absolute
principle is
a universal law or maxim that applies to contingencies.  Examples: 'Act
only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
would become a universal law'; 'Water runs downhill'; 'The sun sets in the
west'.
Absolute principles are capable of being violated but not invalidated.

> Finally, shall I give up any hope that you might consider
> the behavior of atoms and animals as being limited by
> physical and biological rules much as human behavior is
> limited by societal and intellectual rules?  In other
> words, can you entertain the thought that morality extends
> beyond the insular world of man?

I believe there is an order to existence and a teleology by which it moves
toward certain ends.  My objection to this being called "morality" is the
common understanding (your cause?) of morality to mean human behavior.
Would you accept the idea that the behavior of atoms and animals is
a function of "intelligent design"?

That would of course imply a Designer.
Man is the "designer" of cultural morality.
Who or what would you say is the designer of physical morality??

Best regards,
Ham


> moq_discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/




More information about the Moq_Discuss mailing list