[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[David M]

Hi Scott

Sounds reasonable to me.

Would you agree that it is fair to conclude
that patterns or things interact with each other
and that whenever this interaction involves one
pattern or thing changing another that change is
always placed on some kind of value scale for the
pattern or thing or body changed. So change and
consciousness and value are inseparable? We
perceive what changes us....

David M


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Scott Roberts" <jse885 at localnet.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2006 6:28 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question


> Ian,
>
> Ian said:
> OK Scott, let's keep it simple ... you mentioned the distinction
> between the macro and micro levels of the argument ... how about ...
>
> At the micro-level (the most "atomic" level of reality) I say "any
> significant difference" does not require "intellect" for that reality
> to be aware of it - its "value" is perceived very simply and
> immediately, no metaphors were needed.
>
> Scott:
> First, some clarification. Is this a shift in your thinking, that you now
> accept that "aware of" and "perceived" are suitably applied to any
> significant difference? (This is a straight question, that is, I'm not 
> sure
> whether or not you always felt this way, since I don't recall your saying
> so, but may have just forgotten.) That is, are you in agreement that value
> implies awareness of value? Another terminological question, which is what
> do you mean be "proto-". I believe it can mean two things, and I want to
> disambiguate. A protozoon is "first life" -- and is living, but a
> "proto-star" is (I think) "not a star but will be". So, in your view, 
> would
> "proto-awareness" be some very simple and originating kind of awareness or
> something that is not aware but (when complexified) becomes aware?
>
> On to the issue. I deny that one can have significant difference, or
> perceived value, without intellect, and to explain why I refer once again 
> to
> Peirce's distinction between dyads and triads. A dyad is a 2-relation, 
> like
> stimulus and response, or "John saw Mary", while a triad is a 3-relation,
> like "John gave the book to Mary" All semiotic events are triads, which
> involve an interpretant, a representamen, and a referent (an interpretant 
> is
> the cognition of the referent through the representamen). Now the thing 
> is,
> no triad is reducible to dyads, and there are clearly triads, so what are
> dyads? In my view (and this may be going beyond what Peirce says, I'm not
> sure), all dyads are partial observations. We jump off a hot stove
> reflexively, and see it as a dyad. But that is only our view of it, 
> because
> we jump off before we consciously cognize that we are in a dangerous
> situation. However, to the body, this was a triad. The heat of the stove
> makes a signicant difference to the well-being of the body, and so the 
> heat
> is the sign of danger.
>
> So my argument is that to call a difference significant means one is 
> dealing
> with a triad, or semiosis. To be aware without value is impossible (a MOQ
> postulate, which I agree with). But there is value only because what one 
> is
> aware of is within some static pattern of value, which is to say, an
> interpreting pattern. By isolating the "what one is aware of" from the
> interpretive nature of the pattern is how one gets dyads. But in fact that
> isolation only exists because we are only thinking *about* the event in
> question. Because of this we are not cognizant of the interpretant. We are
> only cognizant of the interpretant when we think *with* the situation, as 
> we
> do in understanding what someone else is saying. Because we cannot think
> with atomic activity, or with a cat, for that matter, we see only dyads, 
> not
> triads. Which is to say, objective thinking (thinking about) produces 
> dyads,
> while subjective thinking (thinking with) includes interpretants.
>
> Thus my response to what you say is that there is intellect in subatomic
> activity, but we do not know the interpretant involved. So how do we know
> there is intellect? Because triads are not reducible to dyads, and we 
> don't
> like dualism (I don't, anyway). Or because we assume (as the MOQ does, or
> accept as revelation from mystics) that there is value involved, and that
> implies triadic relations, not dyadic.
>
> - Scott
>
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