[MD] Essentialism and the MOQ

[Ham Priday]

Hi Platt, and all --

Platt has agreed to participate with me in an open discussion of
Essentialism, subject to several caveats or conditions which he's enumerated
as follows:
> 1) that we have perhaps incompatible views on
> the nature of existence,
> 2) that I like to examine premises as much as
>conclusions, and
> 3) that agreement on definitions is absolutely
> essential to mutual understanding.
> Finally, I will be critical of expressions that I think
> a reasonably intelligent high school sophomore
> would find strange.  For example, the word "negate"
> will have to go. Also I favor simple declarative
> sentences.  As for nothingness, if the numerical zero
> doesn't express it's meaning as well as anything,
> then I'm afraid we're stuck before we begin.
>
> P.S. Since this is a site devoted to Pirsig's MOQ,
> I think it's incumbent on us to relate your philosophy
> to his as much as possible, hopefully to the explication
> of both.

I agree to Platt's conditions.  Regarding the postscript, I intend to let
Platt determine whether my assertions are within the bounds of Pirsig's
philosophy or, if not, to make the necessary adjustments or voice whatever
objections he feels are prudent.  (Of course corrections and comments from
others will also be welcome.)

A quick check through the MD archives shows that, although we've had
previous threads with "Essentialism" in the title, including "Essentialism
and anti-Essentialism", "Essentialism and the MOQ" does not appear to have
been taken, and it seems most appropriate for this purpose.

I'd like to preface this discussion by denying responsibility for any
connotations implied or suggested by the terms Essence and Essentialism as
used by other writers.  Athough I'm aware that "essence", "essentialism" and
"essentialists" have special meanings in certain unrelated contexts, for all
practical purposes, it should be assumed that the terminology and
definitions I'll be referring to in this discussion are my own.

Since Platt, among others here, has expressed some differences as to the
"nature of existence" from an epistemological viewpoint, I thought it would
be useful to open this discussion with a general assessment of what I
consider to be the difference between "Absolute" and "Relative" in
metaphysics, and how these two categories are handled in my philosophy.

Human beings can conceive of a theoretical Absolute by extension, just as
they can imagine Infinity or pure Nothingness, although none of these
concepts is experienced in existence.  The object(s) of existential
experience -- whether it's persons, trees, houses, creatures, galaxies, or
events -- is always observed as relative to something else.  The universe
itself is commonly viewed as a finite region of energized matter relative to
the whole of outer space.

Essentialism holds that Existence, and everything experienced as occurring
within the dimensions of time and space, is relative and differentiated.
That is its primary distinction.  We cannot form a mental image of an
undifferentiated, absolute whole.  Such concepts are hypothetical or
intellectual "abstractions" based on logic, mathematics, or intuition.  They
have no empirical equivalent.  Likewise, the moral or valuistic concepts of
"Goodness", "Quality", "Love", "Beauty", and "Truth" can only be sensed
differentially, relative to a theoretical higher or lower standard.  In
other words, there are no absolutes where Existence is concerned.

The converse of this axiom is that whatever is NOT relational and
differentiated has as its source an Essence that is without difference or
division.  Essence cannot be defined or verified empirically; it is not a
physical entity.  Like the concepts Absolute and Infinite, Essence can only
be posited intuitively, by an extension of logical, moral or aesthetic
principles that we call Metaphysics.  Thus, Metaphysics is the theory of
reality beyond, but not exclusive of, the physical (empirical) universe.

I think this distinction is fundamental to an understanding of metaphysical
reality.  I'm also cognizant of the fact that it deviates from the "nature
of existence" as Pirsig described it in the MOQ.  This is particularly
apparent in the concept of Morality and Quality as "absolute or innate in
the universe".  Unfortunately, the author did not provide us with a formally
developed metaphysical theory to support his philosophy.

So, to start the ball rolling, I'll throw out the following questions:

1) Since Morality and Quality are relative sensibilities of human awareness,
how can they be considered absolute?

2) Inasmuch as there is no consensus by cosmologists that the universe
itself is absolute, what logical premise supports the notion that the
universe can contain an absolute?

Cordially,
Ham