[MD] Essentialism and the MOQ

[Platt Holden]

Hi Ham,

Whoa. You are proceeding too fast for my ability to keep pace. As I 
said, I like to examine basic premises first and foremost, along with 
agreement on definitions. So let's take a look at your number one
premise: 

> Essentialism holds that Existence, and everything experienced as
> occurring within the dimensions of time and space, is relative and
> differentiated.

1. Is there any reason to capitalize "existence." If not, let's not.

2. Is "existence" the same as "reality." If so, let's use "real" and 
"reality" instead of "being" and "existence" for the sake of simplicity 
and clarity.  

3. "Experienced" by what or whom? Raising the issue of "Do animals 
and/or robots experience?"

4. Is "differentiated" the same as "distinctive?" If so, let's use the 
simpler word or find a suitable simpler expression..

Then recognize at the outset that your premise is contradicted by the 
MOQ. It holds that reality is experience prior to any distinctions made 
by mental concepts. Such distinctions only come after primary, direct 
experience. And yes, animals and robots experience. (Experience exists 
at the inorganic level.) Further, it holds that there is no distinction 
between experience and Quality. (Quality is capitalized because in the 
MOQ it is central to Pirsig's metaphysics, just as Essence is central 
to yours.) 

I know -- picky, picky, picky. So please feel free to dismiss my turtle-
like approach. I'm sure others can keep up with the pace of your 
intellect better than me and go right to your questions.

Best regards,
Platt

(Ham continued)
> That is its primary distinction.  We cannot form a
> mental image of an undifferentiated, absolute whole.  Such concepts are
> hypothetical or intellectual "abstractions" based on logic, mathematics,
> or intuition.  They have no empirical equivalent.  Likewise, the moral
> or valuistic concepts of "Goodness", "Quality", "Love", "Beauty", and
> "Truth" can only be sensed differentially, relative to a theoretical
> higher or lower standard.  In other words, there are no absolutes where
> Existence is concerned.
> 
> The converse of this axiom is that whatever is NOT relational and
> differentiated has as its source an Essence that is without difference
> or division.  Essence cannot be defined or verified empirically; it is
> not a physical entity.  Like the concepts Absolute and Infinite, Essence
> can only be posited intuitively, by an extension of logical, moral or
> aesthetic principles that we call Metaphysics.  Thus, Metaphysics is the
> theory of reality beyond, but not exclusive of, the physical (empirical)
> universe.
> 
> I think this distinction is fundamental to an understanding of
> metaphysical reality.  I'm also cognizant of the fact that it deviates
> from the "nature of existence" as Pirsig described it in the MOQ.  This
> is particularly apparent in the concept of Morality and Quality as
> "absolute or innate in the universe".  Unfortunately, the author did not
> provide us with a formally developed metaphysical theory to support his
> philosophy.
> 
> So, to start the ball rolling, I'll throw out the following questions:
> 
> 1) Since Morality and Quality are relative sensibilities of human
> awareness, how can they be considered absolute?
> 
> 2) Inasmuch as there is no consensus by cosmologists that the universe
> itself is absolute, what logical premise supports the notion that the
> universe can contain an absolute?
> 
> Cordially,
> Ham