[MD] Essentialism and the MOQ

Ham Priday hampday1 at verizon.net
Fri Nov 17 21:36:51 PST 2006


Platt --


> Whoa. You are proceeding too fast for my ability
> to keep pace. As I said, I like to examine basic
> premises first and foremost, along with agreement
> on definitions. So let's take a look at your number one
> premise:

But this is a basic premise AND a definition.  I said:

> Essentialism holds that Existence, and everything
> experienced as occurring within the dimensions of
> time and space, is relative and differentiated.

> 1. Is there any reason to capitalize "existence."
> If not, let's not.

No.  I capitalized it because I didn't want it to be confused with Essence.

> 2. Is "existence" the same as "reality." If so, let's
> use "real" and "reality" instead of "being" and
> "existence" for the sake of simplicity and clarity.

Existence is the reality that appears in time and space.  I've said nothing
about ultimate reality or "being" in this statement.

> 3. "Experienced" by what or whom?  Raising the
> issue of "Do animals and/or robots experience?"

Everything experienced means exactly that: whatever is experienced by
anything that can experience.  Please don't finesse the fundamentals with
you own specifics.  (I prefer to leave the subject of experience for another
discussion.)

> 4. Is "differentiated" the same as "distinctive?"
> If so, let's use the simpler word or find a suitable
> simpler expression..

I have not used the word "distinctive" anywhere in these statements.  I did
use the word "distinction".  I said that the relational (differentiated)
nature of existence was its "primary distinction".  Is the meaning of this
sentence unreasonably difficult for the average high school sophomore?

> Then recognize at the outset that your premise
> is contradicted by the MOQ. It holds that reality
> is experience prior to any distinctions made
> by mental concepts.

Does the MOQ not acknowledge existence as the reality that is experienced?
I'm not talking about what is "prior" to experience.  If mental concepts are
not images of what we experience, then what are they?  So far, I don't see
that I have contradicted the MOQ.  Why should you or I anticipate problems
that may come up in subsequent discussions?

> Such distinctions only come after primary, direct
> experience. And yes, animals and robots experience.
> (Experience exists at the inorganic level.) Further,
> it holds that there is no distinction between experience
> and Quality. (Quality is capitalized because in the
> MOQ it is central to Pirsig's metaphysics, just as
> Essence is central to yours.)

Now it's my turn to yell Whoa!  You're jumping way ahead of me.  You make an
assumption about Essence which I haven't even mentioned in this premise.
I'm laying out the fundamentals of existence and you're already arguing
about the levels of Quality, epistemology, and robotic experience.  I'm not
ready to discuss how experience occurs or the issue of inorganic experience
at this juncture.

> I know -- picky, picky, picky. So please feel free
> to dismiss my turtle-like approach. I'm sure others
> can keep up with the pace of your intellect better
> than me and go right to your questions.

This is not a good start to a productive dialogue, Platt.  I'm proceeding at
a snail's pace compared to your "turtle-like approach".  You have asked that
we agree on definitions.  If you won't accept my definition of existence as
stated, tell me why and provide your own definition.  Otherwise, how do I
communicate with you?

I thought defining what we call existence was a good fundamental place to
start.  Apparently, you see it as a mine field.  Perhaps you can suggest
another approach to this subject that isn't so controversial.

Regards,
Ham





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