[MD] Value and the Anthropic Principle

[Ham Priday]

Hello All --

In my continuing research for unusual ideas on fundamental metaphysics, I
discovered a paper by Arthur Witherall titled "The Fundamental
Question", referring of course to the one Heidegger made famous in his
Introduction to Metaphysics: "Why are there essents rather than nothing?"

Witherall approaches the question from a new, anthropic direction which I
think is hospitable to valuistic ontologies like the MoQ and Essentialism.
His draft, soon to appear in The Journal of Philosophical Research, is
developed in typical academic style and is non-conclusive.  If you're not
put off by the author's skill at raising the right questions without seeming
to take a personal position, you'll be rewarded with a germinal argument for
the value of existence.  The assertions he makes are clear, logical, and
free of the usual metaphoric analogies that annoy Case and Arlo.  This is a
brilliant piece of
work that makes me wish I'd majored in Philosophy!

As a teaser, I'll quote a couple of excerpts, including the introduction
(outlining his strategy) and a philosophical analysis of two unfamiliar
contemporaries named Nicholas Rescher and John Leslie who may be known to
Matt, Anthony, or other scholars.

"In recent years, a number of philosophers have revitalized the fundamental
question of metaphysics after a long period of neglect, and they have
proposed fascinating and illuminating answers.  It is likely that the main
reason for this renewed interest lies in the death of positivism, and the
rebirth of metaphysics itself, but the appearance of certain cosmological
ideas, such as the Big Bang theory and the Anthropic Principle, has also had
an effect.  One of the first of the new reactions to the question was that
of
Nozick, and I will discuss some of the possibilities that he introduces with
the aim of showing that they either fail to answer the question
satisfactorily,
or otherwise pose no threat to my central claim.  I shall also argue that
one of his 'solutions' is itself an expression of awe rather than an
explanation.  Thus his answers, whatever else may be true of them, do not
provide counterexamples to my central claim, that a feeling of awe in
contemplating the fundamental question is appropriate and desirable.

"I will then consider two variants of what might be called the 'value
thesis',
that the world exists because it is valuable.  Many of the recent responses
to the fundamental question are partial endorsements of this thesis, and it
could become one of the most popular metaphysical explanations.  For
example, the Strong Anthropic Principle, as interpreted by Paul Davies,
asserts that the laws of physics must be such as to give rise to conscious
beings (the weak form says that they are contingently such as to give rise
to conscious beings, because after all we do exist), is clearly connected to
the value thesis in some way, since conscious beings are in some sense
realizations of value.  I will examine the thesis as it appears in the work
of Leslie and Rescher, each of whom have their own specific problems.  The
general point that I will make is that in as much as we can offer an
intelligible explanation of the world in terms of its value, it is
appropriate to feel awe at the fact of its existence.

"This means that contemplating the fundamental question, which presupposes
the fact of existence, also leads to appropriate and desirable feelings of
awe, wonder and amazement.  In a way, contemplating this question is an act
which forcefully brings us to acknowledge not only the fact of existence,
but the fact that it is astonishing.  We can say this even if we are
uncertain whether a version of the value thesis will ultimately succeed in
explaining why there is something instead of nothing. ...

"3.3: Teleological Theories: Rescher and Leslie

"The idea that it is good to exist, or that being is better than nonbeing,
is common enough outside of philosophy.  If most people did not hold on to
some version of this thesis, suicide would be far more common than it is.
However, while it seems plausible as a conclusion about life, it seems less
tenable when applied to the existence of non-living things, or to the
universe as a whole.  One of the problems with adopting this as a
fundamental metaphysical principle is that it is difficult to interpret
goodness or value as causally productive.  We know from bitter experience
that just because something ought to happen does not always mean that it
will happen. Normally, other conditions must obtain before a desirable
outcome is realized: someone must have the will to bring it about, and the
power to implement the right procedures.

"On the other hand, the question of why anything exists at all cannot be
answered by using a causal explanation in any case, since the cause of the
world (whether it be God or not) must itself be something, and is therefore
part of what must be explained.  So it seems that we can invoke an
evaluative principle to explain the existence of something rather than
nothing, as long as we do not interpret this as being a causal explanation
in itself.  We could say then that the reason that there is a world is that
it is ethically (or otherwise) desirable, but that this is not the cause for
the world's existence.  Since the question is why rather than how the world
came to be, it seems appropriate to say that it came to be in order to
realize goodness.  This would mean that existence has a purpose, which is
the realization of value.  Leslie's theory follows this kind of course, or
at least purports to do so.  Alternatively it could be argued that, even
though value is not in general a causally productive factor, it can be seen
as such for the unique case of the existence of the world itself, another
tactic adopted by Leslie.  If this kind of claim is made, we must be careful
not to confuse matters by claiming that value is itself something that
requires a cause for its existence.  For then the question arises as to why
it should be.  We ought to hold, then, that value is in some sense 'beyond
being', as Plato said, even though it can somehow produce something that has
real being.  We must also hold, as Rescher does, that value is in some sense
self-explanatory or self-validating.

"Rescher's teleological explanation for the existence of the world does not
make use of ethical values such as goodness, but it does make use of the
idea of "cosmic values".  His theory is not strictly a naturalistic one,
since it does not postulate a (strictly) causal explanation for the
universe, although it does make use of natural laws.  It is really a
programmatic solution which demonstrates how the world might have come to be
rather than how it must have come to be.  He claims that there could be a
set of laws which does not simply describe the way that nature works, but
represent the conditions for existence itself, rather than conditions of
existents.  These are what he calls 'proto-laws', and their realization
would require the existence of things.  It would then be a matter of natural
necessity, rather than chance, that there is something instead of nothing.
When it comes to specifying what these proto-laws are, and how to recognize
them, his suggestion is that the fundamental equations that govern the
physical world may have viable solutions only when they entail that things
exist.

> On such an approach, we would accordingly begin by looking to the
> fundamental field equations that delineate the operation of forces in
nature: > those which define the structures of the space-time continuum, say
the
> basic laws of quantum mechanics and general relativity, and some
> fundamental structural principles of physical interaction.  Principles of
this > sort characterizing the electromagnetic, gravitational, and metric
fields
> provide the basic protolaws under whose aegis the drama of natural events
> will have to play itself out.  And the existence of things would then be
> explained by noting that the fundamental equations themselves admit of no
> empty solutions - that any solution that satisfies them must incorporate
the > sorts of singularities we call "things" ... For such an approach to
work, it
> would have to transpire that the only ultimately viable solutions to those
> cosmic equations are existential solutions.

"This is clearly no more than a suggestion as to what proto-laws might be.
He does not state unequivocally that proto-laws will take the form of
physical laws.  A more significant question, with respect to the details of
Rescher's explanation, is that of the grounds for thinking that there are
any laws, of any kind, which entail that things exist.  In response to this,
Rescher claims that the protolaws that actually obtain are those which
maximize certain 'cosmic' values, such as simplicity, harmony, systemic
elegance, uniformity and economy.  Finally, if it is asked why proto-laws
should maximize values, he claims that this is self-explanatory, and that in
citing an axiological principle, we have reached the end of our
understanding of why the world exists.

> It is the great advantage of a principle of axiology to be in the position
to
> provide materials of its own explanation. Principles of economy,
> simplicity, etc., are literally self-explanatory by virtue of being
optimal on
> their own footing ... A value principle ... must validate itself.

"Thus there need be no infinite regress of laws and necessities, for the
ultimate explanation is axiological, and this validates itself.  Existence
is explained by proto-nomicity, which is explained by proto-laws being
value-maximizing, and value-maximization requires no further explanation.
It may be simplistic to say that there is a world because the condition of
there being a world is maximally valuable, but this is precisely what
Rescher's theory says. ..."

The complete essay can be found at
http://www.hedweb.com/witherall/existence.htm

Naturally I'll be interested to see what reactions, if any, this essay
sparks from the regulars here.

Happy reading,
Ham