[MD] Value and the Anthropic Principle

[Ham Priday]

Platt and all --

I'm reviving last month's thread to provide an update on my e-mail chats
with Arthur Witherall, about which Platt said "I think many of us will be
interested in
how your dialog with Witherall transpires.  I know I will be."  So what I've
patched together below from our recent exchange is fulfilling my promise to
Platt, while possibly also providing a source of interest to others.

Some of you may have read Arthur's essay "The Fundamental Question" which
suggested that the "awe" and "wonderment" expressed by philosophers at the
phenomenon of existence is prima facie evidence that the universe is in some
respect "self-validating".

One statement in particular struck me as "MOQish" for reasons that should be
immediately apparent:
"Since the [fundamental] question is why rather than how the world came to
be, it seems appropriate to say that it came to be in order to realize
goodness.  This would mean that existence has a purpose, which is the
realization of value."

Inasmuch as this is also the teleological premise of Essentialism, I decided
it might be productive to establish a dialog with Arthur, despite the fact
that he has since jumped to a new career in Information Technology [Case and
Arlo, take note].  He's written another article on the Zero Ontology of
David Pearce (not to be confused with the American C. S. Pierce) which I've
now reviewed and which led to the following exchange with Arthur:

[Ham]:
I thought I'd take the opportunity to venture a critique of your critique of
David Pearce on the Zero Ontology theory.  I've read some of the American
pragmatist Charles Pierce, but not David Pearce; so I'm limited to your
description of his ideas.  Incidentally, you've used the term "explanation
space" several times in your essay, and I'm not sure whether it derives from
Pearce's writings or is original with you.  Can you explain what it means?

[Arthur]:
Thanks for the critique.  The zero ontology is not supposed to be a totally
serious attempt to explain the universe.  I doubt that it could really
"explain" in a full sense. But it is an idea startling enough to
investigate.  The term "explanation space" was used by Pearce - I think he
means this: if a thing can be explained, then it has an explanation space,
otherwise it has none.
You are clearly missing some crucial information.  David Pearce is a
contemporary English philosopher, with no relation to C.S. Pierce.  He has a
website that explains his wild speculations, which is here:
http://www.hedweb.com/nihilism/nihilfil.htm (navigate using the page numbers
at the top)  This is what I was mainly talking about.

[Quoting from Arther's essay]:
"In the case of Pearce's proposal, the explanation takes the form of showing
that there is (in a sense) nothing to explain. As such, it is similar to
necessitarian responses to the problem, which claim that there is no
alternative to the existence of the world since something - God, for
example - exists as a matter of logical necessity."

[Ham]:
This is one of those few cases where I accept the "necessitarian"
explanation as the most logical.  While I believe existence is teleological,
I do not presume to qualify "divine purpose" by humanistic concepts.

[Arthur quoting Pearce]:
"This 'Zero ontology', an interpretation of the void which treats it as the
summation of all substantial reality (or vice versa - an interpretation of
substantial reality in terms of the void), appears as either unintelligible
or highly counter-intuitive from the perspective of our everyday worldview.
We are used to dealing with substantial things, and we tend to think of 0,
or the void, as the absence of things rather than their ultimate
'summation'.  But this may be a problem of language rather than
intelligibility.  We do not have the right terms at present to describe the
great totality of the world, considered as a single unit when all of its
properties are taken into account."

[Ham]:
Since being an Essentialist also makes me a phenomenalist, I reject
ontologies that equate existence to objective analogs like the numbers
system, biological evolution, or the laws of thermodynamics.  Any
interpretation of nothingness (i.e., "the void") presupposes a subject as
"interpreter", hence you don't have  nothingness; you have nothing +
awareness of nothing.  And, since awareness infers an object, it is a
logical impossibility to have "an interpretation of nothingness".

[Arthur's essay]:
"When modern physics tells us that the ultimate value of the conserved
constants of the physical universe is exactly zero, or as Pearce puts it:
'In the Universe as a whole, the conserved constants (electric charge,
angular momentum, mass-energy) add up to/cancel out to exactly 0. There
isn't any net electric charge or angular momentum.  The world's positive
mass-energy is exactly cancelled out by its negative gravitational potential
energy. (Provocatively, cryptically, elliptically, 'nothing' exists)' ...
our normal conceptual resources seem to stall.  Does this really mean that
the substance of the world is not really substantial at all, or is it a
bizarre mathematical trick which should be interpreted in some other way?"

[Ham]:
Neither symmetry nor the ultimate state of physical constants affects the
relational state of experienced reality.  For example, the positive charge
in the nucleus of an atom equals the negative charge of its electrons, but
this balance does not annul the matter which atoms comprise.  Again, entropy
is the ultimate state of matter and energy in the universe; even if such a
state reduced all existents to uniform homogeneity, it would not be
'nothing'....
Pearce seems to have made two errors in this argument.  In mathematics, the
system of negative numbers, by which he makes the sum of all numbers "zero",
is hypothetical (unreal or imaginary).  Also, neither things nor their
properties are numbers; so that, even if _numbers_ added up to zero, it
would not affect the existence of material entities.

[Arthur]:
Your point about rejecting any ontology that doesn't allow for awareness is
well-taken.  In fact Pearce does want to say that phenomenology has a place
in his scheme, and it is not a purely "numeric" ontology.  The "fact of
Zero" is not a purely mathematical fact, it is supposed to have application
to consciousness as well as physics.  You may find that this aspect of his
scheme isn't very well developed though.

[Arthur quoting Pearce]:
"Nothing compels us towards thinking that there must be something, or that
there must be nothing. We are also stalemated by the fact that any
particular thing that explains why something exists will itself be
something, which rules out our standard explanations - for example, it rules
out causal explanations (unless there is a self-caused entity, a conjecture
few are prepared to make)."

[Ham]:
In any causal ontology there must be at least one self-caused entity;
namely, the source of what exists.  Cusa called this source the 'First
Principle' and regarded it as the necessary non-contradictory source of all
contrariety.  The asymmetric appearance (or dichotomy) of existence is a
result of actualized nothingness negated by the uncreated source.

[Arthur]:
I was interested in what you said about Nicolas of Cusa, but I am afraid I
don't understand it.  What possible sense can be attached to the idea that
something is self-caused?  Whatever you mean by this, I don't think you are
talking about ordinary empirical causation.

[Ham]:
I don't recall using the term "self-caused" [actually I did - in error],
although I have referred to Essence as "uncreated", which is a different
conception.  Anyway, causation is a moot point when it comes to a Primary
Source, isn't it?  We're no longer talking about progress and change in such
a concept.  Essence in my philosophy is immutable, and any principle or
property hypothesized for it must be regarded as a constant.
Differentiation arises as a negation of the immutable source, and it makes
everything relative, including the space/time mode of experience and the
individuation of subjective awareness.

Your friend Pearce appears to be a reductionist with his Zero Ontology,
whereas I suppose I could be called a "saturationist".  You probably know a
more appropriate term, but I think essentialist says it best.  I base this
on the  logic that nothing can be derived from something, but something
cannot be derived from nothing.  Nonetheless, nothingness is where
metaphysics begins.  In my view, metaphysics encompasses two realities: the
experiential and the absolute.  The only cognitive link between them is
Value.  I think Cusa's theory of the Not-other as the non-contradictory
source of all contrariety supports my ontology, although I have Hegel to
thank for the negation concept.

But here's a Pearcean statement I don't understand:
"Intuitively, it is possible conceptually to subtract all the objects or
events from a given system, leaving no objects or events at all - the
default condition where there isn't anything to be explained.  But it is
problematic to assume one can conceptually do the same with properties -
i.e. notionally to subtract all the properties from a given system, leaving
no properties at all, as distinct from merely exchanging one property for
another.  Properties don't cease to be properties simply in virtue of being
described in terms of the absence of other properties".

What is so permanent about "properties" that they don't cease to be along
with the objects?  Or is Pearce alluding indirectly to the observing
subject's "recalled" concept?  In other words, how can you have properties
without objects?  (I also don't understand the numeric connection to
consciousness, but will check Pearce out on this subject.)

[...to be continued]

Essentially yours,
Ham