[MD] Value and the Anthropic Principle

[Platt Holden]

Hi Ham,
Thanks for relaying your conversation with Witherall. Most of what you
guys are talking about is way over my head. All I can say is that 0 is
about something, so it's place in ontology always leaves me more baffled
than usual. Our major differences continue as ever to be about the  nature 
of awareness (for me it is "proprietary" to quantum particles as well as 
humans and everything in between) and awareness being not of "objects"
as you assert (creating the Subject/Object division) but of "values" 
(creating the Dynamic/static division). In any event, thanks for sharing 
and I hope there's more to come.

Regards,
Platt

> Platt and all --
> 
> I'm reviving last month's thread to provide an update on my e-mail chats
> with Arthur Witherall, about which Platt said "I think many of us will be
> interested in how your dialog with Witherall transpires.  I know I will
> be."  So what I've patched together below from our recent exchange is
> fulfilling my promise to Platt, while possibly also providing a source of
> interest to others.
> 
> Some of you may have read Arthur's essay "The Fundamental Question" which
> suggested that the "awe" and "wonderment" expressed by philosophers at the
> phenomenon of existence is prima facie evidence that the universe is in
> some respect "self-validating".
> 
> One statement in particular struck me as "MOQish" for reasons that should
> be immediately apparent: "Since the [fundamental] question is why rather
> than how the world came to be, it seems appropriate to say that it came to
> be in order to realize goodness.  This would mean that existence has a
> purpose, which is the realization of value."
> 
> Inasmuch as this is also the teleological premise of Essentialism, I
> decided it might be productive to establish a dialog with Arthur, despite
> the fact that he has since jumped to a new career in Information Technology
> [Case and Arlo, take note].  He's written another article on the Zero
> Ontology of David Pearce (not to be confused with the American C. S.
> Pierce) which I've now reviewed and which led to the following exchange
> with Arthur:
> 
> [Ham]:
> I thought I'd take the opportunity to venture a critique of your critique
> of David Pearce on the Zero Ontology theory.  I've read some of the
> American pragmatist Charles Pierce, but not David Pearce; so I'm limited to
> your description of his ideas.  Incidentally, you've used the term
> "explanation space" several times in your essay, and I'm not sure whether
> it derives from Pearce's writings or is original with you.  Can you explain
> what it means?
> 
> [Arthur]:
> Thanks for the critique.  The zero ontology is not supposed to be a totally
> serious attempt to explain the universe.  I doubt that it could really
> "explain" in a full sense. But it is an idea startling enough to
> investigate.  The term "explanation space" was used by Pearce - I think he
> means this: if a thing can be explained, then it has an explanation space,
> otherwise it has none. You are clearly missing some crucial information. 
> David Pearce is a contemporary English philosopher, with no relation to
> C.S. Pierce.  He has a website that explains his wild speculations, which
> is here: http://www.hedweb.com/nihilism/nihilfil.htm (navigate using the
> page numbers at the top)  This is what I was mainly talking about.
> 
> [Quoting from Arther's essay]:
> "In the case of Pearce's proposal, the explanation takes the form of
> showing that there is (in a sense) nothing to explain. As such, it is
> similar to necessitarian responses to the problem, which claim that there
> is no alternative to the existence of the world since something - God, for
> example - exists as a matter of logical necessity."
> 
> [Ham]:
> This is one of those few cases where I accept the "necessitarian"
> explanation as the most logical.  While I believe existence is
> teleological, I do not presume to qualify "divine purpose" by humanistic
> concepts.
> 
> [Arthur quoting Pearce]:
> "This 'Zero ontology', an interpretation of the void which treats it as the
> summation of all substantial reality (or vice versa - an interpretation of
> substantial reality in terms of the void), appears as either unintelligible
> or highly counter-intuitive from the perspective of our everyday worldview.
> We are used to dealing with substantial things, and we tend to think of 0,
> or the void, as the absence of things rather than their ultimate
> 'summation'.  But this may be a problem of language rather than
> intelligibility.  We do not have the right terms at present to describe the
> great totality of the world, considered as a single unit when all of its
> properties are taken into account."
> 
> [Ham]:
> Since being an Essentialist also makes me a phenomenalist, I reject
> ontologies that equate existence to objective analogs like the numbers
> system, biological evolution, or the laws of thermodynamics.  Any
> interpretation of nothingness (i.e., "the void") presupposes a subject as
> "interpreter", hence you don't have  nothingness; you have nothing +
> awareness of nothing.  And, since awareness infers an object, it is a
> logical impossibility to have "an interpretation of nothingness".
> 
> [Arthur's essay]:
> "When modern physics tells us that the ultimate value of the conserved
> constants of the physical universe is exactly zero, or as Pearce puts it:
> 'In the Universe as a whole, the conserved constants (electric charge,
> angular momentum, mass-energy) add up to/cancel out to exactly 0. There
> isn't any net electric charge or angular momentum.  The world's positive
> mass-energy is exactly cancelled out by its negative gravitational
> potential energy. (Provocatively, cryptically, elliptically, 'nothing'
> exists)' ... our normal conceptual resources seem to stall.  Does this
> really mean that the substance of the world is not really substantial at
> all, or is it a bizarre mathematical trick which should be interpreted in
> some other way?"
> 
> [Ham]:
> Neither symmetry nor the ultimate state of physical constants affects the
> relational state of experienced reality.  For example, the positive charge
> in the nucleus of an atom equals the negative charge of its electrons, but
> this balance does not annul the matter which atoms comprise.  Again,
> entropy is the ultimate state of matter and energy in the universe; even if
> such a state reduced all existents to uniform homogeneity, it would not be
> 'nothing'.... Pearce seems to have made two errors in this argument.  In
> mathematics, the system of negative numbers, by which he makes the sum of
> all numbers "zero", is hypothetical (unreal or imaginary).  Also, neither
> things nor their properties are numbers; so that, even if _numbers_ added
> up to zero, it would not affect the existence of material entities.
> 
> [Arthur]:
> Your point about rejecting any ontology that doesn't allow for awareness is
> well-taken.  In fact Pearce does want to say that phenomenology has a place
> in his scheme, and it is not a purely "numeric" ontology.  The "fact of
> Zero" is not a purely mathematical fact, it is supposed to have application
> to consciousness as well as physics.  You may find that this aspect of his
> scheme isn't very well developed though.
> 
> [Arthur quoting Pearce]:
> "Nothing compels us towards thinking that there must be something, or that
> there must be nothing. We are also stalemated by the fact that any
> particular thing that explains why something exists will itself be
> something, which rules out our standard explanations - for example, it
> rules out causal explanations (unless there is a self-caused entity, a
> conjecture few are prepared to make)."
> 
> [Ham]:
> In any causal ontology there must be at least one self-caused entity;
> namely, the source of what exists.  Cusa called this source the 'First
> Principle' and regarded it as the necessary non-contradictory source of all
> contrariety.  The asymmetric appearance (or dichotomy) of existence is a
> result of actualized nothingness negated by the uncreated source.
> 
> [Arthur]:
> I was interested in what you said about Nicolas of Cusa, but I am afraid I
> don't understand it.  What possible sense can be attached to the idea that
> something is self-caused?  Whatever you mean by this, I don't think you are
> talking about ordinary empirical causation.
> 
> [Ham]:
> I don't recall using the term "self-caused" [actually I did - in error],
> although I have referred to Essence as "uncreated", which is a different
> conception.  Anyway, causation is a moot point when it comes to a Primary
> Source, isn't it?  We're no longer talking about progress and change in
> such a concept.  Essence in my philosophy is immutable, and any principle
> or property hypothesized for it must be regarded as a constant.
> Differentiation arises as a negation of the immutable source, and it makes
> everything relative, including the space/time mode of experience and the
> individuation of subjective awareness.
> 
> Your friend Pearce appears to be a reductionist with his Zero Ontology,
> whereas I suppose I could be called a "saturationist".  You probably know a
> more appropriate term, but I think essentialist says it best.  I base this
> on the  logic that nothing can be derived from something, but something
> cannot be derived from nothing.  Nonetheless, nothingness is where
> metaphysics begins.  In my view, metaphysics encompasses two realities: the
> experiential and the absolute.  The only cognitive link between them is
> Value.  I think Cusa's theory of the Not-other as the non-contradictory
> source of all contrariety supports my ontology, although I have Hegel to
> thank for the negation concept.
> 
> But here's a Pearcean statement I don't understand:
> "Intuitively, it is possible conceptually to subtract all the objects or
> events from a given system, leaving no objects or events at all - the
> default condition where there isn't anything to be explained.  But it is
> problematic to assume one can conceptually do the same with properties -
> i.e. notionally to subtract all the properties from a given system, leaving
> no properties at all, as distinct from merely exchanging one property for
> another.  Properties don't cease to be properties simply in virtue of being
> described in terms of the absence of other properties".
> 
> What is so permanent about "properties" that they don't cease to be along
> with the objects?  Or is Pearce alluding indirectly to the observing
> subject's "recalled" concept?  In other words, how can you have properties
> without objects?  (I also don't understand the numeric connection to
> consciousness, but will check Pearce out on this subject.)
> 
> [...to be continued]
> 
> Essentially yours,
> Ham