[MD] The SOM/MOQ discrepancy.

[Ham Priday]

Hi Platt --

> I plead guilty as charged.

I hereby absolve you of all guilt, Platt.  That 'Beholden" appellation was 
uncalled for, although you took it very well.  Actually, you are an original 
thinker when it comes to political and societal issues, and your comments 
and references continue to be a source of inspiration to me.  To be fair, 
you are finely tuned on the subject of morality and aesthetics, and I 
suspect this is what may have initially drawn you to Pirsig and the Quality 
thesis.  So, rather than calling you Platt Beholden, I shall consider you a 
moralist of the finest order who happens to subscribe to the MoQ.

I can see why that passage caught your fancy.  It's by a would-be 
philosopher who makes a lot of sense to me, especially now that I see his 
book quoted by someone else for the first time:

> "In Essence there is no such differentiation. Absolute sensibility
> is not something different from the absolute Self or its absolute
> Value. All is One. In other words, Essence by itself has no
> external perspective of its magnificence or potentiality. But
> because Essence is unappreciated in its Oneness, having its
> value perceived extrinsically perfects its sensibility.
> Thus, Essence actualizes difference as the appearance of
> otherness to an autonomous agent."

[Platt]:
> Here I see value (Quality) at the very root of your philosophy
> -- an Essence that created the world because it wanted to be
> appreciated and "perfect its sensibility." For Essence it was
> better to become known than to remain nameless. In the MOQ
> to which I'm beholden, betterness (DQ) is the fundamental
> creative force.

Interesting that you've picked up on the "valuistic" concept which is 
fundamental to Essentialism, as Quality is to the MoQ.  However, speculating 
on the "motive" for Creation is beyond the capacity of human reasoning. 
Even the author's use of  "unappreciated" in this context is misleading, 
because it suggests that Absolute Sensibility has a "need" to be perfected. 
Such an anthropomorphic perspective of 'Divine Will' is metaphysically 
unsupportable, although it is a useful metaphor for the purpose of a 
value-sensible agent.

Instead of concluding that "it was better to become known than to remain 
nameless," I would say that "it is better to be valued than known with 
certainty."  From the human perspective, this allows the free agent to 
reject the source of the value it senses (as nihilists are predisposed to 
do), thereby insuring the integrity of free choice.

Now, this contradicts your assertion that "betterness is the fundamental 
creative force."  For if DQ is primary and moves everything to "betterness" 
there is no option for "worseness".  Why then do we experience decadence, 
suffering, and corruption, and why do we have perpetrators of evil in the 
human community?  In other words, if morality is a cosmic principle, how can 
immorality exist in a moral universe?  Moral choices are of course based on 
value preferences.  I maintain that we live in an amoral universe but invent 
morality for our collective survival.  As my morality specialist, do you 
still find fault with this concept?

I don't know what Pirsig has to say about individual freedom and "free 
choice", or if he even acknowledges its value.  Perhaps you can provide a 
relevant quote to enlighten me.  And thanks for pointing me to that 
sagacious quote ;-)

Respectfully,
Ham