[MD] The SOM/MOQ discrepancy.

[Ham Priday]

Hi Platt --


Some comments in response to your (RMP) quotes ...

> Some quotes in answer to your queries:
>
> [Ham]
> If morality is a cosmic principle, how can
> immorality exist in a moral universe?
>
> "If you eliminate suffering from this world you eliminate life.
> There's no evolution. Those species that don't suffer don't
> survive. Suffering is the negative face of the Quality that
> drives the whole process." (Lila, 29)

So creatures are born into a universe that subjects them to both "good" 
(positive) and "bad" (negative) quality (and perhaps some that is neutral). 
Since the word "moral" is generally understood to mean positive or 
favorable, how is Pirsig's universe a moral system?

> [Ham]
> Moral choices are of course based on value preferences.
>
> "The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgments are
> essentially assertions of value and if value is the fundamental
> ground-stuff of the world, then moral judgments are the
> fundamental ground-stuff of the world."
> (Lila, 12)

Don't we make "judgments" based on perceived values?  If so, an "assertion 
of value" would be an affirmative expression or action taken toward positive 
values, or a move away from negative values.  If Value (Quality) is Reality, 
by what logic does Pirsig posit "moral judgment" as its fundamental 
ground-stuff?  (I'm assuming that he acknowledges the individual as the 
"moral judge".)

[Ham]
> I maintain that we live in an amoral universe but
> invent morality for our collective survival.  Do you
> still find fault with this concept?
>
> "So what Phaedrus was saying was that not just life,
> but everything, is an ethical activity. It is nothing else.
> When inorganic patterns of reality create life the
> Metaphysics of Quality postulates that they've done so
> because it's "better" and that this definition of "betterness"
> - this beginning response to Dynamic Quality - is an
> elementary unit of ethics upon which all right and wrong
> can be based." (Lila, 12)

Again, what is ethical is a moral judgment of the individual.  Pirsig is in 
effect saying that if the amoeba survives by avoiding a toxic substance, or 
the sun comes up in the morning, it's an ethical happening.  Likewise, if a 
flood destroys his home, or his crops are wiped out by a drought, it's an 
unethical happening.  Is that man making "assertions of value" about 
objective phenomena?  And what about patterns of reality that create deadly 
viruses and earthquakes?  How do such departures from "betterness" 
constitute a moral universe?

[Ham]
> I don't know what Pirsig has to say about individual freedom
> and "free choice", or if he even acknowledges its value.
>
> "It (the MOQ) says that what is meant by 'human rights' is
> usually the moral code of intellect-vs.-society, the moral right
> of intellect to be free of social control.  Freedom of speech;
> freedom of assembly, of travel; trial by jury; habeas corpus;
> government by consent-these 'human rights' are all
> intellect-vs.-society issues. According to the Metaphysics of
> Quality these 'human rights' have not just a sentimental basis,
> but a rational, metaphysical basis. They are essential to the
> evolution of a higher level of life from a lower level of life.
> They are for real."  (Lila, 24)

Am I to understand that slavery, oppression, terror, and genocide, which 
express the freedom of tyrants to subdue their subjects, are "not for real"? 
Or that genetic mutations which cause cancer and anatomical malformations, 
defeating the "betterness" principle, are to be ignored in a moral universe? 
Does the illegal immigrant have the right to free schooling, healthcare, and 
the protection of our courts because "human rights are 
intellect-vs.-society" issues?

> Finally, there's this quote early on in Lila that brings you
> and Pirsig very close to one another in your respective metaphysics:
>
> "Their overall subject he called a "Metaphysics of Quality,"
> or sometimes a "Metaphysics of Value" . . ." (Lila, 2)

Close in the usage of these two terms only, I'm afraid.  Apart from "human 
rights",  I see no reference supporting individual freedom in these 
quotations,  In fact, I see no evidence that Pirsig associates morality with 
human values at all.

> You seem to have no problem connecting values with morals.
> Now if you could just take your value-rich metaphysics and
> inject it with dose of universal morality, you and Pirsig could
> become bosom buddies.
>
> Until that happens, I will have to substitute as a matchmaker. :-)

Until Pirsig acknowledges Value and Morality as relational perceptions of 
the human being rather than a universal principle, I shall remain 
unattached.

But I give you an 'A' for trying.

Thanks, Platt.
Ham