[MD] MOQ levels

[skutvik at online.no]

Platt, Steve and Moqsayers. 

26 January. :

 
> > Platt:
> > >> We disagree on this. There are plenty of static social ideas 
> > >> around IMO, including the idea that religion can tell us
> > >> something about about reality and morality that reason can't. 
> > >> But, let it rest.

Steve has "slashed and burned" the traditional - what I call  Semitic - 
religion so well that I would not add to his post load. But there is the 
point about all ideas/thinking being intellectual patterns, as Platt says: 
"There are plenty static social ideas (thinking) around". I once agreed 
with Steve that those are "bad intellectual patterns", but by this I meant 
the said religions (Christendom preferable) trying to rationalize their 
views.   
 
> > Steve quotes RMP from LC:
> > "45. After the beginning of history inorganic, biological, social
> > and intellectual patterns are found existing together in the same
> > person. I think the conflicts  mentioned here are intellectual
> > conflicts in which one side clings to an intellectual  justification
> > of existing social patterns and the other side intellectually
> > opposes the  existing social patterns..."

I don't know what "problem" he refers to but "intellectual justification of 
existing social patterns" sounds weird. As Pirsig says a person 
consists of all levels (at least in the Western world) and the intellect 
will under no circumstances "justify" any social patterns. As said 
before a country may be intellect-dominated, i.e. its social patterns 
mollified by intellect, f.ex. a judicial system that has to go through the 
paces, not simply following the words of a prophet, but intellect will 
never really like or "justify" any punishment, just secure its 
OBJECTIVITY. 

> > All justifications are intellectual patterns (as I was arguing that 
> > using faith as justification for belief is an intellectual pattern 
> > which I have further argued is a dangerous one). Your example of
> > "the  idea that religion can tell us something about about reality
> > and  morality that reason can't" is an intellectual justification of
> > a  social pattern rather than a social pattern itself.

We must see the relative novelty of calling world views "faith" or 
"belief". Ancient people did not know these intellect-derivatives. The 
old Greek mythology was no faith or required any justification. 

Platt: 
> You may be right, but I got the idea for "static social ideas" from
> Pirsig's explication of Victorian ideas about morality which he
> invariably described as "static patterns." Also the following quote
> suggests the existence of "static social ideas:"

Sure, what it cooks down to is that there are "thinking going on" at the 
social level ... not mere copying or whatever definition managed to get 
elected during the time when the social level was our focus. 

IMO

Bo