[MD] Philosophy and Philosophology

[John Carl]

On Wed, Aug 12, 2009 at 10:08 PM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:

>
> On 8/12 at 2:33 PM John Carl wrote --
>
>
>  I don't believe self is an illusion.  I believe self is a choice.
>> Or let me put it this way, the self as a static entity is illusory
>> as an object, but the *existence* of a self is the self-evident
>> choice of consciousness.
>>
>
> I like your definition of the self as "choice."  It complements my concept
> of "value sensibility" by imbuing it with action.  Actually, I believe that
> the act of experiencing is making a choice, rather than passively receiving
> external information.  That choice shapes our objective reality to represent
> our value-sensibility.
>

Right, you can't make a choice unless you have values and something to
choose from - which "values-sensibility" does describe succinctly and
accurately.



>
>
>  Self as entity is real.
>>
>
> It is certainly the most intimate reality we can know.  Paradoxically, it's
> the most difficult entity to define.


Perhaps that is because "knowing" is for me and "defining" is for other.  I
know my self, but defining it for your satisfaction can be problematic.
 Especially if you make it so!




> In fact, I think it's easier to come up with a conception of the primary
> source (Creator or Essence) than to peg selfness as the locus of conscious
> awareness.
>
>  The contents of this entity are illusory as objects.
>>
>
> Yes, and the Pirsigians tend to regard the knowing self as illusory too.
> Their definition of the subject as a "collection of interactive patterns"
> hardly qualifies as an existing entity.  Yet, my Internet search for a
> proper definition has born no fruit.  Isn't it ironic that, after thousands
> of years, the greatest minds in history have been unable to fathom exactly
> what a "mind" is?


And yet, they seem to be using theirs in an effort to evade this fathoming.
 You'd think that'd be a clue of some kind, eh?


John