[MD] Philosophy and Philosophology

[Ham Priday]

On 8/12 at 2:33 PM John Carl wrote --


> I don't believe self is an illusion.  I believe self is a choice.
> Or let me put it this way, the self as a static entity is illusory
> as an object, but the *existence* of a self is the self-evident
> choice of consciousness.

I like your definition of the self as "choice."  It complements my concept 
of "value sensibility" by imbuing it with action.  Actually, I believe that 
the act of experiencing is making a choice, rather than passively receiving 
external information.  That choice shapes our objective reality to represent 
our value-sensibility.

> Self as entity is real.

It is certainly the most intimate reality we can know.  Paradoxically, it's 
the most difficult entity to define.  In fact, I think it's easier to come 
up with a conception of the primary source (Creator or Essence) than to peg 
selfness as the locus of conscious awareness.

> The contents of this entity are illusory as objects.

Yes, and the Pirsigians tend to regard the knowing self as illusory too. 
Their definition of the subject as a "collection of interactive patterns" 
hardly qualifies as an existing entity.  Yet, my Internet search for a 
proper definition has born no fruit.  Isn't it ironic that, after thousands 
of years, the greatest minds in history have been unable to fathom exactly 
what a "mind" is?

My own theory is that, apart from its contents, the self is a 'negate' 
(nothingness) -- a "cosmic void" that sucks up the value of Essence to 
objectify its reality.  There is metaphysical support for such a theory. 
For example, whatever we can't sense or experience is by definition 
nothingness.  Secondly, the moment a particular entity is identified and 
defined in space/time by the intellect, it becomes separated from the whole 
of existence by nothingness.  This suggests that the act of experience 
differentiates finite phenomena by "encapsulating" them in our own 
nothingness.  Finally (and fundamentally), there is the problem of 
explaining how an undivided absolute Source can give rise to differentiated 
finite existence without negating the nothingness that actualizes it. 
(That, incidentally, is the premise of my Creation hypothesis.)

> At least, that's what I think.
>
> If I am I.
>
> And if I do think.
>
> Which I think I do.
>
> Which hopefully satisfies you cuz it sure satisfies me.
>
>
>>
>> Bo hints that the original MOQ as described in ZAMM dissolves the
>> mind/matter enigma. But how? By making it a static level within the
>> umbrella of the MOQ? OK. Does that make the DQ of the MOQ
>> consciousness itself?
>
>
> A form of meta-consciousness perhaps?
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> In Lila Pirsig says Quality is experience and experience is value. Is
>> consciousness the same as experience? Frankly, I don't see a
>> difference. So that would make Quality=Consciousness
>
>
>> Is this what you are saying, Bo? Is this where your train of thoughts is
>> leading, John?
>>
>
> How can I know until I get there?  Right now  I'm still on the roller
> coaster at the bottom of the hill and looking forward to where this
> rollercoaster metaphysical train ends up.
>
> I don't see anything wrong with Quality=Consciousness, at least on the
> immediate surface appearance...
>
> I've an ongoing issue with the ambiguity of the term "value" as used for
> "differentiation" vs. "the good", which to me is practically a night and 
> day
> kind of opposition - the apprehension of an axis of travel vs an
> apprehension of a direction to go.   So it would depend upon which kind of
> Quality you mean.
>
> But even equating (as you do, Platt) Quality with Good, there is a way of
> posing this in a revealing manner: In what way is consciousness different
> from "the Good".  And we haven't really gotten into much of a discussion 
> of
> evil, but if there is evil, then it seems the only place it arises is in
> human consciousness.  Thus Quality is conscious, but not all consciousness
> is Quality.
>
> I'll be more sure after climbing out of my darkness, no doubt.
>
>
>
>> Or is the problem of consciousness something we don't want to deal
>> with? After all, nobody else has come up with a satisfactory explanation
>> of consciousness. The idea that it somehow emerges from a lump of
>> electric meat means it's a miracle. Shall we settle for that?
>>
>
> Relying on miracle as explanation is cheating in the metaphysic game.
> Naughty!  But I don't see a problem
> in  explaining consciousness.   It's a good place to start when you're at
> the bottom and in the dark.  We shall go there in more detail.  Promise.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> john
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