[MD] Reductionism

[Matt Kundert]

DMB said:
Even if my radical empiricist reading of DQ (of the MOQ, 
actually) is
not accurate, that reading doesn't suffer from 
the problems of
inconsistency that seem to come from your 
reading. And I'd like to
suggest that if one understands 
Pirsig's books in such a way that any
given quote makes 
sense next to any other quote such that everything
fits 
together coherently, then you are probably reading his 
books
rightly. Or, to say the same thing from the other 
direction, if
Pirsig's claims seen inconsistent or 
contradictory, then you are
probably not reading him 
rightly.  I'm not saying his books are absolutely perfect, of 
course, but I
really do not remember any case in which a 
perceived inconsistency
between claims was not a result 
of a misreading of those claims.

Matt:
Despite your gesture towards assuming "Pirsig's a bright 
guy who knows what he's saying," which granting he (or 
anyone else) is doesn't get us very far in interpretation (it 
simply pleads patience with an antsy audience--which I 
doubt I'd be a paradigm case of with regards to Pirsig), I'm 
taking for granted that your (now) assumption that Pirsig is 
internally coherent is something you worked for to achieve, 
and not something you simply assume for everyone.  
Coherence isn't based on memory (though a good one helps), 
it's something that's created and displayed.  

And in that case, I'll absolutely grant you that our 
respective readings are based on our extensive work with 
the texts--you don't sense any inconsistencies, I do.  And 
based on your work, you assume that anyone who does find 
inconsistencies is wrong, and--more or less--vice versa for 
me.  Or rather, I think the jury is still out, because I have 
not read a reading of Pirsig qua "untensioned" philosopher 
that makes sense to me, answers all my questions.  I still 
think showing Pirsig's system requires yet more work.  (And 
let me reiterate--it's not like I think it's impossible.  I think 
it might be quite possible, but I seem to think it's a much 
larger endeavor than others suppose.)

Or perhaps, I shouldn't say "inconsistency," but rather 
"untenability."  Now I'm not sure.  If you pound language 
hard enough, any fool thing can be made consistent--the 
question is, is it worth it?

That's work I don't have the energy/time to display for my 
own case, so I'm willing to concede the battle to your 
authority, and limp back to my barracks to decide whether 
the war is worth continuing.

Let me also say this--I take it as an interpretive principle 
that you must extend as far as possible the attempt to 
treat a philosopher/text as coherent.  Of course, that 
doesn't always mean success will be met (and for the great 
ones, it's never in my experience met because a great 
philosopher's mind will always be bigger than his 
time/language, and the spillover will always generate 
incoherence and wrong notes in the larger song--a 
consequence of trying to sing so radically: or to put it in 
Pirsigian language: coherence is the sign of static patterns, 
and in pounding out the static latches of his Dynamic 
breaks with old crusts of convention, it would surprising 
indeed if every latch he suggested was in fact the best 
way forward).

DMB said:
I think it is no accident that everyone of them rejects 
and/or
misunderstands the MOQ's mysticism and radical 
empiricism. Without
that, as I see it, the MOQ can't be 
understood coherently. I would even
go so far as to say 
that this is the only thing that stands between you
and a 
completely coherent understanding of the MOQ.

Matt:
I still deny radical empiricism is my missing link, still 
because of my belief that the problems solved by that 
-ism--as far as I can tell--are the same problems solved 
by psychological nominalism (though I might now say 
"inferentialism" because of Rorty's student Robert Brandom).  
I still maintain in the face of adversity that radical 
empiricism and psychological nominalism are mirror-image 
positions, simply in different philosophical vocabularies.  
Choice of vocabulary does count, but perhaps I'm more 
ecumenical.  (I've elaborated a little more fully an 
explanation of the parallel in a post that was based on my 
little Quine MD-post a while ago, which we fought over.  If 
I remember correctly, about 13 paragraphs down begins 
new, additional stuff, if you're curious:
http://pirsigaffliction.blogspot.com/2009/04/quine-sellars-empiricism-and-linguistic.html.)

That being the case, I'll grant you (separately) that A) I 
might not be seeing Pirsig's Great Unity, B) this might be 
because of other philosophical commitments (these are 
separate because I do think someone can see clearly when 
they are willfully altering a loved one for their own good), 
and C) it might be because of my relative ignorance of 
and/or insouciance towards the mystic traditions of the 
world.  The former (ignorance) can certainly be cleared up 
by arduous study, but the latter (insouciance) is 
trickier--I've never understood why I can't grant the mystic 
tradition its validity and utility under a broader banner that 
doesn't require me to take part in meditation (narrowly 
defined as sitting and humming).

One of the first blog posts I wrote was a commentary on 
Hediegger, Dewey, and Pirsig, via two essays Rorty wrote 
on the former two.  It opens with a brief ditty on mysticism 
that might spur thoughts (good or bad, about me, Rorty, or 
Pirsig).

http://pirsigaffliction.blogspot.com/2006/03/heidegger-dewey-pirsig.html

Matt

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