[MD] Empirical and Historical

[Ham Priday]

On 7/22/09 3:25 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:


> Hi Ham,
>
> I am pursuing a thread on MOQ Evolution.  Your statement:
> "But the ultimate source of sensibility, value, change and difference
> is itself immutable" is flat out contradicted by description of the
> evolution of QUALITY by Pirsig.

Unfortunately you may be right, Joe.  If Pirsig's Quality (even as DQ) is 
"evolutionary", it cannot represent the absolute, immutable source.  An 
esthetic property like quality, beauty, goodness or value does not equate to 
Essence, anyway, because it is relative to the subject.  Furthermore, 
implied in my use of "absolute" is the notion of perfection, and a perfect 
source is immutable because it has nothing better to "evolve to".

I realized it was going out on a limb to suggest that Pirsig intended 
Quality to be the primary source of existence.  However, the author of MoQ 
equated Quality with Reality.  And since its equivalent connotation 'Value' 
is derived from the source and figures prominently in my ontogeny, there 
seemed to be a commonality of sorts between our philosophies.  But you have 
now astutely pointed out the incompatability.

> My sense is that for Pirsig evolution is not speculation, but the
> metaphysical description for levels of Quality. These levels become
> the metaphysical basis for morality.

Quite frankly, I have never bought into this theory.  Morality is not 
intrinsic to the universe.  The basis for morality is value sensibility, 
which is a subjective property.  That is why individuals collectively (in 
different cultures) adopt different moral systems.  The ability to discern 
value, as in worthiness, excellence and goodness, is a distinctly human 
function.  It is this finely-tuned human attribute which affords the 
individual free choice within a virtually infinite range of options.  If 
Value were universal, free choice would be impossible, and "evolution to 
betterness" would be an automatic progression (without man).

Value, like intellect and passion, is not an extracorporeal realm of the 
cosmos but a sensibility realized only by human beings.  As an essentialist, 
I believe that value-sensibility is not only the essence of man but the 
meaning and purpose of his life-experience.  What disturbs me about the 
Quality thesis is that Pirsig refers to man only in the collective or 
cultural sense, and his "cosmic morality" leaves the reader without a sense 
of individual purpose.  Instead, man simply appears on the scene as a 
byproduct of nature, as if to fulfill a "level of quality", and is swept 
along in its inexorable movement toward betterness.  In my opinion, the 
thesis falls short of defining man's role in existence.

Thanks for making this point, Joe.  I'll be interested to see if the 
Pirsigians can reconcile these differences, even if they have no reason to 
do so.

Essentially yours,
Ham