[MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02

[MarshaV]

John,

Are you saying that you to not believe there is experience that is
non-conceptual?


Marsha





-----Original Message-----
From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
[mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of John Carl
Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 4:31 PM
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Subject: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02

Kreug]


And therefore all philosophical reflection, as an intellectual movement away
from a more concrete analysis into abstract conceptual analysis, invariably
must return "...back once again to the *same practical common-sense* of our
starting point, the pre-philosophic attitude with which we originally
confront the visible world" if it is to remain faithful to our lived
experience.3<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#
_ftn3>



John]


But...but...but... what if our "common sense starting point" is as abstract
as concrete?   What I mean is, what if this latching onto the one "concrete"
thing you can grasp is just as much an intellectual abstraction taken on
faith as the most soaring idealistic conceptions?  Then preferring the
concrete to the abstract is just a preference for minutiae.


Kreuger]



It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the "aboriginal
flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual phenomenal
experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality-such as cause,
continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and
freedom.4<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ft
n4>This
"pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world
is
captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as the
foundation of his radical empiricism.


John]


So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal
experience.  Cause is pre-phenomenal.  Self is pre-phenomenal.  Substance,
activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be
discovered and used.  It's just asinine.  Pirsig describes it that way
exactly.


Every time "something" happen in my experience, my brain fires off some kind
of electrochemical response.  It might be as noticeable as a hot stove or as
subtle as a butterfly's kiss.  I get some kind of response in my organistic
being from the outside world.  When this happens, I often get a formal
pattern that falls into my category of "known concept".  Sometimes it's not
recognizable but I  still call it a  concept - content of consciousness.   I
might not have a word for it, which means I'll probably have a hard time
remembering it or sorting it or intellectualizing about it, but something
happens, some definite pattern falls under the purview of my mind.  You can
spend your time analyzing how this happens, what sort of patterns emerge and
give them all kinds of labels... but the one label that does not fit, that
does not make any sense whatsoever is "pre-conceptual experience".   Such a
self-deluded idea as the basis for a metaphysics is ludicrous.


He must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" the way I
do.   Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up on words
if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual
patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness)


Krueger]

*5*

    James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his
empirical philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of this
methodological principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only things
that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in
terms drawn from
experience."5<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html
#_ftn5>




John]


To a philosopher, it's all debatable -  the definable and the indefinable
alike.   What's not experience?  Just because it occurs only in my mind, is
that not an "experience"?    Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can
realize is that purely in our minds.  Thus "terms drawn from experience" can
be shortened to "terms".    True, albeit tautologically.



Kreuger]


James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional thought
functions as the primitive-and thus irreducible-interface between self and
world.   On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James refers to
it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no
experience.


John]


I guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define
"concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern.


Kreuger]


James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience *as
experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically
articulate it.


John]

He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously experience?
 Ok, I got no problem with that.  Just don't call it a concrete foundation
is all.


Kreuger]


In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences
harbor *non-conceptual
content*. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal content
that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an
exhaustive conceptual
analysis.7<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_f
tn7>



John]


 Exhaustive conceptual analysis can be exhausting, like trying to count how
many hypothesis can dance on the pins of your head -  an infinity of them,
is the answer.  So?  Like trying to quantify the ten thousand things.  Don't
go there.


"Non-conceptual content" is a concept that has no content.  I can see that
this is going to have to be continued.  Where did you guys get this guy?
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