[MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02

[John Carl]

Not if you define concepts by experience... how could there be?

On Sat, Jul 25, 2009 at 2:04 PM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:

>
> John,
>
> Are you saying that you to not believe there is experience that is
> non-conceptual?
>
>
> Marsha
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
> [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of John Carl
> Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 4:31 PM
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Subject: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02
>
> Kreug]
>
>
> And therefore all philosophical reflection, as an intellectual movement
> away
> from a more concrete analysis into abstract conceptual analysis, invariably
> must return "...back once again to the *same practical common-sense* of our
> starting point, the pre-philosophic attitude with which we originally
> confront the visible world" if it is to remain faithful to our lived
> experience.3<
> http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#
> _ftn3>
>
>
>
> John]
>
>
> But...but...but... what if our "common sense starting point" is as abstract
> as concrete?   What I mean is, what if this latching onto the one
> "concrete"
> thing you can grasp is just as much an intellectual abstraction taken on
> faith as the most soaring idealistic conceptions?  Then preferring the
> concrete to the abstract is just a preference for minutiae.
>
>
> Kreuger]
>
>
>
> It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the
> "aboriginal
> flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual
> phenomenal
> experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality-such as cause,
> continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and
> freedom.4<
> http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ft
> n4>This
> "pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world
> is
> captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as the
> foundation of his radical empiricism.
>
>
> John]
>
>
> So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal
> experience.  Cause is pre-phenomenal.  Self is pre-phenomenal.  Substance,
> activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be
> discovered and used.  It's just asinine.  Pirsig describes it that way
> exactly.
>
>
> Every time "something" happen in my experience, my brain fires off some
> kind
> of electrochemical response.  It might be as noticeable as a hot stove or
> as
> subtle as a butterfly's kiss.  I get some kind of response in my organistic
> being from the outside world.  When this happens, I often get a formal
> pattern that falls into my category of "known concept".  Sometimes it's not
> recognizable but I  still call it a  concept - content of consciousness.
> I
> might not have a word for it, which means I'll probably have a hard time
> remembering it or sorting it or intellectualizing about it, but something
> happens, some definite pattern falls under the purview of my mind.  You can
> spend your time analyzing how this happens, what sort of patterns emerge
> and
> give them all kinds of labels... but the one label that does not fit, that
> does not make any sense whatsoever is "pre-conceptual experience".   Such a
> self-deluded idea as the basis for a metaphysics is ludicrous.
>
>
> He must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" the way I
> do.   Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up on words
> if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual
> patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness)
>
>
> Krueger]
>
> *5*
>
>    James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his
> empirical philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of this
> methodological principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only things
> that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in
> terms drawn from
> experience."5<
> http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html
> #_ftn5>
>
>
>
>
> John]
>
>
> To a philosopher, it's all debatable -  the definable and the indefinable
> alike.   What's not experience?  Just because it occurs only in my mind, is
> that not an "experience"?    Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can
> realize is that purely in our minds.  Thus "terms drawn from experience"
> can
> be shortened to "terms".    True, albeit tautologically.
>
>
>
> Kreuger]
>
>
> James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional thought
> functions as the primitive-and thus irreducible-interface between self and
> world.   On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James refers
> to
> it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no
> experience.
>
>
> John]
>
>
> I guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define
> "concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern.
>
>
> Kreuger]
>
>
> James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience *as
> experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically
> articulate it.
>
>
> John]
>
> He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously experience?
>  Ok, I got no problem with that.  Just don't call it a concrete foundation
> is all.
>
>
> Kreuger]
>
>
> In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences
> harbor *non-conceptual
> content*. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal content
> that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an
> exhaustive conceptual
> analysis.7<
> http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_f
> tn7>
>
>
>
> John]
>
>
>  Exhaustive conceptual analysis can be exhausting, like trying to count how
> many hypothesis can dance on the pins of your head -  an infinity of them,
> is the answer.  So?  Like trying to quantify the ten thousand things.
>  Don't
> go there.
>
>
> "Non-conceptual content" is a concept that has no content.  I can see that
> this is going to have to be continued.  Where did you guys get this guy?
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
>
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
>