[MD] (Fwd) Re: John Carl Critiques Pure Experience:INST01

[Ham Priday]

Greetings Ron (with John and Bo in mind) --


Every so often I get the impression that you and John understand the MoQ 
thesis as I do, that is, as a valuistic Reality.  But then, when you attempt 
to explain this concept to Bo, your use of Pirsigian lingo becomes confused, 
the explanation lacks cogency, and the concept falls apart.

You and Bo are logically oriented, which is a philosophical advantage. 
Unfortunately, logic doesn't lend itself well to "description", and I think 
description is the problem in communicating metaphysical ideas.  Here, for 
example, is the epistemology you described for Bo.  Let me try to "clean it 
up" so that it expresses my worldview, and see if we can reach some accord 
with Bo's
peculiar brand of "Intellectualism" (which I understand even less).

> The MoQ, Pirsig's MoQ, takes the position that subjective experience
> is the origin of the reality we experience. The objective viewpoint
> famously misinterprets this, as you yourself do. It is interpreted as
> saying anything from objects only existing when they are subjectively
> perceived to the subjective conceptual generation of all objective
> external reality, they just can't stop assuming the idea of an external
> reality of objective substance as the starting point of experience
> which keeps them from the MoQ understanding. [??]

You lead with a tautological statement that makes "experience" the origin of 
experiential reality.
Experience defines our reality but isn't its source.  That source is Value 
(or Quality) sensed by the subject.  Experience is the objective reality we 
know.  So why not simply say, "The MoQ takes the position that sensibility 
creates (or actualizes) reality"?   (I was unable to decipher the long third 
sentence.)

> MoQ starts with the dynamic quality of experience, not conceptualized
> notions of an "external" "ultimate" reality.  MoQ says that this is DQ,
> the knowable non-conceptual now of experience before it is understood
> in any fashion.  It has no substance other than what is conceptually 
> given.
> Pirsig calls this primal value, the value all other values spring from and 
> their
> test of trueness.

I don't see how anything is "knowable" before it it is "understood". 
However, we can "sense" or "feel" the presence of something that we don't 
understand.  Also, "non-conceptual now of experience" is a specious 
description of Value.  Any phenomenon defined in time is already 
intellectualized (conceptualized), and Pirsig himself has defined the sense 
of Quality (Value) as "pre-intellectual".  Otherwise, I believe these 
statements accurately represent the author's thesis.

While I'm at it, Bo's response to John doesn't make much sense to me:

> The MOQ as the ultimate picture goes without saying, it being neither
> idealist nor materialist is just as plain - these categories belong to
> SOM. Plain is it also that SOM's various tools - among them
> empiricism - had to be used by DQ to make it out of SOM -- out of
> intellect.

MOQ is only the name of a philosophy.  So what does "as the ultimate 
picture" mean?   Idealism and Materialism are two opposing ontologies, like 
Subjectivism and Objectivism.  And if empiricism is a "tool" of SOM, then 
what is Intellect?  Wouldn't it be more logical to call Intellect a tool of 
SOM, and empiricism the product created by this tool?  In any case, DQ 
doesn't make empiricism out of SOM.  Man, the subject, does this by using 
his intellect.  Bo seems to be arguing for Intellect (rather than 
experience) as the primary empirical reality, which is not supported by 
Pirsig in either of his novels or the SODV paper.

This is the way I see it, Ron.  If you have no major disagreement, let's 
throw this in Bo's court and see how he plays it.

Regards,
Ham